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Abstract 
 
 
In the early 2000s, the Republic of Turkey has initiated an ambitious reform 
program in the most important segments of her energy market; namely, 
electricity, natural gas, petroleum and liquefied petroleum gas industries, which 
requires privatization, liberalization as well as a radical restructuring of these 
industries. However, there is no consensus that the measures introduced are 
optimal. The present dissertation attempts to answer, first, whether or not 
recently introduced energy market reforms in Turkey are optimal from an 
economic perspective to ensure a fully functioning energy market; and second, 
what still needs to be done to improve them. The dissertation not only provides 
an economic analysis of these reforms but also lists some policy suggestions 
with crucial importance. Since the rapid electricity demand growth is the most 
contentious reason behind the recent reforms; the dissertation specifically 
focuses on the issue by both providing an electricity demand estimation and 
forecast, and comparing the results with official projections. The study 
concludes that despite relatively good legislative framework, in practice, the 
reforms in Turkey are far from ideal as they are mainly in the form of “textbook 
reforms”; and therefore a significant amount of work still lies ahead of Turkey to 
set up a fully-fledged energy market. 
 
Keywords: Turkish energy market, regulation, restructuring, privatization, 
competition, electricity, natural gas, petroleum, LPG, energy demand, partial 
adjustment model, cointegration, ARIMA modelling   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  2 
The Republic of Turkey1 (hereafter Turkey) has initiated a major reform program 
of the regulatory framework surrounding the most important segments of her 
energy market; namely, electricity, natural gas, petroleum and liquefied 
petroleum gas industries. The reform program entails privatization, liberalization 
as well as a radical restructuring of the whole energy industry. Also, an 
autonomous regulatory body, Energy Market Regulatory Authority2 (EMRA), 
was created to set up and maintain a financially strong, stable, transparent and 
competitive energy market. 
 
No academic work has been done to determine whether or not recent market 
reforms mentioned above are optimal from an economic perspective to ensure 
a fully functioning energy market in Turkey or what still needs to be done to 
improve them3. The present dissertation aims at providing answers to these 
questions4. 
 
The most controversial reason behind, or justification for, recent reforms has 
been the endeavor to avoid so-called “energy crisis”. Therefore, the dissertation 
specifically focuses on the electricity demand in Turkey by presenting an 
electricity demand estimation and forecast. 
 
Although there exists a huge literature on market regulation; to the best of my 
knowledge, so far, no scholar has studied and analyzed energy market reforms 
in Turkey from an academic perspective. Since it is obvious that these reforms 
will have important implications for the future of the country, the dissertation will 
be an important contribution not only to the existing literature but also to the 
energy policy formulation process in Turkey.  
 
                                                 
1 It is strongly advised that those who are not familiar with the basic facts about Turkey and her 
energy market should consult Appendix 1. 
2 The author himself is working for the EMRA. 
3 The present dissertation is a reduced version of a more comprehensive paper that aims at 
providing anyone with or without a background in general principles of regulation with an 
economic analysis of recent reforms in Turkey. However, due to space limitations, it was not 
possible to present the literature review in regulation here; therefore, I assume that the reader is 
familiar with the basic concepts in regulation theory. For those without such knowledge, 
Appendix 2 constitutes an internal part of the dissertation. 
4 The views, findings and conclusions expressed in this dissertation are entirely those of the 
author and do not represent in any way the views of any institution he is affiliated with. 
  3 
The dissertation is organized as follows. The next chapter presents the 
historical background of Turkish energy market starting from the early 1920s up 
to the present time. To alleviate the controversy surrounding the electricity 
demand in Turkey, chapter 3 provides an electricity demand estimation as well 
as a forecast for the period 2005-2015. Given the demand forecast and current 
regulatory policy in Turkey, chapter 4 critically analyzes the compatibility of 
regulatory practice in Turkey with the theory of regulation. To improve current 
regulatory framework, this chapter also lists some policy suggestions with 
crucial importance. The final chapter concludes. 
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Chapter 2: Historical Background and Recent Reforms 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews the history of Turkish energy market and briefly 
summarizes the recent reforms to provide a background to Turkish energy 
market5.  
 
2.2 The History of Turkish Energy Market 
 
Hepbasli (2005) reports that in Turkey “the first electric generator was a 2 kW 
dynamo connected to the water mill installed in Tarsus” in 1902; and, he 
continues, “[t]he first bigger power plant was installed in Silahtaraga, Istanbul, in 
1913”. The following evolution of Turkish energy market may be summarized as 
follows. 
 
The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923, and until the 1930s the electricity 
industry6 was heavily dependent on foreign investment as the country was 
trying a liberal economy. In the 1930s, there was a widespread belief all over 
the world in the benefits of public ownership of the electricity industry. Following 
this trend, nationalization of Turkish electricity industry started in 1938 and, by 
1944, almost all electricity industry had been placed within the public domain. 
 
In the 1960s, the government started the “development plans era”. The Ministry 
of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) was established in 1963, and was 
responsible for Turkey’s energy policy. This was followed in 1970 by the 
creation of Turkish Electricity Administration (TEK), which would have a 
monopoly in the Turkish electricity sector at almost all stages apart from 
distribution, which were left to the local administrations7. 
 
                                                 
5 However, an in-dept analysis of these topics is definitely outside the scope of this chapter. For 
a more detailed study of these subjects, please see IEA (2005b), OECD (2002), World Bank 
(2004), EMRA (2003), Hepbasli (2005), Ozkivrak (2005), Krishnaswamy and Stuggins (2003); 
and Atiyas and Dutz (2003). 
6 As the main reform process has concentrated around electricity industry, the main focus of the 
dissertation in general and that of this chapter in particular will be on that segment of Turkish 
energy market. 
7 In 1982, however, distribution was also transferred to TEK, thus making TEK a national 
vertically integrated monopoly fully owned by the state. 
  6 
In the early 1980s, as was the case in many European countries, the Turkish 
electricity industry was dominated by a state-owned vertically integrated 
company, TEK. Starting from the 1980s, the government sought to attract 
private participation into the industry in order to ease the investment burden on 
the general budget. In 19828, the monopoly of public sector on generation was 
abolished and the private sector was allowed to build power plants and sell their 
electricity to TEK. In 1984, TEK was restructured and gained the status of state-
owned enterprise.  
 
Various private sector participation models short of privatization were put into 
practice. The first law setting up a framework for private participation in 
electricity industry was enacted in 1984 (Law No. 3096). This Law forms the 
legal basis for private participation through Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) 
contracts for new generation facilities, Transfer of Operating Rights (TOOR) 
contracts for existing generation and distribution assets, and the autoproducer 
system for companies to produce their own electricity. Under a BOT 
concession, a private company would build and operate a plant for up to 99 
years (subsequently reduced to 49 years) and then transfer it to the state at no 
cost. Under a TOOR, the private enterprise would operate (and rehabilitate 
where necessary) an existing government-owned facility through a lease-type 
arrangement (Atiyas and Dutz, 2003). 
 
In 1993, TEK was incorporated into privatization plan and split into two separate 
state-owned enterprises, namely Turkish Electricity Generation Transmission 
Co. (TEAS) and Turkish Electricity Distribution Co. (TEDAS). However, the 
constitutional court of Turkey issued a series of rulings in 1994 and 1995 
making the privatization almost impossible to implement in electricity industry. 
Therefore, in August 1999, the parliament passed a constitutional amendment 
permitting the privatization of public utility services and allowing international 
arbitration for resolving disputes. However, during this interval, Turkey not only 
lost five invaluable years in terms of reform process that could never get back 
but also, and more importantly, tried to enhance the attractiveness of BOT 
projects by providing “take or pay” guarantees by the Undersecretariat of 
                                                 
8 In that year, natural gas was introduced for the first time in Turkey. 
  7 
Treasury for adding new generation capacity to meet anticipated demand. An 
additional law, namely the Build Operate and Own9 (BOO) Law (No. 4283), for 
private sector participation in the construction and operation of new power 
plants was also enacted in 1997 again with guarantees provided by the 
Treasury10. Current structure of the contracts concluded based on these laws 
acts as a major barrier to the development of competition in the electricity 
sector. 
 
2.3 Reasons for Energy Market Reform in Turkey 
 
Given the historical background, the reasons that triggered the reform process 
in Turkey may be listed as follows in order of importance:  
 
1. The rapid growth in electricity demand combined with the inability of the 
government to meet that demand through previous structure based on public 
or Treasury-guaranteed private investments 
 
In Turkey, however, there exists no consensus over the actual size of the 
problem of "rapid electricity demand growth". Even some argue that, the 
official electricity projections have overestimated electricity demand to justify 
the construction of new power plants to use excess amount of natural gas 
(Ozturk et al., 2005). 
 
2. Foreign influence 
 
The need for an energy market reform has regularly been underlined by 
various international institutions (especially IMF, World Bank and OECD) 
that have supported Turkey during her frequent economic crises. The reform 
was also a precondition for Turkey’s longer term objective of EU 
                                                 
9 Under the BOO model, investors retain ownership of the facility at the end of the contract 
period. That is, it is a kind of licensing system rather than a concession award. 
10 A typical BOT, BOO or TOOR generation contract, signed between the private party and 
TEAS or TEDAS, includes exclusive “take or pay” obligations with fixed quantities (in general, 
85% of the plant output) and prices (or price formulas) over 15-30 years. That is, under these 
models, the government retains most commercial risks while providing the private sector with 
substantial rewards. Also the situation was worse in Turkey as, in Turkish case; there was no 
requirement for prequalification or even for a competitive open tender to conclude these 
contracts (Atiyas and Dutz, 2003), which resulted in onerous terms and high electricity prices. 
  8 
membership11, which requires progressive liberalization of energy markets. 
Although this foreign influence factor resulted in considerable skepticism in 
Turkey about the real aims of the reforms12; the recent reforms constitute 
the only reasonable way to meet growing energy demand in Turkey13. 
 
3. Fiscal problems 
 
A third rationale in reform process has been budget deficit problems. The 
government simply recognized that it cannot finance the capacity 
expansions necessary to meet future energy demand. 
 
4. Planning and operational inefficiencies in public sector 
 
Like any other developing country, state monopolies in Turkey have been 
inefficient and politicians have been ready to tolerate this inefficiency.  
 
5. Possibility of monopoly abuse 
 
Although the objective of preventing monopoly abuse is regarded as the 
primary reason for market regulation in the literature; in Turkey, its influence 
has been extremely limited, if any, in current reform process. 
 
2.4 Recent Reforms 
 
By the end of the 1990s, it became clear that quasi-privatization with Treasury 
guarantees was not going to be feasible given the rapidly deteriorating fiscal 
situation. Therefore, Turkey turned to a radically different framework for the 
design of her energy market. 
 
                                                 
11 On 3 October 2005, accession negotiations are scheduled to be opened with Turkey, who 
has been an associate member of the EU since 1963 and an official candidate since 1999. For 
a more detailed discussion of EU-Turkey relations, see Erdogdu (2002). 
12 Even still some regard whole reform process as a Western plot designed to control Turkish 
energy market through multinational corporations. 
13 Moreover, without doubt, one of the most significant benefits of EU accession process for 
Turkish energy sector would be the stability provided by anchoring Turkish regulations to EU 
norms. 
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On 3 March 2001, Electricity Market Law (EML, No. 4628) came into force and 
aimed at establishing a financially strong, stable, transparent and competitive 
electricity market. In line with new law, TEAS was restructured to form three 
new state-owned public enterprises, namely Turkish Electricity Transmission 
Co. (TEIAS), Electricity Generation Co. (EUAS) and Turkish Electricity Trading 
and Contracting Co. (TETAS). The new law also created an autonomous 
regulatory body, namely Electricity Market Regulatory Authority.  
 
Along the lines of developments in electricity sector, some other reforms were 
also introduced in other segments of the energy industry. On 2 May 2001, 
Natural Gas Market Law (NGML, No. 4646) also came into force and aimed at 
achieving similar objectives in natural gas market. It also renamed the 
regulatory body as Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA). As a final step, 
Petroleum Market Law (PML, No. 5015) and Liquefied Petroleum Gas Market 
Law (LPGML, No.5307) came into force on 20 December 2003 and 13 March 
2005 respectively and the EMRA was granted the responsibility to regulate 
these markets as well.  
 
Having briefly summarized the developments in Turkish energy market, let me 
focus on the specific reforms in each sector, starting from electricity industry. 
 
2.4.1 Reforms in Turkish Electricity Market 
 
Electricity Market Law14 (EML) made former laws on private investment in the 
electricity sector obsolete. The main issues and building blocks of the new 
system are given below. 
 
2.4.1.1 Market Opening and Market Design 
 
Currently, on the demand side, consumers that consume more than 7.8 GWh 
per annum15 are designated as “eligible consumers” that are free to choose 
                                                 
14 EML is, for the most part, compatible with the EU Electricity Directive of 2003 with the main 
exception that it does not allow state-owned generation companies to sell electricity directly to 
the eligible consumers but only to the wholesale company. 
15 See Appendix 1. 
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their suppliers16. The ultimate aim is stated as 100% market opening. On the 
supply side, the authorization-type licensing framework was established in the 
new regime, which provides entry opportunities into generation, wholesale 
supply, distribution, retail supply, import and export of electricity. Transmission 
remains as a state monopoly. 
 
At the heart of the new regime is a bilateral contracts market where generation 
companies contract with wholesale trade companies (TETAS and any eventual 
new entrants), distribution companies, any new independent retail supply 
companies, and eligible consumers. As for end-users, eligible consumers may 
not only buy electricity from their regional distribution/retail supply company, but 
also may buy directly from a wholesale company, a new independent retail 
supply company or an independent generator. Captive (or non-eligible) 
consumers, on the other hand, must buy their electricity from the 
distribution/retail supply company in their region, but they also have the right to 
buy from any retail supply company operating in the region. 
 
The EML requires the regulated third party access (rTPA) regime for access to 
the transmission and distribution system. The regulatory body (the EMRA) will 
carry out the function of dispute settlement between parties. 
 
As for public service obligations, the EML only allows for an explicit cash 
subsidy in the form of direct cash refunds to consumers without affecting the 
price structure in cases where some consumers need to be supported based on 
non-economic objectives. 
 
The current market design does not envisage a centralized pool or power 
exchange. The actual real-time equality of demand and supply, given the 
bilateral contracts, will be carried out by the system operator (that is, TEIAS) 
through purchases and sales in a balancing market. For this purpose, a 
“System Balancing and Settlement Center” is to be established within TEIAS. In 
short, it is expected that the market would be mostly by bilateral contracts and 
pool would be limited to balancing transactions only. 
                                                 
16 As of October 2004, about 270 eligible consumers signed a bilateral contract with a new 
supplier (IEA, 2005b, p 147). 
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2.4.1.2 Restructuring (or Unbundling) 
 
As discussed above, TEAS has been further unbundled into EUAS (generation), 
TETAS (wholesale trading and contracting) and TEIAS (transmission), each 
organized as a separate legal entity. 
 
Under the new structure, EUAS will take over existing public power plants that 
are not transferred to the private sector. TETAS is created to carry out 
wholesale operations and it seems that it will dominate wholesale market in the 
near future. TETAS is also the holder of all previous BOO, BOT and TOOR 
contracts, including long-term power purchase agreements with Treasury 
guaranties; and will assume other stranded costs17. TEIAS is responsible for 
transmission and, critically, for the balancing and settlement procedure that will 
balance the power transactions among parties, both physically and financially, 
in the new framework. That is, TEIAS is the transmission system operator 
(TSO) in Turkey. 
 
2.4.1.3 Privatization 
 
The new regime envisages eventual direct privatization in generation and 
distribution. Transmission assets are to remain under government ownership. In 
March 2004, the government issued the Strategy Paper Concerning Electricity 
Market Reform and Privatisation, which outlines the major steps to be taken 
during the period up to 2012 and addresses various issues, including the 
privatisation of distribution assets and power plants. According to the strategy 
paper, privatisation will start in the distribution sector in 2005 and will be 
completed in 2006. After the privatization of distribution assets, generation 
privatisation will start in mid-2006. Generation assets will be brought together 
into several groups composed of different types of assets for privatisation to 
                                                 
17 Stranded costs are defined as the costs incurred within the previous market structure that 
cannot be economically recovered within a competitive market structure. In Turkish case, the 
long-term power purchase obligations from private generators with high prices constitute the 
main stranded cost element in the new system. Other stranded costs include high operating 
costs of old and inefficient generators, removal of production subsidies, the debts and 
employment liabilities of public electricity utilities and so on. 
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enhance competition. Seventeen hydropower plants (which total 7,055 MW of 
capacity18), the transmission system and market operator, TEIAS, will remain in 
state ownership (IEA, 2005b, p 144). 
 
2.4.1.4 Independent Regulator 
 
As mentioned before, the new regime established the Energy Market 
Regulatory Authority (the EMRA), governed by its own 9-member board. The 
main functions of the EMRA include: 
⋅ setting up and maintaining new licensing framework, 
⋅ preparing secondary legislation, 
⋅ enforcing rTPA, 
⋅ applying a new transmission and distribution code, 
⋅ determining eligible customers over time, 
⋅ regulating tariffs for transmission and distribution activities as well 
as provision of retail services to non-eligible customers,  
⋅ regulating the wholesale tariff of TETAS, 
⋅ performing tenders for gas distribution networks, 
⋅ monitoring the performance of all actors in the market, 
⋅ protecting customer rights, 
⋅ applying sanctions to parties that violate the rules. 
 
The EMRA has administrative and financial autonomy; it receives no financing 
from the state budget. It collects its revenues principally from electricity and gas 
licensing fees and from a surcharge on electricity TPA tariff (maximum 1%). Its 
total number of staff in August 2005 was 301 (EMRA, 2005a). 
 
2.4.2 Reforms in Turkish Natural Gas Market 
 
Turkey’s indigenous gas production corresponds to 2.6% of the total gas 
demand making the country almost fully dependent on gas imports19. The 
                                                 
18 This figure equals to 19.5 % of total installed capacity in Turkey. 
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government owned Turkish Pipeline Corporation20 (BOTAS) is monopoly in 
almost all segments of the industry. Although its monopoly rights on importation, 
distribution, storage and the sale of natural gas have been abolished by the new 
law, the BOTAS is still Turkey’s sole natural gas importer and has a de facto 
monopoly of all gas supply in the country. It has eight long-term natural gas 
sales and purchase contracts21 with six different supply sources22. In 2003, the 
shares of these sources were the Russian Federation 59.8%, Algeria 18.2%, 
Iran 16.6% and Nigeria 5.3% (IEA, 2005b). 
 
The objectives of the reform in Turkish gas industry closely accord with those in 
electricity and regulatory arrangements are also substantially parallel23. 
Consumers whose annual consumption is above the threshold set by the 
EMRA, or eligible consumers, have the right to choose their own gas suppliers. 
At present, the gas market opening rate is 80% but eligible consumers cannot 
currently choose their suppliers because of the de facto monopolistic position of 
the BOTAS in import and trade24. 
 
As of February 2005, the EMRA granted 65 licences for different natural gas 
market activities, namely storage, importation (all for the BOTAS), exportation, 
wholesale, distribution, transmission (only for the BOTAS) and CNG operations 
(IEA, 2005b). 
 
A key element of the reform is a requirement for a phased divestment of import 
contracts by the current monopoly importer, the BOTAS. The NGML requires 
the BOTAS to transfer part of its import contracts every year through a 
tendering process (the gas release programme). The first attempt to transfer 
10% of the BOTAS’s contracts was recently launched; however, the process 
                                                                                                                                               
19 See Appendix 1. 
20 BOTAS was founded in 1974 and initially focused on the transport of Iraqi crude oil, 
diversifying into the gas sector after 1987. It was transformed into a state economic enterprise 
in 1995. Currently, it owns pipeline infrastructure for oil and gas transmission, LNG terminals, 
and gas distribution. 
21 Supply prices in these contracts are confidential and, in general, they are indexed to oil 
prices. 
22 See Appendix 1-D. 
23 The new law meets the requirements of the 2003 EU Gas Directive. 
24 See Appendix 1. 
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has been delayed due to the complexity of the issue and the reluctance of the 
BOTAS to release its contracts25. 
 
Under the new law, the EMRA is also responsible for organizing tenders for 
natural gas distribution licences in the cities. The tender process was carried 
out in 17 cities in 2003 and in almost 20 cities in 2004 (IEA, 2005b).  
 
Finally, despite the fact that gas demand has been growing rapidly for the last 
two decades; now, there is some risk of oversupply due to the overestimated 
demand forecasts. It is estimated that the existing contracts outstrip demand 
over the next 2 to 3 years by 9 to 13%, reaching 20% later in the decade26 (IEA, 
2005b).  
 
2.4.3 Reforms in Petroleum and LPG Markets 
 
The Turkish historian Evliya Celebi first mentioned the existence of oil in Turkey 
in the 18th century. Exploration began in the second half of the 19th century, 
when both domestic and foreign companies carried out exploration in Thrace, 
where the first productive well was also located.  
 
In 2002, Turkey’s oil production was 2,420 thousand tons, which corresponds to 
8% of the total oil demand27. In the coming years, oil production is expected to 
decrease due to the natural depletion of the fields (Hepbasli, 2005, p 327). 
 
As for LPG (or liquefied petroleum gas); since the beginning of the 1960s, it has 
been used as an alternative to gas and kerosene in Turkey, while the first LPG 
use in cogeneration plants took place in 1996. In Turkey, LPG is marketed in 
three different segments, namely LPG cylinder, bulk storage (storage 
container), and autogas. Among these, autogas (or automotive LPG) is the 
                                                 
25 An amendment to NGML, which is obviously supported by BOTAS and would have 
significantly reduced the scope of the gas release programme if implemented, was proposed 
earlier in 2004 but was withdrawn because of heavy opposition from the EMRA and other 
parties (IEA, 2005b). 
26 This is an enormous risk because contracts concluded by the BOTAS are long-term take-or-
pay contracts, meaning that, unless necessary steps are taken, Turkey may find herself in a 
position in which she needs to pay for the gas that she will never use. 
27 See Appendix 1. 
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branch that has grown the most of the three segments in recent years. In 2000, 
the consumption of petroleum products was 30 million tons, of which nearly 
87% was accounted for by liquid fuel, while LPG constituted the rest (Hepbasli, 
2005, p 326). 
 
The Petroleum Market Law (PML) and Liquefied Petroleum Gas Market Law 
(LPGML) have liberalized market activities in petroleum and LPG markets 
respectively. Especially, PML lifted price ceilings28 and removed import quotas 
on petroleum products at the beginning of 2005. The EMRA has also been 
assigned the responsibility to regulate these markets as well.  
 
Actually, unlike electricity and gas markets, the petroleum market has been 
operating in a relatively liberalized manner for quite some time before the recent 
reforms. In fact, recent reforms in petroleum market have aimed at solving one 
of the most important problems of Turkish economy in general: large-scale fuel 
smuggling. The recent introduction of a national chemical oil marker also targets 
the same aim. The PML requires the EMRA to take measures to prevent fuel 
smuggling and those to introduce and implement national chemical marker 
system in relevant oil products. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
Having reviewed the reform process and before turning to the economic 
analysis of the reforms, let me focus on the electricity demand in Turkey, the 
most controversial one among the factors that triggered the whole reform 
process. 
                                                 
28 In Turkey, the Automatic Pricing Mechanism (APM) was operational from July 1998 until the 
end of 2004 to establish ceiling prices for gasoline, diesel, kerosene, heavy fuel oil, heating oil 
and LPG. The APM linked ex-refinery prices to CIF Mediterranean product prices. Since the 
abolition of the APM in the beginning of 2005, prices can be set freely provided that they reflect 
the developments in the world oil markets. 
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Chapter 3: Electricity Demand in Turkey 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Given the controversy surrounding the actual electricity demand growth rate in 
Turkey; it is obvious that a reliable electricity demand estimation and forecast is 
crucial to the objectives of present dissertation as it will provide us with results 
based on econometric principles to compare with official projections. Besides, 
the econometric analysis here will also contribute to extremely limited literature 
in Turkish energy demand estimation. 
 
The next section presents a literature review in energy demand studies. Section 
three concentrates on the scope of the study. Section four specifies the study 
methodology. In section five, study results are presented and evaluated. The 
last section concludes. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
 
Most of the studies on energy demand have their origins from the time of the 
first major oil price increases of the early 1970s. Since then, various studies of 
energy demand in terms of estimating energy price and income elasticities have 
been undertaken using various estimation methods29. 
 
In most cases, energy demand studies have adopted two different types of 
modeling; namely; “reduced form model” and “structural form model”. The 
first model is a double-log linear demand model under which energy demand is 
assumed to be a direct linear function of energy price and real income. Kouris 
(1981), Drollas (1984) and Stewart (1991) have employed this model in their 
studies. Moreover, Dahl and Sterner (1991) report that more than sixty 
published studies applied the reduced form model. The second model is a 
disaggregated demand model based on the idea that the demand for energy is 
derived demand; that is, energy is not demanded for its own sake rather for the 
services it provides such as lighting, heating and power. It separates energy 
demand into several number of demand equations and treats it as an indirect, 
                                                 
29 Since economic theory and a priori knowledge indicates that the demand for energy in 
general depends on price and income, most of the studies in this area have been concentrated 
on these two variables as the major determinants of energy demand. 
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rather than direct, function of energy price and real income. Pindyck (1979) 
provides a detailed discussion of the structural form model. Although structural 
form model has various advantages over reduced form model from an 
economic point of view, its widespread utilization has been limited by the fact 
that it requires a large number of variables compared to the reduced form 
model. 
 
The third model for energy demand estimation, namely “irreversibility and 
price decomposition model”, was first proposed by Wolffram (1971) and 
developed by Traill et al. (1978). Originally, it was based on the assumption that 
the response to price reductions would be less than that to price increases. This 
model was further improved by Dargay (1992) and Gately (1992), who 
introduced three-way price decomposition to isolate the effects on demand of 
price decrease, price increase below and above the historic maximum. Some of 
the work using this method includes that of Dargay and Gately (1995a, 1995b), 
Haas and Schipper (1998), Ryan and Plourde (2002), just to mention a few. 
However, it is important to note that most of the studies that applied this method 
could not find evidence of irreversibility. 
 
The first three methods, in general, have utilized time series data to estimate 
energy demand but they did not analyze the data to establish its properties and 
therefore they implicitly assumed the data to be stationary, meaning that their 
means and variances do not systematically vary over time. However, this 
attractive data feature has been lacking in most cases. Engle and Granger 
(1987) have developed a technique, popularly known as “cointegration and 
error correction method (ECM)”, for analyzing time series properties and 
estimating elasticities based on this analysis, which enables full analysis of the 
properties of the relevant data before actual estimation. In their study, Engle 
and Granger have devised a model estimation procedure and recommended a 
number of tests, among which the most notable and commonly used is the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. Subsequent improvements related to this 
approach have been in the form of inclusion of more specific energy-related 
variables in the model and the development of new methods to identify 
cointegrating relationships, amongst which the Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
  19 
Model (ARDL) and the Johansen Maximum Likelihood Model (JML) – as 
outlined in Johansen (1988) – are especially popular. 
 
Since the late 1980s, especially cointegration analysis has become the 
standard component of all studies of energy demand; and most scholars have 
done their data analysis based on cointegration. The papers written in this area 
include that of Engle et al. (1989); Hunt and Manning (1989), Hunt and Lynk 
(1992), Bentzen and Engsted (1993, 2001), Fouquet et al. (1993), Hunt and Witt 
(1995); and Beenstock and Goldin (1999). 
 
The popularity and widespread use of the cointegration originate from the fact 
that it justifies the use of data on non-stationary variables to estimate 
coefficients as long as the variables are cointegrated; that is, they have a long-
run equilibrium relationship. 
 
Despite its popularity; some scholars, like Andrew Harvey30, have disputed the 
cointegration and some critics argue that in most of the analyses the demand 
equation is specified as a double-log linear function, as a way to get elasticities 
directly from its coefficients, and the parameters are estimated using data 
whose time length is rather long, going beyond forty years in some cases. The 
long time span covered by these studies, they continue, raises severe concerns 
about the soundness of the fixed coefficients assumption in the demand 
equation. This assumption in a double-log functional form of demand simply 
implies constant elasticities for the entire sample period under consideration. 
This feature of the model is indeed problematic in light of the changes that could 
have taken place in the economy over such a long period of time affecting the 
demand for electricity31. 
                                                 
30 Harvey (1997) states that: "A casual inspection of many economic time series shows that they 
have trends. It is equally apparent that, unless the time period is fairly short, these trends 
cannot be adequately captured by straight lines. In other words, a deterministic linear time trend 
is too restrictive. … Since a deterministic time trend is too restrictive, the obvious thing to do is 
to make it more flexible by letting the level and slope parameters change over time. … Testing 
for unit roots has become almost mandatory in applied economics. This is despite the fact that, 
much of the time, it is either unnecessary or misleading, or both. … The recent emphasis on 
unit roots, vector autoregressions and co-integration has focused too much attention on tackling 
uninteresting problems by flawed methods." 
31 Specific examples of the determinants for such changes may include the efficiency 
improvements in energy-consuming equipments, the developmental stage of the economy 
(whether the economy is in transition to later stages of development or not), the government 
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To sum up, Harvey and other scholars critical of previous methods maintain that 
time trends are not static, but rather tend to evolve gradually through time and 
thus they constantly modify the responses of the demand to variations in 
income and prices. Hence, if the data to estimate a demand function is collected 
over a relatively long time period, it is much better to use structural time series 
model (STSM), which makes time trend more flexible by letting the level and 
slope parameters change over time. 
 
STSM focuses on the concept of underlying energy demand trend (UEDT). In 
addition to price and income, UEDT also recognizes other variables, such as 
trends, economic structure, energy efficiency, technical progress and 
consumers’ tastes, as factors that affect demand for energy. Any change in 
these variables, ceteris paribus, results in a shift of the energy demand curve 
either to the left or to the right.  
 
As STSM is the most recent method and was developed relatively short while 
ago, the number of studies that employed this method is limited. The best 
examples to such academic works include Thury and Witt (1998), Hunt et al. 
(2000, 2003); and Hunt and Ninomiya (2003). 
 
3.3 Scope of Study 
 
One of the aims of this chapter is to estimate a model of electricity demand in 
Turkey using quarterly time series data on real electricity prices, real income 
and electricity consumption with a view to obtaining short and long run 
estimates of price and income elasticities. Also, an electricity demand forecast 
constitutes another aim of the chapter.  
 
The data covers the period from the first quarter of 1984 to the last quarter of 
2004, a total of 84 observations. This period has been chosen as it is the 
longest and the most recent one for which the data is available on all the 
                                                                                                                                               
energy policy and the habit persistence of consumers. For a detailed discussion of the subject, 
see Haas and Schipper (1998). 
  21 
variables under consideration. Coincidentally, most of the efforts to liberalize 
Turkish energy sector occurred during this period. 
 
The model to be employed in demand estimation32 is a dynamic version of 
reduced form model, namely “partial adjustment model”. Also, a cointegration 
analysis will be carried out to analyze the properties of the data. Furthermore, 
an annual electricity demand forecast will be developed and presented based 
on autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) modelling33. 
 
3.4 Study Methodology 
 
3.4.1 Partial Adjustment Model 
 
As maintained by Poyer and Williams (1993), there is no consensus in the 
literature over the most appropriate functional form of a model constructed to 
estimate energy demand. However, a consensus exists over the idea that an 
appropriate model should be able to produce unbiased and efficient energy 
demand elasticities. In line with economic theory and a priori knowledge, this 
study will start with a single equation demand model expressed in linear 
logarithmic form linking the quantity of per capita electricity demand to real 
energy price and real income per capita. 
 
                                                 
32 Structural form model requires data on stock, utilization and efficiency of electricity-using 
appliances and, likewise, a meaningful STSM necessitates data on such variables as economic 
structure, efficiency, technical progress, consumers’ tastes, government energy policy and so 
on. Since it is impossible to obtain this kind of data for Turkish electricity market, these two 
methods could not be employed in this study. As for irreversibility and price decomposition 
model, it is also not applied because there is nothing in both economic theory and a priori 
knowledge to justify the very basic assumption of the model; that is, the effects of price 
decrease, price increase below and above the historic maximum on energy demand are 
diverse. Moreover, during the sustained periods of falling prices or periods in which prices 
fluctuate without reaching their previous maximum, it is hard to work out how a maximum price 
that occurred years ago can still have effects years later. For instance, in Turkey, the highest 
electricity price figure (0.48 YTL/kWh, at 2004 prices) belongs to the fourth quarter of 1994 and, 
according to this model, this figure still had an impact on the consumption decisions of 
consumers ten years later, in 2004. The possibility that consumers have such long memories is 
extremely limited. 
33 Actually, in literature, there are five main approaches to economic forecasting based on time 
series data; namely, (1) exponential smoothing methods, (2) single-equation regression models, 
(3) simultaneous-equation regression models, (4) autoregressive integrated moving average 
models (ARIMA), and (5) vector autoregression. The reason why ARIMA modelling is selected 
among the alternatives is explained in A-3.5 section of the Appendix 3. For a rather general 
discussion of other modelling techniques, see Gujarati (2003). 
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The simplest model can be written as: 
 
 t 1 t 2 t tlnE lnP lnY u= α + β + β +  (1) 
 
where Et is per capita demand for electricity, Pt is the real price of electricity, Yt 
is real income per capita, ut is the error term, the subscript t represents time, α  
is intercept term; and finally 1β  and 2β  are the estimators of the price and 
income elasticities of demand respectively. 
 
This simple “static” model (1) does not make a distinction between short and 
long run elasticities. Therefore, instead of this static one, a dynamic version of 
reduced form model, called “partial adjustment model”, will be used in this 
study in order to capture short-run and long run reactions separately. The partial 
adjustment model assumes that electricity demand cannot immediately respond 
to the change in electricity price and real income; but gradually converges 
toward the long run equilibrium. Suppose that E't is the desired or equilibrium 
electricity demand that is not observable directly but given by: 
 
 t 1 t 2 t tlnE lnP lnY u′ = α + β + β +  (2) 
 
and the adjustment to the equilibrium demand level is assumed to be in the 
form of 
 
 t t 1 t t 1lnE lnE (lnE lnE )− −′− = δ −  (3) 
 
where δ  indicates the speed of adjustment ( 0δ > ). Substituting equation (2) 
into equation (3) gives: 
 
 t t 1 1 t 2 t t t 1
t 1 t 2 t t t 1 t 1
lnE lnE ( lnP lnY u lnE )
lnE lnP lnY u lnE lnE
− −
− −
− = δ α + β + β + −
= δα + δβ + δβ + δ − δ +
 
 
 t 1 t 2 t t 1 tlnE lnP lnY (1 )lnE u−= δα + δβ + δβ + − δ + δ  (4) 
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where 1δβ  and 2δβ  will be the short-run price and income elasticities 
respectively. The long-run price and income elasticities will be given by 1β  and 
2β  correspondingly. Since the error term tuδ  is serially uncorrelated, consistent 
estimates of α , 1β , 2β  and δ  can be obtained by OLS (Ordinary Least 
Squares).   
 
3.4.2 Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average Modelling 
 
The publication authored by Box and Jenkins (1978) ushered in a new 
generation of forecasting tools, technically known as the ARIMA methodology, 
which emphasizes on analyzing the probabilistic, or stochastic, properties of 
economic time series on their own rather then constructing single or 
simultaneous equation models. ARIMA models allow each variable to be 
explained by its own past, or lagged, values and stochastic error terms34. 
 
If we have to difference a time series d times to make it stationary and apply the 
ARMA(p,q) model to it, we say the original time series is ARIMA(p,d,q). The 
important point to note in ARIMA modelling is that we must have either a 
stationary time series or a time series that becomes stationary after one or more 
differencing to be able to use it35. 
 
3.5 Presentation and Evaluation of Study Results 
 
Based on the principles outlined above, the actual estimation is carried out for 
Turkish electricity demand and the results are provided below36. 
 
                                                 
34 ARIMA models are sometimes called atheoretic models (meaning models with no basis in 
theory) as they are not derived from any economic theory. 
35 Because of space limitations, the steps in ARIMA Modelling are provided in A-3.2 section of 
Appendix 3. 
36 Again due to space limitations, steps and tests in cointegration analysis, overview of the data 
used and actual procedure in both demand estimation and forecasting are presented in A-3.1, 
A-3.3, A-3.4, A-3.5 sections of the Appendix 3, respectively. 
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Table 1. Elasticities of Electricity Demand in Turkey 
 
 Short-run Long-run 
Price Elasticity -0.041aa -0.297aa 
Income Elasticity 0.057aa 0.414aa 
 
Table 2. Demand Forecast for Turkey, 2005-2015 
 
Year 
Forecasted 
Annual 
% Change 
Index 
(2004=100) 
Net Electricity 
Consumption 
(GWh) 
2005 130,204.9 11.7 111.7 
2006 134,876.5 3.6 115.7 
2007 142,091.6 5.3 121.9 
2008 152,696.9 7.5 131.0 
2009 153,897.4 0.8 132.0 
2010 167,413.7 8.8 143.6 
2011 170,957.3 2.1 146.7 
2012 176,576.5 3.3 151.5 
2013 192,011.2 8.7 164.7 
2014 187,387.9 -2.4 160.8 
2015 205,108.1 9.5 176.0 
Note: Average annual % change is 5.4 
 
Having obtained both the elasticities of electricity demand in Turkey and 
forecasted values for this demand, let me interpret the results and compare 
them with the official estimates available from TEIAS (2005c). 
 
The estimated elasticities indicate that the price and income elasticities of 
electricity demand in Turkey are quite low, meaning that there is definitely a 
need for regulation in this market. Otherwise, since consumers do not react 
much especially to price increases, the firms with monopoly power (or those in 
oligopolistic market structure) may abuse their power to extract “monopoly rent”. 
To provide a more precise picture of price and income elasticities, the figures 
below are provided37.  
 
                                                 
37 Since we are concentrating on elasticities; the units of price, income and demand are not 
important; and, therefore, they are not specified in the figures. 
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Figure 1. Price Elasticities of Electricity Demand in Turkey 
    
 
 
Figure 2. Income Elasticities of Electricity Demand in Turkey 
            
 
As to forecasted net electricity consumption values, it is obvious that there 
exists a rapid electricity demand growth in Turkey; and in the following 11-year 
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period (i.e., 2005-2015), based on ARIMA modelling, we may argue that the 
demand will continue to increase at an annual average rate of 5.4% and will 
turn out to be 205,108 GWh in 2015, corresponding to a 76% increase 
compared to 2004 demand level. 
  
As for comparison of our results with official demand projections, the official 
projection is available from TEIAS (2005c) but the official forecasts are for gross 
demand; and, therefore, they need to be converted into net consumption for a 
meaningful comparison. The details of this conversion are provided in Appendix 
6-H and the result is presented below. 
 
Table 3. The Comparison of the Results with Official Projections 
 
  Official   Forecasted Net   
  Projection Average Total Official Electricity Cons.  Difference as a 
  of Gross Int. Cons. and Net. Projection based on ARIMA  % of forecasts 
  Demand Losses as a % of of Net Cons. Modelling Difference based on ARIMA 
  (GWh) Gross Demand (GWh) (GWh) (GWh) Modelling 
      (e) (f) (g=e-f)   
2005 168,262 22.3 130,739.6 130,204.9 534.7 0.4 
2006 185,600 22.3 144,211.2 134,876.5 9,334.7 6.9 
2007 204,150 22.3 158,624.6 142,091.6 16,533.0 11.6 
2008 224,300 22.3 174,281.1 152,696.9 21,584.2 14.1 
2009 246,150 22.3 191,258.6 153,897.4 37,361.2 24.3 
2010 269,842 22.3 209,667.2 167,413.7 42,253.5 25.2 
2011 295,800 22.3 229,836.6 170,957.3 58,879.3 34.4 
2012 323,200 22.3 251,126.4 176,576.5 74,549.9 42.2 
 
 
The most outstanding outcome from the comparison is the fact that there is a 
substantial difference between official projections and forecasts based on 
ARIMA modelling. Ozturk (2005) had concluded that official total electricity 
demand projection for the period of 1996–2001 overestimated demand by 36%. 
In line with this conclusion; in this study, we have found that the official net 
electricity consumption projection for 2012 again overestimates demand by 
42.2% compared to the forecasted value based on ARIMA modelling. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
The main goals of this chapter have been to estimate short and long run price 
and income elasticities of electricity demand in Turkey; and to forecast future 
growth in this demand using ARIMA modelling. 
 
In the course of study, elasticities are obtained and it is found out that they are 
quite low, implying that consumers’ respond to price and income changes is 
quite limited; and, therefore, there is a need for regulation. Then, an ARIMA 
model is developed and used to forecast future net electricity consumption in 
Turkey. Based on forecasts obtained, it has been seen that the current official 
projections highly overestimate the electricity demand in Turkey. It is believed 
that the elasticities and forecasts presented here would be helpful to policy 
makers in Turkey for future energy policy planning. 
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Chapter 4: Critical Analysis and Policy Suggestions 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
Given that we have confirmed both a rapid electricity demand growth (though it 
is overestimated) and a need for regulation in Turkey, now we may turn to our 
main objective of answering two crucial questions mentioned in the introduction 
chapter. The first section of this chapter deals with the first question and other 
question is left to the second one.  
 
The economic analysis throughout this chapter will be based on the literature in 
market regulation, an overview of which is provided in Appendix 238.  
 
4.2 Critical Economic Analysis of Recent Energy Market Reforms 
 
4.2.1 Key Issues in Turkish Regulatory Policy 
 
On paper, recent reforms clearly aim for liberalization of Turkish energy market 
and the ultimate target is deregulation in the long run. However, deregulation, 
which requires development of effective competition in a fully functioning 
market, is a very distant objective in Turkish case as Turkey does not have a 
fully functioning (or even just functioning) market, let alone effective competition 
in that market. Hence, Turkey needs to follow the necessary steps to create the 
conditions for deregulation starting from restructuring and privatization, followed 
by enhancement of competition where possible and (effective) regulation where 
unavoidable; and finally introducing deregulation in the long term when the 
market is ready to do so. Since Turkey is still at the very beginning of this 
process (despite the fact that she started the process 5 years ago), I will only 
concentrate on the first few steps; namely, restructuring and privatization; 
competition; and regulation. 
 
                                                 
38 Appendix 2, first, presents the problem of natural monopoly; and then concentrates on key 
concepts in regulatory policy, the reasons and objectives of regulation; and finally focuses on 
some major topics in regulation literature and economic regulation methods. 
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4.2.1.1 Restructuring and Privatization 
 
Underlying structure of the particular industry being regulated is one of the most 
important determinants in the success of regulation in any market. In Turkish 
case, there is no need for restructuring in petroleum and LPG markets as they 
already have appropriate structure. In electricity market, restructuring is either 
completed or planned to be completed in the near future. However, there exists 
a grave mistake in the restructuring process: the preservation of TEIAS as a 
single entity, which makes the effective regulation in transmission system 
impossible by rendering the only possible effective price regulation method, 
namely yardstick competition, in this segment of the market impossible to 
implement. As for natural gas industry, there is a vital need for restructuring in 
that industry in which the BOTAS currently dominates the entire market. 
 
As to privatization, all powerful economic rationales for privatization, discussed 
in Appendix 2, are also certainly valid in Turkish case. However; despite that, 
there are formidable political and institutional barriers to privatization in Turkey. 
Unless carefully managed; they can delay, or totally block, the process of 
privatization. 
 
The first obstacle to privatization in Turkish case is the bureaucratic opposition 
from government owned utilities or labour unions, for instance, to maintain their 
privileged position in current public utilities, excessive work forces or wages 
above market rates. Although such an opposition is generally the case almost in 
all similar countries, it is especially strong in Turkey where bureaucrats are a 
politically powerful force in their own right. 
 
The second source of opposition to privatization in Turkey originates from the 
concerns based on economic nationalism and the desire to control the destiny 
of the energy industries so central to the economic infrastructure. However, 
there are some simple ways that combine privatization with maintaining 
government control of the key elements of the power system. However, in 
practice, these kind of arguments are employed by the bureaucrats at the top of 
public companies; and they are likely to resist privatization on the pretext of the 
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probability that companies with so-called “strategic importance” will be taken 
over by a foreign or multi-national firm, an argument that can easily be falsified 
by, for example, keeping a “golden share”. 
 
The last problem with privatization relates the fact that subsidization, especially 
of consumer prices, is common in Turkey. It poses a major barrier to efficient 
privatization; and the elimination of the subsidies may be very difficult politically. 
 
Regarding the progress made so far in terms of privatization, in electricity 
industry, the government plan of privatizing distribution company (TEDAS) and 
generation company (EUAS) into several parts is a reasonable approach as it 
may bring immediate competition to the market and/or enable the regulator to 
compare the performance of newly created private companies. However, it 
seems that government intends to keep both transmission company39 (TEIAS) 
and large parts of the hydro generation facilities. It is again a serious mistake 
with a huge potential to undermine the positive expectations about the future 
structure of the energy market, and thereby may undermine the whole reform 
process. In natural gas market, the BOTAS is still there but should be privatized 
as soon as possible in a way that does not let new players have a market 
power. 
 
4.2.1.2 Competition 
 
A kind of competition is possible in every segment of Turkish energy industry, 
including transmission and distribution of electricity and gas markets. Also, 
when we take into account the fact that even limited competition provides a 
regulator with some benchmarks against which to measure the performance of 
a dominant firm, gives consumers some alternatives, and forces the dominant 
firm to reduce costs, improve services, innovate and so on; the EMRA should 
take all necessary steps to enable effective competition in the markets it 
regulates. The markets currently regulated by the EMRA may be divided into 
four groups based on the possible type of competition:    
 
                                                 
39 The EML does not presume a monopoly owned transmission system and it definitely allows 
for multiple transmission owners. 
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1. The markets in which actual competition exists 
  
Almost all market activities in Turkish petroleum and LPG markets fall into 
this group. Since competition already exists in these markets and the rule is 
“competition where possible, regulation only where unavoidable”, the 
EMRA’s role in these markets should be limited to further enhancement of 
competition and taking measures against possible threats to present 
competitive structure. Apart from these, regulation should be kept at 
minimum. 
 
2. The markets which are currently not competitive but in which there is a 
potential for actual competition in the near future40 
 
All activities in electricity and natural gas markets with the exceptions of 
transmission and distribution may be placed into this group. Provided that 
EUAS and the BOTAS are privatized appropriately, there exists a huge 
potential for competition in these markets. Especially, electricity 
generation/supply and natural gas importation/supply seem to be highly 
competitive in the near future if necessary steps are taken. Nevertheless; 
until competition develops up to appropriate levels, the EMRA should 
employ proper economic regulation methods in these markets.  
 
3. The markets in which one-to-one competition is not possible but there is a 
potential for competition for the market (franchising) and competition via 
regulation (yardstick competition) 
 
Electricity and natural gas transmission and distribution activities belong to 
this group. However; to activate “competition” in these sectors, the BOTAS’s 
transmission arm should be separated from its other activities. Then, this 
new natural gas transmission company together with its counterpart in 
electricity industry (TEIAS) should be divided into enough number of parts in 
a way that makes effective comparison of performance among these newly 
                                                 
40 When actual effective competition becomes operational in the future for the markets within 
this group; EMRA should again limit its role to further enhancement of competition and taking 
measures against possible threats to then existing competitive structure. 
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created companies possible. Finally, all distribution and transmission assets 
should be privatized as soon as possible.  
 
4.2.1.3 Turkish Energy Market Regulation 
 
The current Turkish regulatory framework may be evaluated as follows. First of 
all, the EMRA should keep it mind that regulation is unavoidably inefficient and 
therefore it should be confined to the core natural monopoly of the network 
minimizing the extent of regulatory inefficiency. That is, the most important 
feature of regulation must be that there should be as little of it as possible, 
which involves the identifying the precise sources of market failure in industries 
and targeting regulation specifically on these areas. The EMRA also needs to 
realize that regulation in essence is a kind of incentive mechanism design, 
which needs to reflect the consensus among all related parties such as 
consumers, firms, politicians, academicians and so on. Therefore, the EMRA 
should take all necessary steps to create a platform in which everyone related 
with energy industry may express their ideas with a view to reaching such a 
consensus. 
 
Second, the EMRA needs to put into practice an information program to 
alleviate the problem of asymmetric information in a manner mentioned in 
Appendix 2. 
 
Third issue relates what is called regulatory commitment. The EMRA must 
ensure that it is committed to the ultimate aim of economic efficiency by taking 
all necessary measures. To do so, first of all, all decisions and procedures 
applied by the EMRA should be transparent, which entails that the EMRA is 
required to explain and justify its decisions. The EMRA should also realize that 
without transparency in the regulatory process it is impossible to ensure 
regulatory commitment and, therefore, to realize economic efficiency. Moreover 
a body of precedent should be created to ensure consistence in regulatory 
practice. If the EMRA rejects transparent procedures, it may lose the public 
credibility, on which its success and acceptance so crucially depend. The 
second measure to guarantee regulatory commitment should be in the form of 
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creation of effective appeal procedures for the firms, consumers or any other 
related parties against the decisions of the EMRA. Under current framework, 
lawsuits against the EMRA’s decisions may be filed in the Council of State (in 
Turkish, “Danistay”), a high court in Turkish legal system. However, the Council 
of State is not well suited to review the decisions of the EMRA due to technical 
nature of the matters and the need for speedy resolution of outstanding issues. 
Therefore, as also underlined by OECD (OECD, 2002, p 37), in Turkey, there is 
a need for establishment of a specialist regulatory appeal body with suitable 
expertise in regulatory issues. The appeals against the decisions of the EMRA 
should be in the first instance to this appeal body that acts with similar 
discretion and flexibility to that of the EMRA, not to the Council of State. 
Furthermore, the relation between the EMRA and the firms should be based on 
what is called “regulatory contract” to further guarantee regulatory commitment. 
Current practice of provision of licences whose terms are unilaterally 
determined (and also may be altered) by the EMRA undermines the regulatory 
commitment, let alone reinforcing it. If a firm considers that licence terms so 
crucial to its future profit level may easily be changed by the EMRA at any time, 
it is almost impossible to provide it with incentives to act properly. Finally, to 
prevent any confusion and opportunistic behaviour by firms, the appropriate 
division of labour between, on the one hand, general competition authority in 
Turkey (that is, Turkish Competition Authority) and, on the other hand, the 
specialist regulator in Turkish energy market (that is, the EMRA) should be 
clearly determined by a protocol to be signed between these two institutions. 
 
The fourth major issue in Turkish regulatory framework is the question of how to 
prevent regulatory capture and regulatory failure. To prevent regulatory capture 
by the industry it regulates, the EMRA should not only encourage but also take 
concrete measures (if necessary) to set up and institutionalize consumer 
concern to enable active consumer participation in the regulatory process. But 
while doing so, it should pay due attention not to push regulation into social, and 
away from economic, matters; and ensure that consumer representatives’ 
attention is confined to economic matters and does not spread over political or 
non-economic ones.  As discussed before, regulatory capture by government is 
also a threat to regulatory process especially in Turkey where government 
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traditionally has strong powers. To prevent this, ministerial and other political 
influences must be constrained as far as possible to roles that do not allow 
them to influence regulatory decisions. That is, the EMRA should be 
independent while making decisions concerning the markets it regulates. 
However, this does not mean unaccountability. The EMRA, like any other public 
body in Turkey, must be held accountable for its actions and be subject to 
adequate controls. In short, the EMRA should take appropriate steps not to be 
captured either by energy industry or its employees or by politicians or by other 
particular interests, or by self-interest at all costs. 
 
As for regulatory failure, the EMRA should make a clear distinction between its 
responsibilities concerning economic and non-economic regulation; and should 
delegate the latter to appropriate bodies as soon as possible. Otherwise, its 
discretion is sooner or later jeopardized by unwise extensions of non-economic 
regulation. Also, the EMRA should always keep in mind that a regulatory 
system which has objectives that either in principle or in practice differ from that 
of economic efficiency spells regulatory failure from an economic perspective. 
 
The final critical issue in Turkish regulatory framework is about the quality of the 
persons in the position of regulators (that is, the members of the Energy Market 
Regulatory Board) and the staff of the EMRA. As also indicated in OECD report 
(OECD, 2002, p 24), it is important for the credibility of the EMRA that not only 
the members of its Board but also its staff are highly qualified, which requires 
strict merit selection and performance management. The EMRA should seek to 
recruit a high level of expertise and pay very close attention to establish a merit 
based personnel system. 
 
4.2.2 Economic Regulation Methods 
 
In line with our classification made in “competition” section of this chapter, the 
appropriate action for the EMRA in terms of economic regulation may be 
summarized as follows.  
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For the first group of markets; the EMRA should do nothing but just taking 
measures for the preservation and further enhancement of competition. That is, 
in these markets, the rule should be laissez-faire. For the second group, the 
EMRA should always remember that a system of price regulation should be 
evaluated in terms of incentives it provides the regulated firm to achieve 
economic efficiency. Therefore, the EMRA should apply incentive based 
regulation (for instance, RPI-X or price cap regulation) wherever possible and 
try to avoid cost-plus regulation and its various different forms41. Finally, for the 
markets in which one-to-one competition is not possible, the EMRA should 
apply franchising and yardstick competition methods to simulate effective 
competition in these markets. But as mentioned above, this option is only 
operable if all distribution and transmission assets in both electricity and natural 
gas industries are privatized in an appropriate way. 
 
4.3 Policy Suggestions 
 
Based on our analysis up to here, the answers to the question that what still 
needs to be done to improve recent energy market reforms in Turkey may be 
divided into three parts according to their urgency, degree of importance, and 
the responsible body to implement them.  
 
4.3.1 Policy Suggestions for the EMRA  
 
Policy suggestions under this heading require immediate and effective action by 
the EMRA, and therefore need to be implemented as soon possible. Otherwise, 
all reform process may face failure at the very beginning due to the EMRA’s 
actions or lack of action. To prevent this outcome, first of all, the EMRA must 
take all necessary steps to create a platform in which everyone related with 
Turkish energy industry may express their ideas with a view to reaching a 
consensus42. Second, the EMRA also needs to ensure regulatory commitment, 
                                                 
41 In Turkish case, the laws are not specific as to whether ‘incentive based’ or ‘cost-plus’ 
regulation is to be applied in tariff determination process, so this issue is a matter for EMRA to 
determine in deciding general tariff principles. 
42 Within such a platform; EMRA needs to persuade government, employees, managers, 
taxpayers, potential investors, customers, the financial markets, annalists, media commentators 
and all other related parties of the advantages of the reform process. 
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which requires particularly transparency, creation of a body of precedent and 
effective appeal procedures for the firms in the market. Moreover, the EMRA 
must change, in the medium term, its licencing procedure into one based on the 
logic of private contracts, which is called “regulation by contract”43. Fourth, the 
EMRA has to introduce all necessary measures to prevent regulatory capture 
and regulatory failure discussed before. Furthermore, it needs to prepare and 
publish a plan which specifies its short, medium and long term objectives in 
detail so as to strengthen regulatory commitment. Sixth, the EMRA must put 
into practice the information program mentioned before to alleviate the problem 
of asymmetric information. Additionally, the EMRA has to implement strict merit 
selection and performance management in its human resources policies. Eight, 
the EMRA needs to clearly separate economic and non-economic issues and 
take appropriate steps to delegate the latter to suitable bodies. In addition, the 
EMRA must carry out economic regulation in line with suggestions made 
before. Tenth, the EMRA must continue natural gas distribution tenders in the 
form of “franchising” but also develop the mechanisms to introduce “yardstick 
competition” as soon as the construction of distribution networks are completed. 
Finally, it has to restrict the scope of regulation in petroleum and LPG markets 
due to reasons discussed before. 
 
4.3.2 Policy Suggestions for Turkish Government  
 
Although the discretion of the EMRA is limited in terms of the policy suggestions 
under this heading; the EMRA still must take appropriate steps to supervise, 
encourage and facilitate the realization of these suggestions that are crucial for 
the outcome of the reforms. 
 
The privatization of energy industry, including TEIAS, BOTAS and all hydro 
generation facilities, must be completed as soon as possible in an appropriate 
way after restructuring where necessary. As discussed before, the opposition to 
privatization of some bureaucrats will definitely be formidable. To counter this, a 
chairman who is more favorable to privatization may be appointed to the 
enterprises to be privatized. Second, the government must not intervene in the 
                                                 
43 For a detailed discussion of "regulation by contract", see Bakovic et al. (2003). 
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EMRA’s decisions concerning economic regulation of energy markets. If it 
disagrees with the EMRA in any issue, the government should have recourse to 
appropriate appeal procedures. The government also needs to delegate all non-
economic responsibilities of the EMRA to related bodies. In particular, it must 
prepare and put into force the necessary legislation that removes the EMRA’s 
non-economic responsibilities in petroleum market, especially, the 
implementation of national chemical marker system and prevention of fuel 
smuggling in Turkey44.  
 
The government must appoint the members of the EMRA’s board based on 
strict merit norms. The consequences of political appointments to the EMRA 
may turn out to be destructive for the future of the country as a whole. Also, 
when all privatizations are completed, the energy sector and other related 
interests should be represented in the Board as well, which requires that some 
members of the Board should be selected by these interest groups. The 
government also needs to establish a specialist regulatory appeal body with 
suitable expertise in regulatory issues.  
 
BOTAS’s share in imports must also be reduced, which is absolutely necessary 
for the market liberalization to be successful and competition to develop. Finally, 
the government must stop all forms of subsidy that affect price structure and 
provide subsidies only in the form of direct cash refunds if necessary. 
 
4.3.3 Other Policy Suggestions 
 
The policy suggestions under this heading are deemed beneficial for the future 
progress of Turkish reforms from an economic perspective but they also need to 
be further discussed among related parties before actual implementation. 
 
                                                 
44 Up to now, EMRA has distributed almost 10.000 licences just to prevent fuel smuggling in 
Turkey. However, since this was an irrational step from the very beginning especially when we 
take into account the fact that an institution with only 300 people cannot effectively monitor the 
implementation of licence terms of so many licences (let alone their enforcement); the EMRA 
has already had to delegate most of its responsibilities in this area to the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs via a protocol signed between EMRA and the Ministry. So, what is suggested here is just 
the reflection of actual practice into legal system (EMRA; 2005b,c). 
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All persons or bodies that do not have sufficient expertise in issues related with 
energy markets but whose ideas or decisions have still a vital effect on the 
energy market should consult those with expertise before revealing their ideas 
or making some decisions with an (sometimes, profound) effect on the energy 
market. The decisions of courts are especially critical in this respect. 
 
All related bodies in Turkey should take necessary steps to find out the reasons 
for apparently misleading demand forecasts both in electricity and natural gas 
markets; and develop accurate demand projections. While doing so, the 
emphasis should be on the development and use of appropriate data and 
econometric techniques which is open to debate, rather than some computer 
packages for demand estimation provided by various international organizations 
or, even worse, the methods in which the demand is determined as a result of a 
bargaining process among various public bodies. 
 
The EMRA should also prepare and publish a timetable indicating the process 
of reducing eligibility threshold to zero both in electricity and natural gas 
markets. Current “Strategy Paper” is not enough in this perspective. 
 
The EMRA and Turkish government should deal with the problem of “stranded 
costs” in a way that does not undermine the trust in the system and within the 
boundaries of the principle of “rule of law”. 
 
The EMRA should manage to ensure consistency in the decisions of its multi-
member board. If this cannot be done, the practice of “regulation by an 
individual”, rather than “regulation by a board”, should be considered as an 
alternative.  
 
The EMRA should initiate the process of signing a protocol with Turkish 
Competition Authority to determine appropriate division of labour between them. 
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4.4 Study Limitations 
 
Although the main objectives have been clearly achieved in the dissertation, 
limitations of the study should be kept in mind while evaluating (and perhaps, 
utilizing) the results.  
 
First of all; due to space limitations, it was not possible to present a detailed 
literature review in regulation, lack of which may render the understanding of 
analysis difficult for those without a background in regulatory economics. 
Limited time available for the preparation of the dissertation also constituted 
another limitation; which prevented detailed analysis of some issues in full 
sense.  
 
The final limitation relates the estimation and forecasting section. In the study, 
an aggregate demand estimation approach is adopted; but, as suggested by 
Pindyck (1979), there are some problems related to such an approach. 
Perhaps, separate estimations for each group of consumers (e.g., industry, 
households etc.) may yield better results. Moreover, forecasting, especially in 
energy demand, is considered more an art than a science; therefore, some 
variations between forecasted and actual demand levels are to be expected. 
Like all other models, ARIMA modelling is based on some assumptions and, of 
course, there is a direct link between the accuracy of the forecast and the 
validity of the underlying assumptions. The main assumption behind ARIMA 
modelling is that the already existing trends in electricity consumption will more 
or less repeat themselves in the future. Although this is a widely used, essential 
and reasonable assumption; some unanticipated events may occur and it is 
always very difficult, if not impossible, to foresee such "unexpected" events that 
have a potential to completely change the electricity demand trend in Turkey 
reducing the precision of the forecasts presented here45. Furthermore, due to 
nature of ARIMA modelling and the low elasticities obtained, present study only 
used net total consumption data for forecasting. When we take into account the 
                                                 
45 For instance, the success (or, lack of success) of recent energy market reforms will have 
definitely an impact on future electricity demand in Turkey, which is a variable ignored by 
ARIMA model developed here. 
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fact that there exist various important determinants of energy demand, there is 
an apparent need for further work with more variables. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
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Despite relatively good legislative framework, the current regulatory policy in 
Turkey towards the energy industry in practice seems to be far from ideal. The 
reforms are mainly in the form of “textbook reforms”, meaning that they are 
simply copied from regulation literature with some modifications but in practice 
the crucial underlying economic logic behind them is not taken into account 
either by the EMRA or by the Turkish government. It should not be forgotten 
that every new structure entails new understanding of the issues. However; in 
Turkish case, new reform has been tried to be implemented within previous 
degenerated bureaucratic understanding, which is simply impossible. As long 
as the vital decisions regarding the future of energy industry have been taken in 
the depths of some government departments, including those of the EMRA; it is 
definitely impossible to create a fully functioning market and the result may turn 
out to be a disaster for the country as a whole. On the other hand, the energy 
industry is a complex one; and the creation of a market for energy, where none 
previously existed, is no easy task. Not surprisingly, there will be problems but 
most of them will disappear with the growth of more effective competition 
provided that necessary change in understanding mentioned above is 
materialized. 
 
If reforms are practiced by taking into account their underlying economic logic, 
there is no reason not to believe that the domestic and foreign investors will be 
greatly interested in entering a market with excellent growth potential, like 
Turkish energy market. If implemented properly, the reforms my transform 
Turkey from a simple so-called “Eurasia energy corridor” into an “energy base” 
where electricity is produced and exported to various regions surrounding the 
country, especially Europe.  
 
Also, one should not blame the bureaucrats in the Turkish energy industry, its 
unions, and others for trying to protect what they see as their interests by 
persuading the government to retain previous structure as much as possible. 
But it will be a catastrophe for the country as a whole if they are successful in 
doing so as the way would be open for continued government manipulation of 
these public corporations.  
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As no meaningful competition has developed so far, a significant amount of 
work still lies ahead. It should not be forgotten that the true test of regulatory 
success comes in the form of whether a structure in which generators, 
suppliers, customers and other actors in the market can all freely negotiate, 
each taking their own view of the prices, risks, opportunities and threats that a 
competitive market offers is created or not. 
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Appendix 1: The Republic of Turkey 
 
 
 
Appendix 1-A: Comparative Analysis of Turkey and Turkish Energy Market 
 
The table below presents a comparative analysis of Turkey with respect to the 
United Kingdom, which not only is similar to Turkey in terms of population but 
also constitutes an excellent example for energy market reforms in Turkey with 
market opening rates of 100% in both electricity and natural gas markets.  
 
 
Table 4. Turkey and the United Kingdom 
 
      
Turkey 
Index United 
Kingdom Notes     (UK=100) 
  Basic Facts         
 · Population (July 2005 est.) 69,660,559 115 60,441,457 (1) 
 · Age Structure         
     - 0-14 years (% of total population) 26.0 147 17.7 (1) 
     - 15-64 years (% of total population) 67.3 101 66.5 (1) 
     - 65 years and over (% of total population) 6.7 42 15.8 (1) 
 · Population Growth Rate (%, 2005 est.) 1.1 389 0.3 (1) 
 · Life Expectancy         
     - total population (years)  72.36 92 78.38 (1) 
     - male (years)  69.94 92 75.94 (1) 
     - female (years, 2005 est.)  74.91 93 80.96 (1) 
 · Government type 
Republican 
Parliamentary 
Democracy 
- Constitutional Monarchy  (1) 
 · Total Area (sq km) 780,580 319 244,820 (1) 
 · Coastline (km) 7,200 58 12,429 (1) 
          
  Economy         
 · GDP (billion $, PPP, 2004 est.) 509 29 1,782 (1) 
 · GDP Real Growth Rate (%, 2004 est.) 8.2 256 3.2 (1) 
 · GDP per capita ($, PPP, 2004 est.) 7,400 25 29,600 (1) 
 · GDP Composition by Sector       
     - agriculture (%)  11.7 1170 1.0 (1) 
     - industry (%)  29.8 113 26.3 (1) 
     - services (%, 2003 est.) 58.5 80 72.7 (1) 
 · Unemployment Rate (%, 2004 est.) 9.3 194 4.8 (1) 
 · Population Below Poverty Line (%, 2002) 20 118 17 (1) 
 · Inflation Rate (%, consumer prices, 2004 est.) 9.3 664 1.4 (1) 
 · Investment (% of GDP, gross fixed, 2004 est.) 17.3 107 16.2 (1) 
 · Public Debt (% of GDP, 2004 est.) 74.3 188 39.6 (1) 
 · Industrial Production Growth Rate (%, 2004 est.) 16.5 1833 0.9 (1) 
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 · Current Account Balance (billion $, 2004 est.) -15.3 46 -33.5 (1) 
 · Currency New Turkish Lira (YTL) - 
British Pound 
(GBP) (1) (2) 
 · Exchange Rates (per US dollar, 2004) 1.43 261 0.55 (1) (2) 
          
  Electricity Market Indicators         
 · Market Opening (share of eligible customers, %, 2004) 28 28 100 (3) (4) 
 · Eligibility Threshold (GWh per annum, 2004) 7.8 - 0 (3) (5) 
 · Gross Electricity Production (TWh, 2002) 129.4 33 387.1 (6) (7) 
 · Final Electricity Consumption (TWh, 2002) 101.5 31 332.7 (6) 
 · Electricity Exports (TWh, 2002) 0.4 50 0.8 (6) 
 · Electricity Imports (TWh, 2002) 3.6 39 9.2 (6) 
 · Transmission and Distribution Loses (TWh, 2002) 23.9 77 30.9 (6) 
 · Transmission and Distribution Loses (% of consumption) 23.5 254 9.3   
 · Electricity Prices in 2003 for       
     - industry in US Dollars/kWh 0.099 180 0.055 (8) 
     - households in US Dollars/kWh 0.106 91 0.116 (8) 
     - industry in US Dollars/kWh (using PPPs) 0.204 378 0.054 (8) 
     - households in US Dollars/kWh (using PPPs) 0.217 190 0.114 (8) 
           
  Natural Gas Market Indicators         
 · Market Opening (share of eligible customers, %, 2004) 80 80 100 (9) (10) 
 · Eligibility Threshold (million cm/year, 2004) 1 - 0 (9) 
 · Natural Gas Production (million cubic metres, 2003) 560 0.5 108,438 (11) 
 · Natural Gas Total Consumption (million cubic metres, 2003) 21,181 21 100,741 (11) 
 · Natural Gas Imports (million cubic metres, 2003) 20,650 263 7,851 (11) 
 · Natural Gas Exports (million cubic metres, 2003) 0 - 16,106 (11) 
 · Natural Gas Prices in 2003 (GCV basis) for         
     - industry in US Dollars/107 kcal  228.9 142 161.4 (8) 
     - households in US Dollars/107 kcal 265.3 75 351.8 (8) 
     - industry in US Dollars/107 kcal (using PPPs) 469.7 295 159.3 (8) 
     - households in US Dollars/107 kcal (using PPPs) 544.4 157 347.3 (8) 
          
  Petroleum Market Indicators         
 · Oil Production (thousand metric tons, 2002) 2,420 2 116,063 (12) 
 · Oil Net Imports (thousand metric tons, 2002) 28,167 - -39,775 (12) 
 · Oil Consumption (thousand metric tons, 2002) 30,148 38 78,555 (12) 
 · Gasoline Prices in 2004 (premium unleaded, 95 RON)         
     - in US Dollars/litre 1.374 93 1.471 (8) 
     - in US Dollars/litre (using PPPs) 2.511 193 1.300 (8) 
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Notes 
(1) Source: CIA (2005)     
(2) On 1 January 2005, the old Turkish Lira (TRL) was converted to New Turkish Lira (YTL)   
 at a rate of 1,000,000 old to 1 New Turkish Lira.     
(3) Source: European Commission (2004, p 114)     
(4) Source: European Commission (2001a, p 101)     
(5) In 2005, eligibility threshold in Turkey further reduced to 7.7 GWh per annum     
 by the Energy Market Regulatory Board Decision No: 427, dated 27.01.2005.    
(6) Source: IEA (2004b)     
(7) Gross production refers to total public and autoproducers’ production,     
 including production from pumped storage.     
(8) Source: IEA (2005a)     
(9) Source: European Commission (2001b, p 29)     
(10) In European Commission's report, the level of domestic gas market opening for Turkey is given as 80%, which 
is calculated based on the eligibility threshold of 1 million cm/year. However, this threshold is only valid for 
those who acquired such rights before the enactment of Natural Gas Market Law. For all other domestic 
consumers, the threshold is 15 million cm/year. However, as also indicated in the report, the BOTAS still keeps 
its current monopoly position in domestic supplies. Therefore, in practice, no consumer in Turkey can switch 
his/her supplier, meaning that practically market opening rate is 0% in Turkey. For details, see the Energy 
Market Regulatory Board Decision No: 408, dated 27.12.2004.  
(11) Source: IEA (2004c)     
(12) Source: IEA (2004d)     
 
 
 
Figure 3. Map of Turkey 
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Appendix 1-B: Turkish Energy Industry Mile Stones 
 
Date Event 
19th century Oil exploration activities began in Turkey 
1902 The first electric generator was introduced in Tarsus, Turkey 
1913 The first power plant was installed in Silahtaraga, Istanbul 
1923 The Republic of Turkey was founded and started to try a liberal economy 
1938 Nationalization of Turkish electricity industry started 
1944 Nationalization was completed 
1960s LPG started to be used as an alternative to kerosene (and later to gas) in Turkey 
1962 The First 5-Year Development Plan was introduced, and thereby "development plans era" started 
1963 The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) was established  
1970 The Turkish Electricity Administration (TEK) was created 
1974 The BOTAS was founded for the transport of Iraqi crude oil 
1982 Distribution assets were transferred to TEK, thus making TEK a national vertically integrated monopoly fully owned by the state 
1982 The monopoly of public sector on generation was abolished and the private sector was allowed to build power plants and sell its electricity to TEK 
1982 Natural gas was introduced for the first time in Turkey 
1984 TEK was restructured and gained the status of state-owned enterprise 
1984 Law No. 3096, which forms the legal basis for BOT, TOOR and autoproducer system, was enacted 
1984 The BOTAS started to diversify into the natural gas sector 
1993 TEK was incorporated into privatization plan and split into two separate state-owned enterprises as TEAS and TEDAS 
1994-5 The Constitutional Court of Turkey issued a series of rulings, which made the privatization almost impossible to implement 
1994 
Law No. 3996 and Implementing Decree 5907 were enacted to enhance the 
attractiveness of BOT projects by authorizing the granting of guarantees by the 
Undersecretariat of Treasury and providing some tax exemptions 
1996 The first LPG use in cogeneration plants 
1997 The Build Operate Own  (BOO) Law (No. 4283) was enacted to enable private sector participation in the construction and operation of new power plants 
August 1999 
The parliament passed a constitutional amendment permitting the privatization 
of public utility services and allowing international arbitration for resolving 
disputes 
3 March 2001 Electricity Market Law (EML, No. 4628) came into force 
2 May 2001 Natural Gas Market Law (NGML, No. 4646) came into force 
20 December 2003  Petroleum Market Law (PML, No. 5015) came into force 
17 March 2004 Turkish government issued the Strategy Paper Concerning Electricity Market Reform and Privatisation, which outlines the major steps to be taken up to 2012 
13 March 2005 Liquefied Petroleum Gas Market Law (LPGML, No.5307) came into force 
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Appendix 1-C: Current Market Structure in Turkish Electricity Industry 
 
In generation, EUAS and its affiliated partnerships were responsible for 58.3% 
of total generation in 2002. Power plants under autoproducer system accounted 
for 15.4% of total production in the same year. Those under BOT and BOO 
contracts also supplied another 14.9%. The table and figure below show the 
distribution of electricity generation by utilities in Turkish electricity market. 
 
Table 5. Distribution of Electricity Generation in Turkey (by utilities, 2002) 
 
Utilities Production (GWh) 
Contribution to 
Turkey’s Total 
Consumption (%) 
Power plants of EUAS and  
its affiliated partnerships 77,332.1 58.3 
Power plants of Autoproducers 20,446.6 15.4 
Power plants of BOT and BOO 19,700.0 14.9 
Power plants of TOOR 4,204.8 3.2 
Others 7,716.0 5.8 
Turkey's Total Production 129,399.5 97.6 
Net Exports -3,153.2 2.4 
Turkey's Total Consumption 132,552.7 100.0 
Source: Hepbasli (2005). 
 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of Electricity Generation in Turkey (by utilities, 2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In terms of installed capacity, EUAS is again in a dominant position and 
controlled 61.9% of total installed capacity in 2003. Power plants under 
autoproducer system and BOT and BOO contracts accounted for 11.3% and 
22.6% of installed capacity respectively in the same year. The following table 
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and figure present the breakdown of Turkey’s installed capacity by utilities in 
2003.  
 
Table 6. Breakdown of Turkey’s Installed Capacity (by utilities, 2003) 
 
Utilities 
Installed 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Contribution to 
Turkey’s total 
Installed capacity (%) 
Power plants of EUAS 22,333 61.9 
Power plants of Autoproducers 4,084 11.3 
Power plants of BOT and BOO 8,161 22.6 
Power plants of TOOR 650 1.8 
Others 878 2.4 
Total Installed Capacity 36,106 100.0 
Source: Hepbasli (2005). 
 
 
Figure 5. Breakdown of Turkey’s Installed Capacity (by utilities, 2003) 
 
 
 
TEDAS and its affiliated regional distribution companies dominate the 
distribution and retail supply sector. Turkey’s distribution network has been 
divided into 21 regions, one of which is currently operating under a TOOR 
contract. The government’s objective is to privatise the remaining 20 distribution 
regions by the end of 2006 (IEA, 2005b). 
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Appendix 1-D: Natural Gas Import Contracts of the BOTAS 
 
Agreement 
Volume 
Signature date 
Length 
Operation date 
Volumes delivered 
(bcm/year) (years) in 2003 (bcm) 
Russia (West) 6 February 1986 25 June 1987 
11.4  
(total Western 
pipeline) 
Algeria (LNG) 4 April 1988 20 August 1994 3.8 
Nigeria (LNG) 1.2 November 1995 22 November 1999 1.1 
Iran 10 August 1996 25 December 2001 3.5 
Russia (Black Sea) 16 December 1997 23 February 2003 1.2 
Russia (West) 8 February 1998 23 March 1998 See above 
Turkmenistan 46 16 May 1999 30 - 0 
Azerbaijan 6.6 March 2001 15 2006 0 
Source: IEA (2005b) 
 
 
                                                 
46 Contract suspended, among other things, for pending issue regarding the legal status of the 
Caspian Sea. 
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Appendix 1-E: Energy Balance Table for Turkey 
 
Table below shows the energy balance table for Turkey, which sets out the 
energy flows in the Turkish economy from initial inputs to final consumption for 
the year 2001. The unit of measurement is thousand tonnes of oil equivalent 
(ktoe) on a net calorific value basis. 
 
The initial inputs of energy to the economy are the primary fuels of coal; crude 
oil; petroleum products; natural gas; hydro; geothermal, solar etc.; combustible 
renewables and waste; and electricity. In Turkey, for the time being, there exists 
no nuclear-generated energy. 
 
Indigenous production of primary fuels in Turkey is dominated by the coal, 
which is responsible for 53.7% of the total (row 1). It is followed by 
combustibles, renewables and waste (24.1%); crude oil (9.5%); hydro (7.9%); 
geothermal, solar etc. (3.8%) and natural gas (1%). 
 
Row 2 shows imported inputs added to indigenous production. Of these, there 
is a negligible level of electricity imports and a large amount of crude oil and 
natural gas imports, which are responsible for 47.5% and 27.2% of total imports 
respectively. Coal (11.6%) and petroleum products (12.9%) are also significant 
trade items. 
 
Row 3 shows exports of primary fuels. Petroleum products are responsible for 
almost all exports (98.6%). International marine bunkers (row 4) cover those 
quantities delivered to all sea-going ships; and petroleum products account for 
all quantity in this item. 
 
Stock changes (row 5) reflect the difference between opening stock levels on 
the first day of the year and closing levels on the last day of the year of stocks 
on national territory held by producers, importers, energy transformation 
industries and large consumers. We can detect from the table that, during the 
year 2001, some crude oil and natural gas stocks were built in Turkey; while a 
stock draw occurred in coal and petroleum products. 
 
Row 6 indicates total primary energy supply (TPES), which is made up of 
production + imports - exports - international marine bunkers ± stock changes. 
TPES points out the available supply both for direct consumption and for 
conversion into secondary fuels.  
 
Row 7 shows transfers; which include interproduct transfers, products 
transferred and recycled products. However, there was not any kind of transfers 
in Turkey, in 2001.  
 
Row 8 contains statistical differences, which include the sum of the unexplained 
statistical differences for individual fuels. Mainly, they arise because of the 
variety of conversion factors in coal and oil columns. 
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Table 7. 2001 Energy Balances for Turkey 
 
SUPPLY and 
CONSUMPTION Coal 
Crude 
Oil  
Petroleum 
Products 
Natural 
Gas Hydro 
Geothermal 
Solar, etc 
Combustible 
Renewables 
and Waste 
Electricity Total 
1. Production 14,040 2,490 0 257 2,065 988 6,315 0 26,155 
2. Imports 5,626 23,077 6,274 13,214 0 0 0 394 48,585 
3. Exports 0 0 -2,583 0 0 0 0 -37 -2,620 
4. International Marine Bunkers 0 0 -235 0 0 0 0 0 -235 
5. Stock Changes 787 -188 77 -102 0 0 0 0 574 
6. TPES 20,453 25,379 3,533 13,369 2,065 988 6,315 357 72,459 
7. Transfers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8. Statistical Difference -527 -136 0 0 0 0 0 0 -663 
9. Electricity Plants -10,618 0 -1,702 -6,680 -2,065 -83 -10 9,181 -11,977 
10. CHP Plants -514 0 -854 -2,153 0 0 -96 1,374 -2,243 
11. Heat Plants 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12. Gas Works 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13. Petroleum Refineries 0 -25,349 25,836 0 0 0 0 0 487 
14. Coal Transformation -1,547 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1,547 
15. Liquifaction Plants 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16. Other Transformation 0 106 -106 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17. Own Use -225 0 -1,701 -73 0 0 0 -708 -2,707 
18. Distribution Losses 0 0 0 -17 0 0 0 -2,007 -2,024 
19. TFC 7,022 0 25,006 4,446 0 905 6,209 8,197 51,785 
20. Industry sector 5,379 0 5,556 1,466 0 118 0 3,870 16,389 
21. Transportation sector 0 0 11,891 44 0 0 0 57 11,992 
22. Other sectors 1,643 0 5,651 2,936 0 787 6,209 4,270 21,496 
23. Agriculture 0 0 2,689 0 0 0 0 275 2,964 
24. Commercial and Public Services 0 0 0 616 0 0 0 1,516 2,132 
25. Residential 1,643 0 2,962 2,320 0 787 6,209 2,026 15,947 
26. Non-Specified 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 453 453 
27. Non-Energy Use 0 0 1,908 0 0 0 0 0 1,908 
28. Electricity Generated-GWh 38,417 0 10,417 49,550 24,010 152 179 0 122,725 
(in thousand tonnes of oil equivalent (ktoe) on a net calorific value basis) 
Source: IEA (2004e) 
 
 
Row 9 refers to plants which are designed to produce electricity. Here, we can 
observe total electricity produced (output) and total sources used to produce 
that electricity (input). Transformation losses appear in the total column as a 
negative number. This row is especially important because it allows us to 
calculate thermal efficiency in electricity generation for Turkey as follows:  
 
Thermal Efficiency in Electricity Generation = Total Electricity Produced 
Total Sources Used to Produce Electricity 
 
Thermal Efficiency in Electricity Generation = 9,181 
10,618 + 1,702 + 6,680 + 2,065 + 83 + 10 
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Thermal Efficiency in Electricity Generation = 9,181 
21,158 
 
Thermal Efficiency in Electricity Generation 
 
= 43.4% 
 
Row 10 explains the role of combined heat and power (CHP) plants, which 
refers to plants which are designed to produce both heat and electricity; also 
known as co-generation power stations.  
 
Row 11 shows the role of heat plants (those designed to produce heat only) in 
the conversion process. Row 12 does the same for gas works. If there is 
production of natural gas at gas works; the quantity produced appears as a 
positive figure in the natural gas column, and inputs as negative entries in the 
relevant columns. Also, conversion losses appear in the total column. However, 
as can be seen in the table, there are not any heat plants or gas works in 
Turkey. 
 
Row 13 (petroleum refineries) shows the use of primary energy for the 
manufacture of finished petroleum products and the corresponding output. 
Thus, the total reflects transformation losses; and in general the data in the total 
column should be a negative number. However, here it is a positive one, 
indicating either a problem in the underlying energy data or a problem in the 
primary refinery balance! 
 
Coal transformation (row 14) contains losses in transformation of coal from 
primary to secondary fuels. Liquifaction plants (row 15) include diverse 
liquefaction processes, such as coal liquefaction into oil, and natural gas to 
gasoline. However, there is no liquefaction plant in Turkey. 
 
Row 16 covers other transformations that are not specified in previous rows. 
 
Own use (row 17) contains the primary and secondary energy consumed by 
transformation industries for a variety of purposes (e.g. energy used for heating, 
lighting, oil and gas extraction etc). 
 
Row 18 contains data regarding distribution and transmission losses that 
include losses in natural gas/electricity distribution and transmission. 
 
The essential balance in the table is; TFC (row 19) = TPES (row6) – (the sum 
of rows 7 to 18), and in turn row 6 is the sum of rows 1-5; row 19 is the sum of 
rows 20, 21, 22 and 27; while row 22 is the sum of rows 23-26. In this way, row 
19 shows the consumption of energy by final users after the conversion 
process, and rows 20, 21, 22 and 27 indicate the distribution of this 
consumption among different market sectors.  
 
When we examine the shares of different sectors in final consumption, it can be 
seen that dominant sectors are industry (31.6%), residential (30.8%) and 
transportation (23.2%). The remaining 14.4% consists of agriculture (5.7%), 
commercial & public services (4.1%), non-energy use (3.7%) and other non-
specified (0.9%) sectors. Here we should note that non-energy use covers other 
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use of petroleum products such as white spirit, paraffin waxes, lubricants, 
bitumen and so on. 
 
Actually, the last row (row 28) is not a part of a standard energy balance table 
and even the unit of measurement in this row is not thousand tonnes of oil 
equivalent (ktoe) but it is GWh (1 ktoe = 11.63 GWh). It is added to the table 
because it provides very useful information by demonstrating Turkey's electricity 
generation by primary energy resources, which can be showed graphically as 
follows: 
 
 
Figure 6. Electricity Generation in Turkey 
(2001, by primary energy sources) 
 
 
Primary energy demand in Turkey can also be showed graphically as follows: 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Primary Energy Demand in Turkey (2001) 
 
 
  71 
Moreover, the distribution of final energy consumption among different market 
sectors (or, industries) can be seen in the figure below. 
 
 
  
Figure 8. Final Energy Consumption in Turkey (2001, by industry) 
 
 
Finally, the figure below shows the distribution of final energy consumption 
among different fuels. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Final Energy Consumption in Turkey (2001, by fuel) 
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Appendix 1-F: The Trends in Energy Supply and Use in Turkey 
 
Having discussed the current energy balance of Turkey, let me focus on the 
development of the supply and use of energy in Turkey since 1960. 
 
First of all, I will review the trends in total primary energy supply. Then the 
trends regarding final energy consumption will be examined based on fuel and 
final user. Moreover, trends in the energy consumption of three important 
sectors - namely industrial, residential (domestic) and transportation - will also 
be discussed. 
 
Table below shows distribution of fuels in total primary energy supply of Turkey 
during the period 1960-2001. The column “Others” reflects the sum of 
petroleum products; hydro; geothermal, solar, wind and electricity. The following 
two graphs were drawn based on these data. 
 
 
Table 8. Total Primary Energy Supply in Turkey (by fuel) 
 
  Coal Crude Oil  
Natural 
Gas 
Combustible 
Renewables 
and Waste 
Others Total 
1960 3,200 370 0 5,879 1,260 10,709 
1961 2,940 592 0 5,950 1,385 10,867 
1962 3,246 2,954 0 5,943 -290 11,853 
1963 3,476 3,696 0 5,838 -567 12,443 
1964 3,676 4,452 0 5,895 -912 13,111 
1965 3,595 4,684 0 5,871 -352 13,798 
1966 4,007 5,281 0 5,943 -48 15,183 
1967 3,870 5,597 0 5,977 311 15,755 
1968 3,925 6,491 0 5,968 165 16,549 
1969 4,219 6,629 0 5,939 640 17,427 
1970 4,245 7,378 0 5,972 607 18,202 
1971 4,314 9,056 0 5,798 296 19,464 
1972 5,097 11,194 0 6,246 -531 22,006 
1973 5,149 13,267 0 6,452 -545 24,323 
1974 5,588 13,255 0 6,574 -236 25,181 
1975 5,760 13,346 0 6,819 810 26,735 
1976 6,252 13,797 0 7,025 2,046 29,120 
1977 6,581 14,881 0 7,193 3,302 31,957 
1978 6,235 13,427 0 7,448 4,739 31,849 
1979 6,551 11,392 0 7,741 4,601 30,285 
1980 6,988 13,192 0 7,680 3,592 31,452 
1981 7,159 13,939 0 7,722 2,896 31,716 
1982 7,972 16,708 33 7,925 1,019 33,657 
1983 8,845 16,624 58 8,055 2,053 35,635 
1984 10,035 18,435 33 7,929 552 36,984 
1985 12,055 18,542 55 7,746 735 39,133 
1986 13,386 19,771 376 7,891 709 42,133 
1987 14,031 23,699 599 7,892 447 46,668 
1988 13,726 24,703 1,008 7,924 -263 47,098 
1989 15,038 21,880 2,650 7,921 1,411 48,900 
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1990 16,944 23,596 2,855 7,205 2,050 52,650 
1991 17,771 21,717 3,487 7,209 1,958 52,142 
1992 17,287 22,369 3,814 7,206 2,916 53,592 
1993 15,977 24,868 4,239 7,145 4,609 56,838 
1994 15,969 24,711 4,519 7,137 3,706 56,042 
1995 16,618 26,983 5,785 7,065 4,945 61,396 
1996 18,904 26,193 6,984 7,043 7,744 66,868 
1997 21,176 26,733 8,339 7,022 7,203 70,473 
1998 21,992 27,361 8,943 6,986 6,407 71,689 
1999 20,073 25,722 10,588 6,812 7,341 70,536 
2000 23,459 23,851 12,635 6,475 10,685 77,105 
2001 20,453 25,379 13,369 6,315 6,943 72,459 
(in thousand tonnes of oil equivalent - ktoe) 
Source: IEA (2004f) 
 
 
The figures below show the development of total primary energy supply in 
Turkey in terms of fuel types in real values and percentages, respectively. It can 
easily be seen that primary energy supply increased over the last 40 years. The 
value of combustible renewables and waste has almost remained constant in 
real terms, which caused a sharp decline in percentages (from 54.9% in 1960 to 
8.7% in 2001). In Turkey, natural gas was first introduced in 1982, and since 
then, its share has steadily increased and reached 18.5% in 2001. As for crude 
oil, its contribution to total primary energy supply has also increased over the 
years. Its share reached a peak (54.5%) in 1973; however, post-1973 oil price 
rises changed this trend and its share has fluctuated between 30.9% and 52.6% 
since then. In 2001, the figure was 35%. The coal has also increased its 
contribution over the years; its share has varied between 19.6 % and 34.1%. 
Actually, the share of coal in 2001 (28.2%) was very close to its value in 1960 
(29.9%).   
 
 
 
Figure 10. Total Primary Energy Supply in Turkey (by fuel) 
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Figure 11. Total Primary Energy Supply in Turkey (by fuel, percentages) 
 
 
The table below shows distribution of fuels in total final energy consumption in 
Turkey. The following two figures reflect these data. 
 
 
Table 9. Total Energy Consumption in Turkey (by fuel) 
 
  Coal Petroleum Products 
Natural 
Gas 
Renewables 
and Waste Electricity Total 
1960 2,280 1,405 31 5,879 184 9,779 
1961 2,020 1,762 30 5,950 200 9,962 
1962 2,044 2,219 30 5,943 239 10,475 
1963 2,400 2,564 32 5,838 267 11,101 
1964 2,300 2,827 33 5,895 298 11,353 
1965 2,124 3,316 38 5,871 337 11,686 
1966 2,263 3,946 39 5,943 376 12,567 
1967 2,250 4,750 39 5,977 420 13,436 
1968 2,235 5,247 40 5,968 471 13,961 
1969 2,412 5,429 42 5,939 540 14,362 
1970 2,447 6,155 41 5,972 593 15,208 
1971 2,324 7,380 40 5,798 673 16,215 
1972 3,146 8,528 41 6,246 779 18,740 
1973 2,944 9,704 40 6,452 853 19,993 
1974 3,119 9,895 38 6,574 918 20,544 
1975 3,156 11,171 31 6,819 1,096 22,273 
1976 3,536 12,524 41 7,025 1,317 24,443 
1977 3,286 14,296 40 7,193 1,477 26,292 
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1978 3,506 14,288 41 7,448 1,557 26,840 
1979 3,486 12,625 42 7,741 1,620 25,514 
1980 4,191 12,910 39 7,680 1,681 26,501 
1981 4,164 12,753 42 7,722 1,821 26,502 
1982 4,799 13,554 74 7,925 1,949 28,301 
1983 5,002 14,429 97 8,055 2,028 29,611 
1984 5,628 14,201 76 7,929 2,290 30,124 
1985 6,017 14,639 76 7,746 2,448 30,926 
1986 5,912 16,022 72 7,896 2,650 32,552 
1987 7,376 18,804 78 7,902 3,019 37,179 
1988 7,652 18,944 203 7,937 3,269 38,005 
1989 7,537 19,249 435 7,942 3,548 38,711 
1990 7,566 20,797 724 7,242 3,866 40,195 
1991 8,055 20,537 1,120 7,227 4,045 40,984 
1992 7,540 21,514 1,638 7,238 4,449 42,379 
1993 6,815 24,368 2,082 7,177 4,880 45,322 
1994 5,657 22,909 2,014 7,198 5,074 42,852 
1995 6,432 26,018 2,787 6,904 5,601 47,742 
1996 7,918 27,315 3,394 6,995 6,143 51,765 
1997 9,007 26,650 4,068 7,038 6,853 53,616 
1998 9,050 26,046 4,113 7,155 7,376 53,740 
1999 7,363 25,916 4,042 7,123 7,672 52,116 
2000 10,219 26,924 4,492 6,820 8,245 56,700 
2001 7,022 25,006 4,446 7,114 8,197 51,785 
(in thousand tonnes of oil equivalent - ktoe) 
Source: IEA (2004f) 
 
 
In Turkey, total final energy consumption has increased more than 5 times 
during the period 1960-2001. Electricity consumption has gradually increased 
over the years not only in terms of real value but also in terms of percentages 
(from 1.9% in 1960 to 15.8% in 2001). As for renewables and waste, since their 
value has not changed a lot over the years; there is an enormous decline in 
their share in final consumption (from 60.1% in 1960 to 13.7% in 2001). Starting 
from the late 1980s, natural gas has progressively raised its share in terms of 
both real value and percentages; and in 2001 its share reached 8.6%. 
Consumption of petroleum products also increased in real terms; however, this 
increase slowed down, again, due to post-1973 oil price rises, which caused the 
share of petroleum products to remain the same since 1973. In 1973, their 
share in final consumption was 48.5% and in 2001 this figure was 48.3%. 
Regarding coal, its consumption increased too; however over the last 10 years 
its share has started to decline in percentage terms. The share of coal was 
20.1% in 1988; but by 2001 it had decreased to 13.6%. 
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Figure 12. Total Energy Consumption in Turkey (by fuel) 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Total Energy Consumption in Turkey (by fuel, percentages) 
 
 
The table below shows distribution of total final energy consumption among 
different sectors of Turkish economy. The following two figures depend on these 
data. 
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Table 10. Total Energy Consumption in Turkey (by final user) 
 
  Industry Residential (Domestic) Transportation Other Total 
1960 991 7,048 1,588 153 9,780 
1961 931 7,058 1,649 325 9,963 
1962 1,026 7,185 1,838 426 10,475 
1963 1,224 7,382 1,953 542 11,101 
1964 1,182 7,453 2,159 559 11,353 
1965 1,234 7,418 2,398 636 11,686 
1966 1,380 7,619 2,808 760 12,567 
1967 1,638 7,994 2,899 906 13,437 
1968 1,691 8,277 3,028 966 13,962 
1969 1,949 8,424 2,965 1,024 14,362 
1970 2,335 8,562 3,270 1,041 15,208 
1971 2,790 8,746 3,551 1,128 16,215 
1972 3,634 9,814 3,971 1,321 18,740 
1973 3,881 10,076 4,486 1,551 19,994 
1974 4,002 10,273 4,673 1,596 20,544 
1975 4,611 10,436 5,386 1,840 22,273 
1976 5,385 11,128 5,834 2,095 24,442 
1977 5,772 11,428 6,691 2,401 26,292 
1978 6,701 11,735 6,546 1,859 26,841 
1979 6,415 11,593 5,877 1,628 25,513 
1980 6,929 12,207 5,620 1,745 26,501 
1981 7,034 11,932 5,656 1,880 26,502 
1982 7,357 12,715 6,061 2,168 28,301 
1983 7,656 13,202 6,348 2,405 29,611 
1984 8,247 12,883 6,428 2,565 30,123 
1985 8,296 13,291 6,653 2,685 30,925 
1986 8,417 13,667 7,474 2,995 32,553 
1987 10,315 14,859 8,513 3,491 37,178 
1988 10,999 14,882 8,726 3,397 38,004 
1989 11,770 14,912 8,858 3,171 38,711 
1990 12,651 14,266 9,576 3,702 40,195 
1991 13,255 14,526 9,204 3,998 40,983 
1992 13,651 15,164 9,448 4,116 42,379 
1993 13,761 15,085 11,245 5,232 45,323 
1994 12,764 14,364 10,887 4,838 42,853 
1995 14,455 15,679 12,197 5,411 47,742 
1996 16,851 16,068 12,891 5,956 51,766 
1997 18,093 16,831 12,193 6,498 53,615 
1998 18,724 16,476 11,371 7,169 53,740 
1999 16,940 16,592 11,864 6,720 52,116 
2000 20,401 16,836 12,498 6,965 56,700 
2001 16,389 15,947 11,992 7,457 51,785 
(in thousand tonnes of oil equivalent - ktoe) 
Source: IEA (2004f) 
 
 
 
 
 
  78 
 
Figure 14. Total Energy Consumption in Turkey (by final user) 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Total Energy Consumption in Turkey (by final user, percentages) 
 
 
As can be seen in the figures above, energy consumption of the industry sector 
has increased more than 16 times in real terms over the last 40 years; and its 
share in final consumption reached 31.6% in 2001, which was just 10.1% in 
1960. Although doubled in terms of real value, the share of domestic 
consumption has massively decreased in the same period (from 72.1% in 1960 
to 30.8 % in 2001). As for transportation sector; although it was not as large as 
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in the case of industry sector, there is an increase in the share (from 16.2% in 
1960 to 23.2% in2001). 
 
Since any discussion of trends in energy consumption is incomplete unless 
paying due attention to trends in the energy consumption of three important 
sectors - namely industrial, residential (domestic) and transportation; now let me 
turn to this task. 
 
Table below shows distribution of fuels in industrial energy consumption. 
Following two figures are derived from this table. 
 
 
Table 11. Industrial Energy Consumption in Turkey 
 
  Coal Petroleum Products 
Natural 
Gas 
Solar, Wind, 
Other Electricity Total 
1960 734 132 0 0 125 991 
1961 665 136 0 0 130 931 
1962 677 192 3 0 154 1,026 
1963 838 211 3 0 172 1,224 
1964 728 259 3 0 192 1,182 
1965 634 374 3 0 223 1,234 
1966 705 432 3 0 240 1,380 
1967 661 710 2 0 265 1,638 
1968 639 749 3 0 300 1,691 
1969 715 885 3 0 346 1,949 
1970 754 1,203 3 0 375 2,335 
1971 710 1,633 3 0 444 2,790 
1972 1,142 1,983 3 0 506 3,634 
1973 1,139 2,185 3 0 554 3,881 
1974 1,188 2,218 3 0 593 4,002 
1975 1,447 2,473 3 0 688 4,611 
1976 1,519 3,026 3 0 837 5,385 
1977 1,465 3,342 3 0 962 5,772 
1978 1,791 3,911 3 0 996 6,701 
1979 2,009 3,396 4 0 1,006 6,415 
1980 2,173 3,708 3 0 1,045 6,929 
1981 2,157 3,727 2 0 1,148 7,034 
1982 2,258 3,836 36 0 1,227 7,357 
1983 2,269 4,062 61 0 1,264 7,656 
1984 2,982 3,765 36 0 1,464 8,247 
1985 3,008 3,666 43 0 1,579 8,296 
1986 2,893 3,808 40 0 1,676 8,417 
1987 3,510 4,843 46 0 1,916 10,315 
1988 3,995 4,805 172 2 2,025 10,999 
1989 4,108 5,036 408 4 2,214 11,770 
1990 4,520 5,100 671 8 2,352 12,651 
1991 5,003 5,025 955 13 2,259 13,255 
1992 4,283 5,532 1,300 17 2,519 13,651 
1993 4,011 5,398 1,601 20 2,731 13,761 
1994 3,494 5,062 1,458 20 2,730 12,764 
1995 3,978 5,750 1,633 20 3,074 14,455 
1996 5,705 5,869 1,952 24 3,301 16,851 
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1997 6,382 5,938 2,198 24 3,551 18,093 
1998 7,057 5,925 1,917 24 3,801 18,724 
1999 5,712 5,689 1,637 76 3,826 16,940 
2000 8,533 6,049 1,758 97 3,964 20,401 
2001 5,379 5,556 1,466 118 3,870 16,389 
(in thousand tonnes of oil equivalent - ktoe) 
Source: IEA (2004f) 
 
 
As can be seen in the figures below, coal and petroleum products have 
dominated industrial consumption over the last 40 years. As expected, however, 
the share of petroleum products started to decline mid 1970s onwards due to oil 
price shock. Also, electricity has an important share in total industrial energy 
consumption and its contribution increased from 12.6% in 1960 to 23.6% in 
2001. Moreover, since the early 1990s, natural gas has emerged as another 
fuel consumed by industry. In 2001, its share reached 8.9%. Unfortunately, the 
consumption of renewables (solar, wind and others) in industrial sector has 
always been so low that their total has never reached 1%; even their existence 
cannot be detected in the figures below.  
 
 
Figure 16. Industrial Energy Consumption in Turkey 
 
 
  81 
 
Figure 17. Industrial Energy Consumption in Turkey (percentages) 
 
 
In the same way, table below shows distribution of fuels in residential (or, 
domestic) energy consumption. Following figures are obtained from this data. 
 
 
Table 12. Residential (Domestic) Energy Consumption in Turkey 
 
  Coal Petroleum Products 
Natural 
Gas 
Renewables 
and Waste Electricity Total 
1960 728 372 29 5,879 40 7,048 
1961 661 375 29 5,950 43 7,058 
1962 686 482 26 5,943 48 7,185 
1963 911 553 28 5,838 52 7,382 
1964 856 612 29 5,895 61 7,453 
1965 797 651 33 5,871 66 7,418 
1966 854 718 34 5,943 70 7,619 
1967 1,016 884 35 5,977 82 7,994 
1968 1,016 1,166 36 5,968 91 8,277 
1969 1,107 1,232 37 5,939 109 8,424 
1970 1,115 1,312 36 5,972 127 8,562 
1971 1,044 1,740 35 5,798 129 8,746 
1972 1,446 1,955 35 6,246 132 9,814 
1973 1,282 2,189 33 6,452 120 10,076 
1974 1,401 2,137 32 6,574 129 10,273 
1975 1,258 2,170 26 6,819 163 10,436 
1976 1,593 2,277 34 7,025 199 11,128 
1977 1,532 2,439 34 7,193 230 11,428 
1978 1,493 2,505 35 7,448 254 11,735 
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1979 1,276 2,266 35 7,741 275 11,593 
1980 1,837 2,357 32 7,680 301 12,207 
1981 1,797 2,062 36 7,722 315 11,932 
1982 2,328 2,096 35 7,925 331 12,715 
1983 2,531 2,237 33 8,055 346 13,202 
1984 2,476 2,070 38 7,929 370 12,883 
1985 2,886 2,201 30 7,746 428 13,291 
1986 2,950 2,305 29 7,896 487 13,667 
1987 3,808 2,559 30 7,902 560 14,859 
1988 3,614 2,649 29 7,935 655 14,882 
1989 3,405 2,833 25 7,938 711 14,912 
1990 3,031 3,170 52 7,234 779 14,266 
1991 3,040 3,176 164 7,214 932 14,526 
1992 3,245 3,394 317 7,221 987 15,164 
1993 2,794 3,604 450 7,157 1,080 15,085 
1994 2,157 3,348 524 7,178 1,157 14,364 
1995 2,451 3,975 1,123 6,884 1,246 15,679 
1996 2,205 4,069 1,410 6,971 1,413 16,068 
1997 2,620 3,770 1,835 7,014 1,592 16,831 
1998 1,988 3,475 2,159 7,131 1,723 16,476 
1999 1,647 3,588 2,368 7,047 1,942 16,592 
2000 1,685 3,680 2,694 6,723 2,054 16,836 
2001 1,643 2,962 2,320 6,996 2,026 15,947 
(in thousand tonnes of oil equivalent - ktoe) 
Source: IEA (2004f) 
 
 
The most striking feature of domestic consumption is the huge share of 
renewables and waste. Although their share has decreased enormously over 
the years (from 83.4% in 1960 to 43.9% in 2001); they are still the most 
important fuels in terms of domestic consumption. The second important fuel in 
domestic consumption is petroleum products with a share of 18.6% in 2001, 
which was 5.3% in 1960. Coal has the next important figure with 10.3%. 
Although the share of coal has fluctuated over the years, in 2001 it returned 
exactly to its value in 1960, that is 10.3%. Starting with its introduction in 1980s, 
natural gas has also started to increase its share in domestic consumption and 
in 2001 it reached 14.5%. Finally, contribution of electricity to domestic 
consumption has increased gradually and in 2001 its share reached 12.7% from 
almost nothing in 1960. 
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Figure 18. Residential (Domestic) Energy Consumption in Turkey 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Residential (Domestic) Energy Consumption 
in Turkey (percentages) 
 
The final sector that I focus on is transportation. Table below shows relevant 
data. In 2001, given over 99% dominance of petroleum products in this sector, 
we even do not need to look at graphs to see the importance of petroleum 
products. However, still I provide them so as to identify the development of 
petroleum products since 1960, when this figure was only 48.3%. 
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Table 13. Transportation Sector Energy Consumption in Turkey 
 
  Petroleum Products Others Total  
  Petroleum Products Others Total 
1960 767 821 1,588  1981 5,432 224 5,656 
1961 951 698 1,649  1982 5,831 230 6,061 
1962 1,152 686 1,838  1983 6,128 220 6,348 
1963 1,297 656 1,953  1984 6,242 186 6,428 
1964 1,437 722 2,159  1985 6,512 141 6,653 
1965 1,699 699 2,398  1986 7,383 91 7,474 
1966 2,087 721 2,808  1987 8,430 83 8,513 
1967 2,310 589 2,899  1988 8,653 73 8,726 
1968 2,431 597 3,028  1989 8,803 55 8,858 
1969 2,358 607 2,965  1990 9,531 45 9,576 
1970 2,673 597 3,270  1991 9,158 46 9,204 
1971 2,968 583 3,551  1992 9,378 70 9,448 
1972 3,400 571 3,971  1993 11,164 81 11,245 
1973 3,953 533 4,486  1994 10,811 76 10,887 
1974 4,133 540 4,673  1995 12,132 65 12,197 
1975 4,922 464 5,386  1996 12,809 82 12,891 
1976 5,395 439 5,834  1997 12,135 58 12,193 
1977 6,390 301 6,691  1998 11,301 70 11,371 
1978 6,310 236 6,546  1999 11,788 76 11,864 
1979 5,662 215 5,877  2000 12,391 107 12,498 
1980 5,426 194 5,620  2001 11,891 101 11,992 
(in thousand tonnes of oil equivalent - ktoe) 
 
Source: IEA (2004f) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Transportation Sector Energy Consumption in Turkey 
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Figure 21. Transportation Sector Energy Consumption in Turkey (percentages) 
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Appendix 2: Literature Review in Regulation 
 
A-2.1 Introduction 
 
“Monopoly, besides, is a great enemy to good management, which 
can never be universally established but in consequence of that free 
and universal competition which forces everybody to have recourse 
to it for the sake of self-defence.” (Smith, 1776, p 202) 
 
The arguments for not allowing direct competition in businesses supplying 
“utilities”, such as electricity and natural gas, and subjecting them to regulation 
have their origins even in The Wealth of Nations of 1776, the famous book of 
Adam Smith. Since then it has become a conventional wisdom that the market 
failures in the utility industries were so great as to legitimize intervention in free 
market in the form regulation. 
  
The main purpose of this section is both to examine some of the underlying 
principles of any effective regulatory policy and to provide a theoretical 
background to the economics of regulation.  
 
The next section offers both a definition of the problem of natural monopoly and 
a discussion of methods proposed to overcome it. Section 3 discusses some 
key concepts required for a full understanding of an evaluation of any regulatory 
policy. Section 4 focuses on the reasons for the need for a regulatory system. 
Section 5 reviews the objectives of regulation. The following section 
concentrates on some major topics in regulation; namely, the problem of 
asymmetric information, the principal-agent theory, regulatory commitment, 
regulatory capture, regulatory failure and, finally, the distinction between 
economic and non-economic regulation. The final section presents a review of 
methods employed in the economic regulation of electricity and natural gas 
utilities. 
 
A-2.2 The Problem of Natural Monopoly 
 
It is, by and large, an accepted wisdom that natural monopolies47 need to be 
watched, or regulated. The logic behind this persuasion is that firms in 
monopoly positions, whether public or private, have a tendency to exploit their 
dominant position for their own benefit at the expense of consumers. 
Throughout the history, two main patters have been evolved to overcome the 
so-called “problem of natural monopoly”; namely, vertically integrated state 
monopolies and regulated private utilities. In the former case, state ownership of 
vertically integrated monopolies has been seen as a solution to the conflict 
between the private and public interests. However, the experience showed that 
public ownership tends to be trapped in an inefficient equilibrium that reflects 
the balance of power of the various interest groups. Therefore, the latter pattern 
acquired the dominance; and privatization, combined with restructuring, 
including vertical separation, of public utilities and liberalizing access to private 
                                                 
47 In Economics, ‘natural monopoly’ refers to a case where a single firm can meet the entire 
market demand for a range of goods or services at lower total cost than any other combination 
of firms. 
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utilities have gradually been employed to disturb this inefficient equilibrium 
within a regulatory framework. 
 
A-2.3 Key Concepts in Regulatory Policy 
 
A-2.3.1 Liberalization 
 
Liberalization means the opening up of a service or product to more than one 
supplier under the control of a regulator. It requires policy changes to reduce 
entry barriers to the industry, together with the replacement of government 
funding of investment projects by reliance on the private capital markets. 
 
A-2.3.2 Restructuring 
 
More than any other single factor, underlying structure of the particular industry 
being regulated defines the context in which regulatory agencies operate. A 
vertically integrated monopoly48 is the most difficult of all “monsters” to regulate. 
Therefore, in almost all cases, it is vital to restructure (or, break-up) the industry 
before privatization to set up a viable regulatory system. However, it is not an 
easy task. Substantial reform of any public enterprise is a politically sensitive 
issue. Although no one defends the status quo as ideal, any deviation from it 
offends some interests too much.  
 
Despite the fact that the break-up of monopolies does not necessarily result in 
direct competition, it has argued that even when there is no additional direct 
competition, break-up may still be beneficial. Smaller natural monopolies will 
have less ability to cross-subsidize than larger ones; thus, break-up may 
increase the possibility of future competition by making predation less possible. 
Moreover, there will be more innovation and greater diversity of operation if 
there are several operators than if there is just one. Also, most importantly, 
more than one monopoly makes inter-firm comparison possible; and, thereby, 
enables the regulator to compare performance. 
 
A-2.3.3 Privatization  
 
Privatization simply means the sale of at least more than 50% of a state-owned 
asset to private agents. 
 
The balance between state and market experienced a radical shift with the fall 
of the Berlin wall in 1989. Since then, the boundaries of the state have started 
to shift; and the privatizations in Britain and the transition from state socialism to 
the market economy in Eastern Europe accelerated this shift. Within less then a 
decade, privatization spread around the world. Today, the English model of 
vertical separation succeeded by privatization and regulation is rapidly 
becoming the reference model for reform in both developed and developing 
countries.  
 
                                                 
48 Vertically integrated private network utilities have many of the drawbacks of public 
monopolies, with the added disadvantage that the government no longer has the power to order 
their reorganization and restructuring. 
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The reasons for privatization are manifold. As will be argued shortly in this 
section, the ultimate and most important aim of economic regulation is ensuring 
“economic efficiency”; and it can be realized in full sense only by effective 
competition, which requires reducing the role of government in economic life as 
a whole. Shleifer (1998) underlines the reasons why privatization is not only 
desirable but also crucial to an efficient economy. The case for private 
ownership made in his paper rests essentially on the importance of incentives 
to innovate and to reduce costs. For him, the weak incentive of government 
employees concerning both cost reduction and innovation is the basic reason of 
superiority of private ownership. He argues that even the pursuit of "social 
goals" cannot be used to justify state ownership. The concerns, he maintains, 
that private firms fail to address "social goals" can be addressed through 
effective regulation, without resort to state ownership. He especially draws 
attention to non-benevolent government, which he describes as “more realistic”; 
and for him bureaucrats’ pursuit of political goals and personal income, as 
opposed to social wellbeing, makes the case for private ownership stronger. 
Even this point made by A. Shleifer alone is enough to privatize all energy 
assets in any country as without incentives to innovate and to reduce costs, 
which are definitely lacking in most public enterprises, economic efficiency is 
impossible to realize. In a state-owned company, prices do not reflect costs; 
and costs themselves are usually inflated through excessive employment and 
excessively expensive capital; incentives to innovate are reduced to minimum 
(or in worst cases to zero); quality of service is lower than in a competitive 
environment; and the number of choices available to consumers is extremely 
limited (or even reduced to one!). What is more striking and dangerous is that 
until the point when it is seen to be in crisis from outside, a public enterprise 
never feels a failure no matter what is the degree of its failure in realizing 
economic efficiency.  
 
The other reasons for privatization cited in the literature may be summarized as 
follows. Privatization provides competition with a fertile ground to develop. Also, 
it is argued that the valuation of the company by movements in its share price in 
stock exchanges is potentially an important check on a privatized enterprise’s 
performance. Moreover, the possibility of a hostile takeover in a competitive 
market imposes a fierce discipline on the management and provides a powerful 
incentive to good management because a takeover usually leads to many 
changes near the top. Furthermore, some scholars claim that the most 
important effect of privatization is that the changes it brings about become 
practically irreversible. In the case of reforming public enterprises, the possibility 
is much greater that a change of government or even just a change in the 
opinion of the same government will undermine all reforms and may result in a 
return to the old interventionism and confusion. Privatization, on the other hand 
is less reversible not only because the legislation needed to reverse it would be 
more complex, and because in some cases the privatized bodies have 
disappeared into other firms or acquired overseas ownership, but also because 
too many interests have been created that are opposed to renationalization. 
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A-2.3.4 Regulation 
 
Littlechild (1983) states: 
 
“Competition is indisputably the most effective means – perhaps ultimately the 
only effective means – of protecting consumers against monopoly power. 
Regulation is essentially a means of preventing the worst cases of monopoly; it 
is not a substitute for competition. It is a means of ‘holding the fort’ until 
competition arrives.” 
 
The statement above well defines the role of regulation in a regulatory system; 
and implies that although the private industry with regulation is far from perfect, 
it is the best answer currently available to monopoly problem.  
 
In line with the statement above, the experience so far has confirmed that 
regulation is a more efficient means of controlling monopoly power than state 
ownership; although competition is superior to both. So, regulation is not a 
perfect instrument for controlling monopoly power but it seems to serve the 
public interest better than state ownership (Stelzer, 2002). 
 
Actually, regulation is unavoidably inefficient. The inherent sources of 
inefficiency in regulation are various. For instance, regulated prices may deviate 
from costs unless economic and non-economic objectives are clearly 
separated. Also, regulation is itself an expensive activity and easily spreads 
from economics into politics, if not properly managed. There are also other 
more fundamental problems inherent in any regulatory situation; namely, 
information asymmetries, commitment issues, the possibility of regulatory 
capture and/or failure; which will be discussed in the course of the paper in 
more detail. Despite the fact that there are no easy escapes from all these 
problems inherent in regulation, in industries with natural monopoly 
characteristics, the extension of competition requires regulation in order to be 
effective. 
 
As suggested by Professor David M. Newbery (Newbery, 2000, p 134), since 
regulation is inherently inefficient, the rule for any regulatory system is simple: 
“competition where possible, regulation only where unavoidable”. Therefore, all 
reform programs should aim at confining regulation to the core natural 
monopoly of the network and thereby minimizing the extent of regulatory 
inefficiency. So, the most important problem to address in any reform process is 
to choose the right structure for the industry that will limit the need for naturally 
inefficient regulation. 
 
Actually, the main idea of this section may be put forward as follows: “the most 
important feature of regulation should be that there should be as little of it as 
possible, which involves the identifying the precise sources of market failure in 
industries and targeting regulation specifically on these areas. 
 
Another crucial issue in the regulation of any industry is the independence of 
the regulator. The basic principle is that regulators have to be independent not 
only from the regulated but also from all other parties involved. Otherwise, 
conflicts of interests are unavoidable, and regulation is bound to deteriorate. 
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Therefore, careful design of regulatory institutions is needed to ensure effective 
independence of the regulator. 
 
The independence of the regulator, however, needs to be differentiated from 
lack of accountability. Regulatory agencies, like any other public body, must be 
held accountable for their actions and be subject to adequate controls. 
Regulatory agencies built on the principles of independence and accountability 
have the highest potential to deal effectively with the regulatory challenges. 
 
Another current theme in the regulation literature is the appropriate division of 
labour between, on the one hand, the general competition authorities and, on 
the other, the specialist regulators; or between “generalists” and “specialists”. 
The task of “regulation” to promote and maintain competition in the industries 
with dominant privatized firms should belong to the regulatory authority for that 
industry. Otherwise, the firms in the industry may be confused about whose 
decisions to obey; and more importantly, they may play one authority against 
the other if their interests require them to do so. 
 
Finally, it is important to underline the fact that regulation may sometimes be 
essential to maintain freedom of entry even where competition is present. In 
most cases, the dominant firm(s) with market power in any market has at its 
disposal a variety of instruments of strategic entry deterrence and incentives for 
predatory behavior, which constitutes a potential threat to competition; and 
therefore regulation may be needed to defeat this threat even if competition 
exists. 
 
A-2.3.5 Competition 
 
Competition refers to a situation in which the price and quantity supplied is set 
at the economically efficient level and the price is beyond the influence of the 
firm(s), giving maximum incentive to reduce costs and innovate as the only 
ways to increase profits. 
 
The competitive forces to be found in markets rather than bureaucratic 
structures produce a superior allocation of resources. Although privatization 
provides greater incentives for cost minimization, encourages more efficient 
managerial supervision; it alone is not sufficient for economic efficiency. Also, 
since regulation is inevitably inefficient, effective competition remains to be the 
only viable way to realize full economic efficiency. Actually, competition’s 
invisible hand is the best regulator because, under the pressure of competition, 
firms reveal more facts about their costs that can ever be extracted from them 
by regulation; and they will reduce costs to the minimum for fear that they will 
otherwise be undercut by rivals. And, provided that there is enough competition, 
it will be harder and less rewarding for firms to engage in anti-competitive 
practices. For instance, in electricity industry, it is not easy to ensure that 
utilities in monopoly positions operate their generation plant efficiently and at 
minimum cost. However, when a utility knows that it has no monopoly power 
and consumers may turn to other sources of supply if they think that there 
would be a benefit to them in doing so, the pressures to operate efficiently are 
much greater. Also, any utility would try to do its best to minimize its cost while 
generating electricity if it knew that its customers were able to switch to a lower-
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cost competitor. In short, the key innovation that makes a difference in terms of 
economic efficiency is the introduction of competition.  
 
Despite its central role in provision of economic efficiency, it is imperative to 
realize that competition is not a panacea for all problems that a specific industry 
suffers from. One should be aware of what competition can and cannot achieve. 
Under competitive environment, prices tend to reflect costs more closely; 
investment and purchasing decisions tend to reflect the concerns of profit rather 
than political ones; management is under greater pressure to operate efficiently; 
there is a greater scope of choice for consumers, the terms and contracts 
offered increasingly reflect the latest most effective method of providing the 
specific good or service under consideration. Nevertheless, neither competition 
can automatically deliver price reductions nor should price reduction itself be an 
ultimate aim for regulators. If the market conditions require price increases, 
price rises may be beneficial as they convey signals to consumers concerning 
how to modify their consumption behavior at the benefit of general public. To 
make this point clearer, suppose that there is a dual-fired factory that can be run 
either by electricity or natural gas, and there occurred an unexpected increase 
in the price of inputs used to produce electricity. Under these circumstances, 
the most efficient policy to follow is to switch from electricity to natural gas as 
the latter is cheaper. However, without a working market, prices do not reflect 
the increase in input costs and the factory in our example continue to use 
electricity, which is inefficient for economy in general. On the other hand, in a 
market-based economy, as electricity prices are expected to reflect input cost 
rises, they increase concomitant with input prices, which motivates factory 
managers to switch to natural gas, therefore, helping to reach efficient allocation 
of resources. Therefore, unless there is a kind of market failure, it is better to let 
market determine the price. 
 
As a final point, from a practical perspective, it is important to keep in mind the 
fact that the claim that competition is not possible in many so-called “natural” 
monopoly industries has been greatly exaggerated; and many of the so-called 
“natural” monopolies are not truly natural, but they are intentionally and 
artificially created. For instance, while a gas or electricity transmission network, 
under current technological conditions, may have natural monopoly features; it 
is doubtful that only one gas or electricity transmission company serving the 
whole country can be justified. Evans (1989), for example, reports that in 
Lubbock (Texas, USA), a city of some 150.000 people, two distribution 
companies operate in the market each using their own network; and that the 
competition still produces lower electricity prices and better service despite 
duplication of assets. 
 
A-2.3.6 Deregulation 
 
Deregulation refers to reducing the level of regulation and replacing regulation 
with competition and market forces. The wave of deregulation that started in the 
late 1970s in the US showed that markets are better than regulators at reducing 
prices and increasing efficiency. However, since deregulation is a very distant 
target for developing countries like Turkey, the details of deregulation will not be 
discussed here. 
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A-2.4 The Reasons for Regulation 
 
In most cases, intervention in free market economy is rationalized by the 
existence of market failures. Since the main form of market failure in utilities is 
monopoly; in the past, the most powerful economic justification for public 
intervention was the prevention of possible monopoly abuse. However, a huge 
literature has documented how public-sector has been largely inefficient in 
reducing the impact of market failure. So, under these conditions, public 
ownership thought to be unjustifiable and a far better solution has turned out to 
be private ownership combined with regulation targeted directly on the identified 
sources of market failure. 
 
To be brief, it may be argued that the only reason and valid justification for 
economic regulation is the existence of market failure in the form of abuse of 
monopoly power. If there is no actual or potential threat of monopoly, then there 
is simply no need for economic regulation and the policy should be laissez-
faire49 in the specific industry under consideration. 
 
A-2.5 Objectives of Regulation 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the objective of regulation50 is essentially the 
realization of “economic efficiency”, captured by the concept of “Pareto 
efficiency”51. 
 
In a practical perspective, on the other hand, the aim of regulation is to design 
an incentive mechanism so that individual economic actors making decisions in 
their own best interest achieve “economic efficiency” in general. To realize this, 
the regulatory approach should attempt to affect economic decisions of the 
private actors in the regulated industry both by placing constrains upon them 
and by providing them with incentives to act in accordance with the ultimate aim 
of “economic efficiency”, but not by seeking to change their underlying 
objectives based on self-interest, which is not realistic and, in most cases, 
simply impossible. 
 
A-2.6 Major Topics in Regulation 
 
A-2.6.1 The Problem of Asymmetric Information 
 
The effectiveness of regulation depends critically upon the information available 
to the regulators since a regulator can condition its policy only on what it knows. 
                                                 
49 Laissez-faire is short for ‘laissez-faire, laissez-passer’, a French phrase meaning idiomatically 
‘leave to do, leave to pass’ or more accurately ‘let things alone, let them pass’. First used in the 
eighteenth century as an injunction against government interference with trade, it is now used 
as a synonym for free market economics. 
50 Although the idea presented here is the dominant one in the theory of economic regulation, 
there are some other ‘marginal’ views of regulation based on various Marxist theories, which 
state that regulatory institutions are a part of oppressive institutions of capitalism and the 
function of regulation is simply to preserve the capitalist system by buying off potentially 
damaging opposition. 
51 Pareto efficiency refers to a situation in which it is impossible to make someone better off 
without making someone else worse off by re-arranging the firms, the flows, the production 
decisions, the consumption decisions or anything else in the economy. 
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If both the regulator and the firm had access to the same information about 
industry conditions, then the regulatory problem could be solved simply by 
directing the firm to implement the economically efficient plan given the 
common information available. In reality, however, the firm is much better 
informed about industry conditions than the regulator and its behavior can be 
monitored only imperfectly, meaning that, the regulator is unlikely to be able to 
regulate the firm’s activities in full sense. The state of this unbalanced or 
“asymmetric” information benefits the regulated at the expense of not only the 
regulator but also actual and potential competitors and customers. Therefore, 
this so-called “asymmetric information problem” is at the heart of the economics 
of regulation52. 
 
The regulatory question is, then, how to motivate the managers of the regulated 
firm to exploit their superior information to advantage despite the problem of 
imperfect information and monitoring. From a practical point of view, to alleviate 
this problem, the regulators should make the regulated provide information and, 
as far as possible, the information provided must be relevant, periodic and 
produced as a matter of routine on the basis of agreed or established 
conventions. 
 
A-2.6.2 The Principal-Agent Theory 
 
Principal-agent theory tries to address the question: what is the optimal 
incentive scheme for the principal to design for the agent. The general 
description of the idea may be put forward as follows. There exists a principal 
and an agent, who have different - and probably conflicting - objectives. The 
principal needs to hire the "agent" with specific skills or knowledge to perform 
the tasks that are too complex or too costly to do by himself/herself, and wants 
to induce the agent to act in his/her interests. However, s/he does not have full 
information about the circumstances and behaviour of the agent, and therefore 
s/he has an information and monitoring problem. 
 
Principal-agent theory can be used to analyze regulation too. In this context, the 
regulator is both an agent (for government) and a principal (of the firm); and the 
firm is the agent of the regulator. In the same way, the government may be 
regarded as an agent for voters and a principal of the regulator. The sequence 
of principal-agent relationship may be put down as follows: 
 
Voters  Government  Regulator  Firm 
 
With this perspective, again, a system of regulation can be regarded as an 
incentive mechanism design. The firm, say, is better informed than the regulator 
about cost conditions; and the regulator seeks to induce the firm to make its 
pricing, production, and investment decisions in accordance with the public 
interest. But the firm is interested in maximizing, say, its profits and will act in its 
own interests, irrespective of the regulatory regime that exists. Then, the major 
question again is how the principal (or, the regulator) can best induce the agent 
(or, the firm) to perform as the principal would prefer, taking into account the 
difficulties in observing the agent's activities. 
                                                 
52 Actually, the problem of asymmetric information is one of the major sources of inefficiency 
inherent in regulation. 
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A-2.6.3 Regulatory Commitment 
 
The history has shown that power corrupts and absolute power tends to corrupt 
absolutely. Since, within its area of regulation, the discretion of a regulator tends 
to be absolute; the seeds of decay are present in any regulatory system. 
Therefore, the any regulatory system should ensure that the regulator itself is 
committed to the ultimate aim of economic efficiency. 
 
The regulatory system itself affects the cost of capital53 and; especially, 
regulatory uncertainty may directly result in both economic inefficiency and, 
therefore, regulatory failure by creating significant increases in the cost of 
capital over and above those arising from normal economic uncertainty. 
Therefore, uncertainty in the regulatory process should be avoided at all costs. 
The only way to do so is to create a confidence in regulatory system to 
persuade all interested parties that the regulator is totally committed to the 
industry and all decisions made by it serve the objective of economic efficiency. 
So, another vital question in any regulatory structure is how to create and 
maintain “regulatory commitment” to prevent what is called regulatory 
opportunism. 
 
Transparency in the regulatory process is an indispensable component of 
regulatory commitment and, without it, it is impossible to ensure regulatory 
commitment and, therefore, to realize economic efficiency. Transparency entails 
that the regulator is required to explain and justify its decisions and publish the 
evidence on which they are based; and also the process in which the regulatory 
decisions are made is open to public. It also puts a significant pressure on the 
regulator to ensure that its decisions are well thought out, and can be defended 
as rational and beneficial. Also, a body of precedent must be developed to 
provide some guide to industry and to separate acceptable from unacceptable 
behavior. By rejecting transparent procedures, any regulator definitely loses the 
public credibility, on which its success and acceptance so crucially depend. 
 
The second component of regulatory commitment is the provision of some 
appeal procedures for the firms, consumers or any other related parties against 
the decisions of the regulator. Since regulation can never be an exact science 
and regulators can fail; the procedures for adjudicating disputes between 
regulators and the companies should be clear and fair for both sides, which 
reduces regulatory uncertainty and, therefore, strengthens not only the 
regulatory commitment but also the position of the regulator in the face of 
possible criticisms on the ground of arbitrariness in the decision making 
process. 
 
The appeals, however, should be in the first instance to a tribunal that acts with 
similar discretion and flexibility to that of the first-tier regulator, not to a court. 
That is, it should be another body specializing in economic regulation. Of 
course, the regulated firms should also have a right of appeal to a court. 
However, the appeals on merits and interpretation of the law in the first instance 
should preferably be to another regulatory body with similar discretion and 
                                                 
53 The cost of capital may be defined as the risk-adjusted return that investors in a firm expect to 
receive in a competitive market. 
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procedures; and a higher court may act as a court of appeal to deal with 
appeals against the decisions of the specialized body by the regulator, the firms 
or any other related party. The main reason for such a requirement is the fact 
that as courts, in general, do not have required expertise in the regulated areas; 
a body that is explicitly concerned with regulatory cases is able to provide 
expert analysis of the particular issues that confront regulated firms.  
 
The third building block of “regulatory commitment” is an appropriate form of 
relationship between regulator and the regulated that guarantees security and 
certainty for the firm. In literature, the relation between the regulator and the firm 
is best thought of as a contract to avoid uncertainty in regulatory process. 
Actually, the design of a “regulatory contract” should be quite similar to drafting 
of a long-term contract between private parties that in essence addresses a 
number of issues to maximize the economic benefits of the relationship. 
Therefore, the licences granted by the regulator to the regulated, which allows 
the latter to operate in the market regulated by the former, should be in the form 
of a private contract, not that of a decree issued by the regulator that may 
unilaterally be amended or totally cancelled by the regulator at any time. 
 
Since legislation can be changed easily as a result of a change in government 
or even a change in the opinion of the same government; then putting some 
guarantees in law does not provide much security for the firm. Therefore, the 
main body of regulation should be included in the kind of licences described 
above54. 
 
The fourth cornerstone in the construction of “regulatory commitment” is the 
quality of the person(s)55 in the position of the regulator; that is, in any 
regulatory process, people definitely matter. For instance, the UK has been 
relatively successful in market regulation partly because she has managed to 
find a set of quite able, fair-minded regulators. Professor Stephen C. Littlechild, 
for example, was Director General of Electricity Supply (DGES), in charge of the 
Office of Electricity Regulation (OFFER), from its foundation in September 1989 
to 199856.  
 
                                                 
54 Of course, here, I assume that the courts are independent and well able to enforce contracts. 
However, if that is lacking; then there may be no credible method of ensuring regulatory 
commitment at all. Actually, the institutional endowment of the country under consideration is 
critically important in the success of regulation. For instance, the UK has been relatively 
successful in regulation partly because she is a country with an independent judiciary, a 
competent administration, and a set of institutions to manage competition policy and resolve 
regulatory disputes. 
55 The regulator can be either a board (multi-person commission) or a single individual. The 
choice should be made based on the specific characteristics of each country provided that 
consistency in the regulatory process is guaranteed. 
56 In 1992, only two years after the introduction of new system in UK electricity market, the 
reform under his direction was so successful that he was able to state “[a]t first, there was 
considerable skepticism as to whether the new system would work at all. Some commentators 
feared that electricity supply would be disrupted because it was simply not possible to create a 
competitive market under which different companies generated and supplied electricity. Others 
worried that security of supply in the longer term would be threatened, because there were 
insufficient incentives for existing generators to build new plant or for new generators to enter 
the market. In fact, these worries have so far proven unfounded” (Littlechild, 1993, p.120). 
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To sum up, regulatory mechanisms in general are designed to constrain the 
power of private firms; but regulatory commitment also requires that the power 
of the regulators must be constrained too. 
 
A-2.6.4 Regulatory Capture 
 
The concept of “regulatory capture” refers to a situation in which the regulator 
becomes the firm’s advocate and, therefore, an instrument for the maintenance 
of monopoly power, rather than controlling and diminishing it.  
 
A regulated industry has many incentives to capture a regulator57. And it can 
attempt this by influencing the relevant legislation, by securing the appointment 
of a sympathetic regulator, by influencing the proceedings or by any other way 
available. 
 
Regulatory capture by the regulated industry can be prevented by active 
consumer participation in the regulatory process. A regulator is less likely to 
want, or be able, to yield its discretion to the firm(s) it regulates if it is under a 
countervailing influence from consumers. Therefore, the consumer 
representation should be made effective. The idea is simply to institutionalize 
consumer concern so as to prevent regulatory capture. However, the consumer 
associations are expected to be a force pushing regulation into social, and away 
from economic, matters. Also, consumer bodies in practice do not escape 
political influence. Their concern is not economic efficiency, and they do not see 
it as part of their concern to give due weight to producer interests or directly to 
competition. That is to say, the regulatory capture by consumers is another 
critical issue to deal with; and it is hardly to be preferred to the one by the 
regulated firm(s). Therefore, it should be ensured that consumer commitees’ 
attention is confined to economic matters (e.g. prices, quality and other related 
issues); and does not spread over political or non-economic matters. 
 
Taking into account the concerns mentioned above, an ideal arrangement in the 
design of an economic regulatory system is to place the regulator in a position 
where representations are made to it by producers and informed consumer 
representatives in a context in which the key issues are economic.  
 
Regulatory capture by government is also as much a threat to regulatory 
process as is capture by the industry or consumers. In countries where 
governments traditionally have strong powers, regulatory capture by 
government is a likely outcome. Furthermore, the government, rather than the 
regulator, may also be captured by the industry; and the firm(s) in the regulated 
industry may try to exercise power over the regulator indirectly via government 
they captured to influence regulatory decisions in line with their interests. To 
prevent all these, ministerial and other political influences must be constrained 
as far as possible to roles that do not allow them to influence regulatory 
decisions. 
 
                                                 
57 From a theoretical perspective, any regulated firm is ready to devote all positive economic 
rent to “capture” the regulator since, once it captures the regulator, the firm receives all the 
positive economic rent minus the expenses incurred to capture the regulator. In practice, this 
means that the firms have huge amounts of resources at their disposal to capture the regulator. 
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To sum it up, the regulator must not be captured either by the industry or its 
employees or by politicians or by other particular interests, or by self-interest. It 
should be kept in mind that if the regulator is captured, the situation turns out to 
be worse than the one under uncontrolled monopoly case as now the abuse by 
monopoly may be legitimized by the decisions of the captured regulator. 
 
A-2.6.5 Regulatory Failure 
 
A regulatory system which has objectives that either in principle or in practice 
differ from that of economic efficiency spells regulatory failure from an economic 
perspective. Apart from this, various other kinds of regulatory failure have been 
identified in literature.  
 
First of all, there is a failure from the perspective of the industry where at worst 
it does not continue to be profitable enough to maintain its capital. This may be 
due to the arrival of new technology; a marked increase in competition; or major 
changes in economic circumstances to which regulatory mechanism does not 
adapt. Therefore, from this perspective, regulatory failure occurs when the 
regulatory system fails to adapt. 
 
Also, since the effects of regulatory policy on social welfare depend critically on 
the investment behavior that it induces, the problem of underinvestment 
constitutes another source of regulatory failure. One of the major sources of 
underinvestment has been the fear of “unfair” future regulation. To prevent this, 
regulators have to make sure that the system does not result in profits 
inadequate to attract enough capital to survive. 
 
Another form of failure emerges when the regulator cannot regulate. This 
occurs when courts reduce regulators to impotence or ministers use or abuse 
any powers to obstruct the regulator or to convert it into their agent. Moreover, 
regulatory failure arises when the regulator no longer commands enough 
political support for it to continue regulation. For other parties, regulatory failure 
emerges when they feel that a regulatory system does not reflect their interests. 
Since all these problems are country specific, each country should take 
necessary steps to prevent these kinds of failures.  
 
The main regulatory failures, however, derive from the way in which the 
regulators were left to implement competition using too wide discretion granted 
to them by related laws. The exercise of this discretion is not easy for investors 
or entrants to predict, with the result that the cost of capital may be increased, 
and competition may be weaker. Additionally, regulatory failures are most in 
evidence where the form of privatization has been incorrect. Since the form of 
regulation is usually dictated by the structure of industries and the way they are 
privatized; if the form of privatization is incorrect, regulators may face 
impossible task of trying to compensate for the deficiencies of inappropriately 
structured private sectors. For instance, if state-owned monopoly industries are 
converted into monopoly private-sector utilities, opportunities for introducing 
competition are missed; and proper regulation becomes almost impossible. 
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A-2.6.6 Economic and Non-Economic Regulation 
 
A distinction should be made in any regulatory system between economic and 
non-economic regulation. Economic regulation may be defined as the one that 
aims at realizing “economic efficiency”; non-economic regulation, on the other 
hand, deals with the promotion of non-economic objectives, such as, social 
justice, security, safety, environmental protection, the achievement of fairness 
between various interest groups, the enhancement of the status of certain 
groups, the redistribution of income, or the service of some other kind favored 
by the government. In an ideal regulatory design, these two should be clearly 
separated, the regulatory body should only be responsible for economic 
regulation; and other kinds of regulation should be left to related government 
departments.  
 
However, in practice, the motives of those who set up and alter regulatory 
systems are not purely economic; and therefore, the relevant laws almost 
always admit other objectives (especially so-called “social” ones) besides 
economic ones, often inconsistently. Also, once a regulatory structure is set up, 
governments are tempted to use it for other purposes, especially for macro-
economic policy objectives. Despite all such kind of practical difficulties, a 
regulator should do its best to keep non-economic regulation to the minimum. 
Otherwise, the regulator’s discretion is sooner or later jeopardized by unwise 
extensions of non-economic regulation. Also, a regulator is more likely to keep 
the independence he needs in order to use its discretion if it narrows its task 
down as far as possible to economic regulation. 
 
A-2.7 Economic Regulation of Electricity and Natural Gas Utilities 
 
Having briefly covered the key components of market regulation literature let me 
concentrate on price regulation methods that are employed in real life. 
However, before doing so, it is better to be aware of both the characteristics of 
the industries under consideration and basic evolution of price regulation 
techniques. Therefore, the first part of this section presents the characteristics 
of electricity and natural gas industries in a few words, followed by the second 
part that discusses the historical evolution of price regulation methods. The third 
part focuses on various price regulation methods, especially on those 
extensively used by regulators in actual life. 
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A-2.7.1 Characteristics of Electricity and Natural Gas Industries 
 
Electricity is a product that is generally regarded as nonstorable58. Also, the 
demand for electricity fluctuates by time of day and year, as the weather varies, 
and randomly. Supply is also subject to unpredictable outages. However, the 
equilibrium between supply and demand, called “electrical equilibrium”, must be 
maintained continuously and throughout the system, which calls for extremely 
close minute-by-minute coordination between generation and transmission.  
 
In view of technical characteristics of the industry, a policy of vertically 
integrated monopoly has some attractions. The integrated 
generation/transmission company can easily run its power stations that meet 
demand at minimum cost at each point in time. Moreover, in the longer run, 
generation and transmission investment can be planned to give the optimal mix 
and capacity to meet prospective demand with reasonable security of supply. 
This is, actually, the main reason why the two activities have historically been 
vertically integrated. Nevertheless, since they allow no room for competition and 
its associated incentives, such schemes nowadays have started to be replaced 
by vertically separated private utilities with the aim of fostering competition in 
generation and supply59. Under contemporary structures, the economic 
activities related with electricity industry may be divided into four:  
 
1) Generation: the production of electricity (wholesale supply),  
2) Transmission: high-voltage transfer of electricity in bulk, 
3) Distribution: lower-voltage delivery of electricity over local networks, 
4) Retail supply: sale of electricity to final consumers. 
 
The transportation activities of transmission and distribution are, in present 
market conditions and with current technologies, naturally monopolistic. On the 
other hand, both generation (wholesale supply) and retail supply are potentially 
competitive activities, which simply constitutes a general economic case for 
competitive markets.  
 
As for natural gas industry, the demand for gas is also seasonal and stochastic, 
with demand on very cold days being up to a few times higher than on summer 
days. Actually, natural gas industry has many common features with electricity 
industry. Like electricity industry, the gas industry is a network industry in the 
sense that it also requires a network to operate. Also, the economic activities 
related with gas industry are similar to those of electricity industry with the 
exception that the gas is storable. So the economic activities related with gas 
industry may be grouped into five: 
                                                 
58 Armstrong et al. (1994, p 280) reports that there is a sense in which some hydroelectric 
power can be stored. In the UK, the National Grid Company has a pumped storage business in 
the Welsh mountains. Water pumped uphill at night can produce hydroelectric power the 
following day, thereby effectively storing some night-time electricity. This is economically 
efficient, provided that the day/night electricity price ratio is high enough. 
59 In fact, a central question for structural policy should be whether the gains from competition in 
generation and supply outweigh the costs of any losses in coordination between generation and 
transmission, which partly depends on how well they can be coordinated in the event of 
deintegration. 
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1) Production and Importation (wholesale supply), 
2) Transmission, 
3) Distribution, 
4) Storage, 
5) Retail supply. 
 
As given above, any natural gas market is characterized by the successive 
vertical stages of importation, production, transmission, distribution, and supply. 
Natural gas must first be imported or extracted. Then, the gas is transmitted 
through national and regional high-pressure transmission networks60 in bulk 
across the country up to the point where regional distribution pipelines start. 
Finally, the gas is distributed to consumers over low-pressure local networks. 
Within this structure, a retail supplier of gas imports the gas or purchases it from 
the producers, moves it through the transmission and distribution networks and 
sells it to final customers. Also, the supplier usually needs access to storage 
facilities to help to meet peak demands.  
 
Both transmission and distribution activities have, in present market conditions 
and with current technologies, natural monopoly characteristics because 
pipeline costs are sunk, and it would be inefficient to have more than one 
network. On the other hand, if access to the transmission network is secured, 
then there can be many competing suppliers. Having access to the 
transportation network means that the supply of gas to final customers is 
potentially highly competitive. Sunk costs in supply are small as the main assets 
are just working capital and contracts with producers and customers. Also, 
since gas is a relatively homogeneous commodity, price competition in supply is 
likely to be strong. 
 
To sum up, today, in both industries, although the transportation activities 
(transmission and distribution) are naturally monopolistic, wholesale supply 
(generation, production or importation) and retail supply are potentially 
competitive and there exists a lot to gain from competition in these activities. 
 
A-2.7.2 Background to Price Regulation 
 
Over the last century, two main competing traditions have dominated both 
regulation literature and practice of regulation. On the one hand, a tradition 
based on an “American” model of investor-owned monopoly utilities has been 
developed, and under this tradition the activities of private utilities have been 
regulated through politically accountable regulatory bodies which were, 
however, in most cases captured by the regulated firm(s). On the other hand, 
an alternative “Western European” model based on state-owned monopoly 
utilities has evolved in Europe, and within this structure, the state-owned 
monopolies have acted either as a government department or as a public 
enterprise subject to controls imposed by government on its pricing and 
investment policy. 
 
                                                 
60 Natural gas may also be transmitted and/or distributed in the form of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG), compressed natural gas (CNG) or by any other means available. 
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Each of these models has changed radically in the last 20 years. In Europe, 
until the early 1980s, almost all energy industries were vertically integrated 
statutory monopolies, operating either under state ownership or as regulated 
utilities in line with traditional “Western European” model. In 1989-90, the UK 
restructured its electricity industry, separating generation from transmission, 
allocating generation capacity between different companies, and creating a spot 
market for wholesale electricity to make generation competitive. She also 
moved gradually to privatize all assets that the government traditionally owned 
in gas and electricity industries. The successful privatization in the UK has given 
not only the other members of the European Union but also overseas 
governments the confidence to follow the example. As stated by Jones (2003), 
“[p]rivatization, market liberalization and deregulation have characterized the 
last decade of the [energy] industry’s development in the European Union with 
its main different versions of the UK model of competitive generation and supply 
together with incentive-based regulation of transmission and distribution”. Also, 
it is the same system based on British model that many economies in transition 
now aspire. 
 
Meanwhile, the US did not privatize her energy industries as almost all utilities 
were already in the private sector in the US. Instead, the change there was in 
the form of liberalization. In the United States, liberalization in various industries 
began in the 1970s, but it was in the 1980s that liberalization became 
widespread. That is, the US never experienced the difficulties inherent in 
privatization and restructuring, the main problems of developing countries in the 
reform process. Therefore, although it may serve as an ideal target to achieve 
in the long-run, the US experience does provide little, if any, for developing 
countries in the short or medium term. 
 
A-2.7.3 Price Regulation Methods 
 
From the very beginning regulation has been perceived as a tool for controlling 
market failure; and even today this trend continues and the most important aim 
of the regulation is still to control market failure, especially to prevent possible 
abuse of monopoly power in the form of excessively high prices. Therefore, the 
underlying aim of price regulation is to keep prices, as well as profits, at certain 
levels which are regarded as “fair” and which will also not remove the firm’s 
incentive to improve its efficiency. To realize these aims, various price 
regulation methods have been developed over time. From a theoretical 
perspective, price regulation methods may be divided into two groups based on 
the extent to which the firm’s revenues are tied to its own costs, namely high-
powered and low-powered incentive schemes. Let me explain what they mean. 
 
Suppose that the regulator determines the revenue of the firm based on the 
following formula: 
= + ×Revenue a b Cost  
 
Traditional so-called “cost-plus” regulation, the weakest possible incentive 
scheme, sets b=1. Under this method, the firm has no incentive to hold down its 
costs as costs are passed through directly to consumers. Rate of Return 
Regulation (RoRR) is often said to be a form of cost-plus regulation.  
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An ideal high-powered incentive scheme, on the other hand, sets b=0. Under 
such a so called “fixed-price” regulation, the firm is like a price taker (as in the 
case of perfect competition), its revenues are outside its control and profits can 
only be increased by cutting costs. High-powered incentive schemes raise no 
problems in a static world of full information. However, when the regulator is 
imperfectly informed regarding the cost and demand conditions, it cannot 
determine the price level appropriately, causing allocative efficiency to deviate 
from the optimal path. At worst, the firm’s viability may be in question if large 
shocks occur in cost and demand conditions. 
 
Between the cost-plus and fixed-price regulation are methods with < <0 b 1, 
such as profit-sharing (sliding-scale) schemes. Sliding-scale regulation imposes 
some limits on how much the firm can gain or lose, which are called “zones of 
reasonableness” or “dead-bands”. Profit sharing61 helps alleviate the potential 
for large differences between prices and costs under an ideal high-powered 
incentive scheme; at the same time, it provides greater incentives for cost 
reduction than does a scheme based on “cost-plus” regulation. 
 
After decades of criticism by academicians and practitioners, “cost-plus” 
regulation has gradually given way to what is called “incentive regulation”, an 
umbrella term used for various kinds of “fixed-price” regulation methods in 
which < ≤0 b 1. Incentive regulation covers such methods as RPI-X (price cap), 
yardstick competition and sliding-scale regulation. Under price-cap regulation, 
the average price of a “basket” of goods and services cannot rise faster than a 
benchmark level of inflation. Under yardstick competition, the firm’s prices are 
based on the costs of comparable firms, rather than the firm’s own costs. And 
finally, under sliding-scale regulation, profits outside a given range, called 
“deadband”, are shared between the firm and consumers.  
 
Apart from the methods mentioned above, in literature, there exist many other 
techniques used to regulate monopolies such as franchising, marginal/average 
cost pricing, Ramsey pricing, two-part pricing, methods based on contestability 
theory and so on. Due to limited scope of this paper, only those methods widely 
used in practice will be discussed here; namely, rate of return regulation 
(RoRR), RPI-X (or, price cap) regulation, yardstick competition and franchising. 
Due to its theoretical importance, the theory of contestable markets will also be 
mentioned briefly at the end of this section. 
 
A-2.7.3.1 Rate of Return Regulation (RoRR) 
 
As mentioned above, historically, methods based on “cost-plus” regulation, and 
especially rate of return regulation (RoRR), are the most widely used form of 
price regulation. Rate of return regulation has been developed as a response to 
concerns about excessive profits and, therefore, allows the utility only charge a 
price that covers the cost of service and so limits profits. Under RoRR, the 
regulator periodically holds a rate review to establish the firm’s costs and to 
design a set of rates for the firm’s various services that will cover these costs. 
The rates typically remain in effect until there is a request for a new review, 
either from the firm or from customer representatives.  
                                                 
61 There is no presumption that 50/50 profit sharing is economically optimal. Given a tight ‘fixed-
price’, it may be efficient for the firm to keep a larger share of gains. 
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The process just described creates incentives for the regulated firm to deviate 
from offering the best possible service at the lowest possible cost. First of all, 
under RoRR, the firm does not get the gains from cost reduction; its incentives 
to cut costs are limited. Second, as earnings are bounded both above and 
below, the firm’s incentives for investment and risk-taking are distorted. The firm 
overcapitalizes and takes extremely high risks. Third, since fixed costs are 
typically allocated in proportion to output, excessive use of fixed costs relative to 
variable costs is encouraged. Therefore, it is argued that RoRR regulation is not 
socially optimal as it leads to inefficient use of resources, more specifically to 
“over-investment” (Averch & Johnson, 1962). Fourth, because rate review must 
rely on cost data from previous periods, price only gradually converges to 
average cost and the firm may have incentives to delay this convergence 
through wasteful expenditures. Fifth, RoRR creates obvious allocative 
distortions that result from setting prices at average and not marginal costs 
(Newbery, 2000). Sixth, it covers the whole industry, or a large part of it, and not 
focuses explicitly on the particular services where monopoly power exists 
(Armstrong et al., 1994). Finally, the inefficiencies of RoRR are masked when 
costs are falling and the regulated firm is a monopoly. In these circumstances, 
the firm may go for years without rate review and extract excessive rents. 
 
A-2.7.3.2 RPI-X (Price Cap) Regulation 
 
In response to the apparent problems of the cost-recovery methods, in 1983, 
Professor Stephen C. Littlechild proposed a “high-powered” incentive scheme, 
popularly known as RPI-X or price cap, in which the regulator caps the 
allowable price or revenue for each firm for a pre-determined period. The 
fundamental idea behind price cap is extremely simple: set a fixed ceiling on the 
price a regulated firm can charge, and the firm under consideration will optimize 
its efforts and minimize its costs just like a price-taking competitive firm as it is 
the only way available to maximize profits (Agrell and Bogetoft, 2004). 
 
All price caps are expressed as a limit of RPI-X % on revenue where X 
represents a reduction in the real price level. X is determined by expectations of 
potential cost reductions, which in turn depend on changing technology and 
demand conditions. A firm subject to RPI-X regulation has to ensure that a 
weighted average of price increases in one year does not exceed the 
percentage increase in the retail price index (RPI) less X, which is reviewed and 
re-determined periodically. In practice, certain categories of costs are not 
subject to constraints either in full or in part, called “cost pass-through”. The 
justification is that some costs are beyond the industry’s control and cannot 
reasonably be reduced or absorbed (such as the costs of purchasing electricity 
from generators). So, risks are passed directly to consumers by exempting 
these elements from the price cap.  
 
RPI-X regulation solves some problems inherent in “cost-plus” regulation. First 
of all, RPI-X regulation gives high-powered incentives to cut costs. Also, it is 
easy and cheap to monitor, so implementation costs are low for both the 
regulator and the regulated. Moreover, unlike rate of return, RPI-X applies only 
to monopolistic sectors.  
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RPI-X regulation, however, comes with its own problems. The first and maybe 
the most important problem with RPI-X is the difficulty related with 
determination of X factor. If it is too tight, it can lead to non-participation and 
bankruptcy. If, however, it is too loose, it gives excessive information rents. 
Second problem originates from the concept of “regulatory lag”, which has its 
roots in the fact that regulation does not occur in a continuous fashion; and 
normally, prices are set for an interval of time, during which the firm is free to 
choose whatever input combinations it wishes, until the next price review 
occurs. Regulatory lag allows the firm to get the benefits of improved cost 
efficiency until the next review. A longer lag increases the firm’s incentives to 
reduce its costs by innovation or better organization of factors of production, but 
it delays the time at which consumers benefit from this greater efficiency. On 
the other hand, a shorter lag means that consumers benefit sooner, but the 
incentive to cut costs is reduced. Also, another point to consider relates the 
behaviour of firm under a system involving regulatory lag. Under such a system, 
as time passes the firm’s calculations will be increasingly affected by the benefit 
to be gained from influencing the outcome of the next regulatory review. As 
review time approaches, the firm will have little or no incentive to reduce costs if 
its future prices are positively related to its current cost level. Even, in the worst 
case, the firm would come to a point where it favors higher costs when 
regulatory review is near at hand, introducing familiar incentives to 
overcapitalize62. 
 
The third problem in RPI-X is the fact that it does not encourage investment, 
and creates a mismatch between optimal investment and review periods, which 
reduce the incentives to invest (Helm, 2003). Moreover, by itself RPI-X does 
nothing to encourage quality. Low quality is rarely an issue under rate-of-return 
regulation because firms under RoRR have an incentive to expand their capital 
base; that is, they have an incentive to invest in quality wherever they can. The 
regulatory problem in RoRR is to prevent companies from making an 
excessively higher investment in quality than consumers would freely pay for. In 
contrast the incentive under RPI-X is to reduce quality. Once its value for X has 
been fixed, the firm has an incentive to underinvest in quality for the given price 
level, which results in a fall in quality that consumers are unable to avoid 
because of the lack of alternative suppliers (Jackson et al., 1994).  
 
The fifth problem is that although it is argued that regulatory burden in RPI-X is 
light because RPI-X does not require the measurement of capital or rates of 
return; inevitably regulators, who are concerned about allocative efficiency, 
have had to consider such factors at review time. Also, the experience shows 
that complexity of RPI-X has so far increased over time in the UK. Now, 
regulators must decide which prices to be regulated, the extent of cost pass-
through, how to regulate investment, the length of regulatory lag and so on. 
Finally, the benefits of RPI-X remain only so long as the determination of the 
level of price cap cannot be affected by the regulated firm. If the firm believes 
that the regulator uses past observations of the firm’s behaviour to update 
                                                 
62 These considerations suggest three lessons. First of all, the incentive effects of regulatory lag 
are not necessarily always positive. Second, the potential losses from strategic behaviour are 
reduced when regulatory review is less sensitive to current cost conditions. Third, the timing of 
regulatory reviews is important. 
  105 
beliefs about costs, a ratchet effect63 operates, and the firm will try to hide some 
of its private information so as to earn high rents subsequently (Armstrong et 
al., 1994). 
  
To sum up, it seems that initial enthusiasm for price cap regulation has 
overstated its advantages, particularly where there is uncertainty. Now, whether 
RPI-X will prove to have served the public interest better than its alternatives in 
the longer term is less clear. Actually, despite the important differences between 
rate of return regulation and RPI-X, both require negotiation between the 
regulator and the regulated. The ability of the regulator to conclude such 
negotiations in the consumers’ interest depends crucially on the information 
available to it, which constitutes the weakest point in both methods. To 
overcome this common problem, yardstick competition method is developed. 
 
A-2.7.3.3 Yardstick Competition 
 
In fact, price cap regulation and yardstick competition are two different ways of 
separating the firm’s revenues from its costs. Price cap indexes revenues to a 
historical base, while yardstick regulation indexes revenues to the performance 
of other firms. 
 
Yardstick competition is a method to bring regulated monopoly units in 
submarkets into competition indirectly via the regulatory mechanism. Shleifer 
(1985) states that "[i]n the typical regulatory scheme a franchised monopoly has 
little incentive to reduce costs ... [yardstick competition] proposes a mechanism 
in which the price the regulated firm receives depends on the costs of identical 
firms. In equilibrium each firm chooses a socially efficient level of cost 
reduction". 
 
Under yardstick competition, a firm is rewarded based on how well a set of 
similar (or yardstick) firms perform. Revenues are entirely divorced from the 
firm’s own costs. The main advantage of this method comes from the fact that 
the revenue of the firm is not determined by its own cost, but by the 
performance of the market (the other firms), which not only improves the 
precision of the regulator’s information about the firms but also helps prices stay 
in line with costs, at the same time giving firms incentives for cost reduction 
(Armstrong et al., 1994). That is, this method endogenizes the X-factor and 
limits the regulatory discretion at the same time.  
 
The primary difficulty of yardstick competition, on the other hand, is the reality 
that firms do not fall perfectly into a fixed set of groups. Thus, a judgment is 
required in determining which firms to be grouped together and care must be 
taken to handle systematic differences between the firms in each group. The 
more closely one firm resembles the others within the same group, the more 
effective yardstick competition is. Then the rule is obvious: “use yardstick 
                                                 
63 The idea behind the ‘ratchet effect’ may be summarized as follows: if the regulated firm 
produces at a low cost today, the regulator might infer that low costs are not that hard to 
achieve and tomorrow offer a demanding incentive scheme. That is, the regulated firm might be 
concerned about the possibility that it jeopardizes future rents by being efficient today (Laffont 
and Tirole, 1993). 
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competition if comparable firms exist, and be careful to adjust yardstick rates for 
special conditions beyond a given firm’s control”. 
 
A-2.7.3.4 Franchising 
 
One of the fundamental regulatory questions has been how to enjoy the cost 
benefits of single-firm production without suffering from monopolistic behaviour. 
Franchising provides an answer to that question in the form of a competition for 
the market, where several firms competing to be one that actually operates in 
the market. 
 
Franchising involves conferring rights in the supply of a good or service to a 
sole producer for a specified period of time. It is regarded as an essential 
mechanism for introducing, competition for the market where competition within 
the market is not feasible or desirable. Natural monopolies are, therefore, 
obvious candidates for franchising. 
 
The concept of “franchising” was first pronounced by Chadwick (1859) and 
popularized by Demsetz (1968). In a so-called “Chadwick-Demsetz” auction, 
competition takes place through bidding for the franchise contract, and the 
winner is the one who bids the lowest price to supply the good or service, or 
more generally, who offers the best price-quality package.  
 
At first sight, franchising appears to provide a very attractive way of combining 
competition and efficiency without any heavy burden for regulators. The 
competition for market appears to destroy the undesirable monopoly of 
information that hinders conventional regulation, and price is set by competition, 
not by bureaucrats. Provided bidding is competitive, a Chadwick-Demsetz 
auction will reduce the profits to the normal competitive level by inducing bid 
prices equal to unit costs of production.  
 
Nevertheless, franchising is not without some difficulties. First of all, as 
mentioned above, bidding must be competitive and cases of collusive bidding 
need to be prevented. There exist mainly two reasons why bidding for the 
franchise might fail to be competitive. First of all, there is a danger of collusion 
between bidders, especially if they are few in number64, or if the firms are 
effectively in a repeated interaction (or, “game”) with one another via frequent 
contracts. The second reason is that one firm might enjoy such strategic 
advantages in the competition for the franchise that other firms would be 
unwilling to compete with it. For instance, suppose that an incumbent firm is the 
holder of a franchise that is now up for renewal. Since, thanks to its past 
operation of the franchise, the incumbent has already reduced its costs; other 
firms will be unwilling to compete with the incumbent as they know that they are 
unlikely to win the competition. Also, another source of incumbent advantage 
may originate from asymmetries of information. The incumbent’s knowledge of 
cost and demand conditions is likely superior to that of any other firm, which 
tends to deter others from competing with it for the future franchise.  
 
                                                 
64 Since, in energy industries, the requisite skills and/or resources are rare; it is generally the 
case. 
  107 
The merits of franchising are further reduced by the issues related with asset 
handover. Unless sunk costs are zero (an extremely unlikely event), efficiency 
requires that the new operator of the franchise takes over the assets from the 
incumbent65. Therefore, one needs to decide how the assets to be valued for 
this purpose. In such a case, there is a problem of bilateral monopoly. If 
incumbent has no alternative, it has to accept as little as the scrap value of the 
assets. If the new operator firm has no alternative, it has to pay as much as 
their replacement value. The gap between replacement value and scrap value 
is likely to be large if the assets involve sunk costs.  
 
The last difficulty with franchising is the question of specification, administration 
and monitoring of franchise contract. The duration of franchise contract must 
also be considered. The difficulties of contract specification and administration 
perhaps suggest that short-term contracts have advantages, because fewer 
future unforeseeable events then need to be considered. Nevertheless, the 
organization of frequent contests for the franchise also involves major costs: all 
the problems of asset valuation and handover occur more often, and the 
industry would frequently be in a state of turmoil. 
 
A-2.7.3.5 The Theory of Contestable Markets 
 
The recent theory of “contestable markets”, put forward by Baumol et al. (1982), 
suggests that the removal of entry barriers may ensure economically desirable 
behavior even in cases of natural monopoly, provided that the monopoly is 
“perfectly contestable”. “A contestable market is one into which entry is 
absolutely free, and exit is absolutely costless” (Baumol, 1982, p 3, italics in 
original). Under these assumptions66, if the incumbent raises prices above 
costs, it creates profitable opportunities for new entrants and becomes 
vulnerable to “hit-and-run” entry. Therefore, equilibrium in a perfectly 
contestable market implies that a natural monopolist makes only normal profits. 
 
The theory has at least two policy implications. First, if a market is contestable, 
then there is no real need for regulation because the threat of entry disciplines 
the existing firm. Second, the same is true if a market can be made contestable 
by dismantling of entry barriers or by any other liberalization measures. 
 
 
                                                 
65 Otherwise there will be inefficient duplication of assets. 
66 However, the theory of contestable markets has little to offer to policy makers concerned with 
energy industries where entry is not so free and, more importantly; exit is highly costly due to 
existence of huge sunk costs. 
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Appendix 3: Details of Electricity Demand Estimation for Turkey 
 
 
 
A-3.1 Cointegration Analysis 
 
A-3.1.1 Stationarity 
 
Time series data consists of observations, which are considered as realizations 
of random variables that can be described by some stochastic process. The 
concept of “stationarity” is related with the properties of this stochastic 
process. A stochastic process is called “strictly stationary” if its properties are 
unaffected by a change of time origin; that is, the joint probability distribution at 
any set of times is not affected by an arbitrary shift along the time axis. 
However, in this study, the concept of “weak stationary” is adopted; meaning 
that the data is assumed to be stationary if the means, variances and 
covariances of the series are independent of time, rather than the entire 
distribution. 
 
A-3.1.2 Unit Root Problem 
 
Nonstationarity can originate from various sources but the most important one is 
the presence of so-called “unit roots”. Before discussing this problem let me 
focus on some concepts required to explain “unit roots”. 
 
The process below is referred to as a first order autoregressive process or 
AR(1) process, where each observation in a time series depends linearly upon 
its previous value. Generally, if the value of Y at time t depends on its value in 
the previous p time periods, Yt is referred to as pth order autoregressive, or 
AR(p), process. Moreover, an AR(1) process is called “random walk with drift” 
when 1θ = ; and it is called ”random walk without drift” when 0δ =  and 1θ = . 
 
t t 1 tY Y −= δ + θ + ε  (5) 
 
where tε denotes a serially uncorrelated “white noise” error term with a mean of 
zero and a constant variance. The process above simply says that the current 
value Yt equals a constant δ  plus θ  times its previous value plus an 
unpredictable component tε . 
 
Another simple time series process is given below and it is known as the first 
order moving average process or MA(1) process. 
 
t 1 t 2 t 1Y −= µ + α ε + α ε  (6) 
 
where µ  is a constant and ε , as before, is the white noise stochastic error term. 
Here, Y at time t is equal to a constant plus a moving average of the current and 
past error terms. More generally, if the value of Y at time t depends on the 
values of current and past error terms in the previous q time periods, Yt is called 
qth order moving average, or MA(q), process. 
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Of course, it is quite likely that Y has characteristics of both AR and MA and 
therefore ARMA. Yt follows an ARMA (1,1) process if it can be written as: 
 
 t t 1 1 t 2 t 1Y Y − −= δ + θ + α ε + α ε  (7) 
 
because there is one autoregressive and one moving average term. In the 
same way, in an ARMA (p,q) process, there will be p autoregressive and q 
moving average terms. 
 
Now, consider the AR(1) process below: 
 
 t t 1 tY Y −= θ + ε  (8) 
 
if 1θ = , equation (8) becomes a random walk without drift model. If θ  is in fact 
1, we face what is known as the unit root problem, that is, a situation of 
nonstationarity. The name ”unit root”67 is due to the fact that 1θ = . If, however, 
I I 1θ ≤ , that is the absolute value of θ  is less than one, then the time series Yt is 
stationary. The stationarity of time series is so important because correlation 
could persist in nonstationary time series even if the sample is very large and 
may result in what is called spurious (or nonsense) regression, as showed by 
Yule (1926). Granger and Newbold (1974) argue that it is a good rule of thumb 
to suspect that the estimated regression is spurious if R2 is greater than Durbin-
Watson d value; that is R2>d. 
 
As easily be concluded from equation (8), the unit root problem can be solved, 
or stationarity can be achieved, by differencing and this can be indicative of the 
order of integration in the series. The number of differencing that is necessary 
to produce stationarity determines the order of integration. Generally, if a 
nonstationary time series has to be differenced d times to make it stationary, 
that time series is said to be integrated of order d. A time series Yt integrated of 
order d is denoted as tY (d )Ι . If a time series Yt is stationary to begin with, it 
is said to be integrated of order zero, denoted by tY (0 )Ι . In practice, most 
economic time series are generally (1)Ι ; that is, they generally become 
stationary only after taking their first differences.  
 
The basic idea behind cointegration is that if a linear combination of 
nonstationary (1)Ι  variables is stationary; that is (0 )Ι , then the variables are 
said to be cointegrated. So to speak, the linear combination cancels out the 
stochastic trends in the two (1)Ι  series and, as a result, the regression would 
be meaningful; that is, not spurious68. As Granger (1986, p 226) notes, “A test 
for cointegration can thus be thought of as a pre-test to avoid ‘spurious 
regression' situations”. Therefore, it is vital to specify whether each variable in 
the model is stationary or not in order to examine a possible cointegrating 
relationship between them. The established way to do so is to apply a formal 
unit root test in each series.  
                                                 
67 The terms ‘nonstationarity’, ‘random walk’, and ‘unit root’ can be treated as synonymous.  
68 As mentioned before, a regression of (1)Ι  variables that are not cointegrated produces 
spurious regression, and the results obtained have no interpretation. 
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A-3.1.3 The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test 
 
We know that if 1θ = ; that is, in the case of unit root69, the equation (8) 
becomes a random walk model without drift, which we know is a nonstationary 
process. The basic idea behind the unit root test of stationary is to simply 
regress Yt on its (one-period) lagged value Yt-1 and find out if the estimated θ  is 
statically equal to 1 or not. 
 
For theoretical reasons, equation (8) is manipulated by subtracting Yt-1 from 
both sides to obtain: 
 
 t t 1 t 1 tY Y ( 1)Y− −− = θ − + ε  (9) 
 
which can be written as: 
 
 t t 1 tY Y −∆ = δ + ε  (10) 
 
where ( 1)δ = θ −  and ∆ , as usual, is the first difference operator. So, in practice, 
instead of estimating equation (9), we estimate equation (10) and test the null 
hypothesis that 0δ = . If 0δ = , then 1θ = , meaning that we have a unit root 
problem and time series under consideration is nonstationary. The only 
question is which test to use to find out whether the estimated coefficient of Yt-1 
in equation (10) is zero or not. Unfortunately, under the null hypothesis that 
0δ =  (i.e., 1θ = ), the t value of the estimated coefficient of Yt-1 does not follow t 
distribution even in large samples; that is, it does not have an asymptotic 
normal distribution. Dickey and Fuller (1979) have shown that under the null 
hypothesis that 0δ = , the estimated t value of the coefficient of Yt-1 in equation 
(10) follows the τ  (tau) statistic. These authors have also computed the critical 
values of the τ  (tau) statistic. In literature tau statistic or test is known as the 
Dickey-Fuller (DF) test, in honor of its discoverers. 
 
In conducting DF test, it is assumed that the error term tε  is uncorrelated. 
However, in practice the error term in DF test usually shows evidence of serial 
correlation. To solve this problem, Dickey and Fuller have developed a test, 
known as the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. In ADF test, the lags of 
the first difference are included in the regression in order to make the error term 
tε white noise and, therefore, the regression is presented in the following form: 
 
 
m
t t 1 i t i t
i 1
Y Y Y− −
=
∆ = δ + α ∆ + ε∑  (11) 
 
To be more specific, we may also include an intercept and a time trend t, after 
which our model becomes: 
 
                                                 
69 For a general preliminary discussion of the concept of "stationarity" and unit root problem, 
please see A-3.1 section in Appendix 3, which also include the equations that are mentioned 
but not provided here. 
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m
t 1 2 t 1 i t i t
i 1
Y t Y Y− −
=
∆ = β + β + δ + α ∆ + ε∑  (12) 
 
The DF and ADF tests are similar since they have the same asymptotic 
distribution. In literature, although there exist numerous unit root tests, the most 
notable and commonly used one is ADF test and, therefore, it will be used in 
this study.  
 
A-3.1.4 Cointegration Tests 
 
On the basis of the theory that (1)Ι  variables may have a cointegrating 
relationship; that is, a stationary long-run linear relationship even though 
individually they are nonstationary, it is crucial to test for the existence of such a 
relationship. This section considers two tests of cointegration; namely 
Augmented Engle-Granger (AEG) test and cointegrating regression Durbin-
Watson (CRDW) test. 
 
A-3.1.4.1 Augmented Engle-Granger (AEG) Test 
 
We have warned that the regression of a nonstationary time series on other 
nonstationary time series may produce a spurious regression. If we subject our 
time series data individually to unit root analysis and find that they are all (1)Ι ; 
that is, they contain a unit root; there is a possibility that our regression can still 
be meaningful (i.e., not spurious) provided that the variables are cointegrated. 
In order to find out whether they are cointegrated or not, we simply carry out our 
original regression and subject our error term to unit root analysis. If it is 
stationary; that is, (0 )Ι , it means that our variables are cointegrated and have a 
long-term, or equilibrium, relationship between them. In short, provided that the 
residuals from our regression are (0 )Ι  or stationary, the conventional 
regression methodology is applicable to data involving nonstationary time 
series. 
 
Augmented Engle-Granger test (or, AEG test) is based on the idea described 
above. We simply estimate our original regression, obtain the residuals and 
carry out the ADF test. In literature, such a regression is called “cointegrating 
regression” and the parameters are known as “cointegrating parameters”. 
However, since the estimated residuals are based on the estimated 
cointegrating parameters, the ADF critical values are not appropriate. Engle and 
Granger (1987) have calculated appropriate values and therefore the ADF test 
in the present context is known as Augmented Engle-Granger test.  
 
A-3.1.4.2 Cointegrating Regression Durbin-Watson (CRDW) Test 
 
An alternative method of testing for cointegration is the CRDW test, whose 
critical values were first provided by Sargan and Bhargava (1983). In CRDW, 
the Durbin-Watson statistic d obtained from the cointegrating regression is 
used; but here the null hypothesis70 is that d=0, rather than the standard d=2. 
                                                 
70 We know that ˆd 2(1 )≈ − ρ , so if there is to be a unit root, the estimated ρ  will be about 1, 
which implies that d will be about zero. 
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The 1 percent critical value to test the hypothesis that the true d=0 is 0.511. 
Thus, if the computed d value is smaller 0.511, we reject the null hypothesis of 
cointegration at the 1% level. Otherwise, we fail to reject the null, meaning that 
the variables in the model are cointegrated and there is a long-term, or 
equilibrium, relationship between the variables. 
 
A-3.2 Steps in ARIMA Modelling 
 
ARIMA methodology includes four steps; namely, identification, estimation, 
diagnostic checking and, of course, forecasting. First of all, in the first step, we 
need to identify the appropriate values of our model; that is, p, d and q. The 
chief tools in identification are the autocorrelation function (ACF), the partial 
autocorrelation function (PACF), and the resulting correlogram, which is simply 
the plots of ACF and PACF against the lag length.  
 
The ACF at lag k, denoted by kρ , is defined as 
 
 kk
0
γ
ρ =
γ
 (13) 
 
where kγ  is the covariance at lag k, 0γ  is the variance. Since both covariance 
and variance are measured in the same units, kρ  is a unitless, or pure, number; 
and lies between -1 and +1.  
 
In time series data the main reason of correlation between Yt and Yt-k originates 
from the correlations they have with intervening lags; that is, Yt-1, Yt-2, … , Yt-k+1. 
The partial correlation measures the correlation between observations that are k 
time periods apart after controlling for correlations at intermediate lags; that is, it 
removes the influence of these intervening variables. In other words, partial 
autocorrelation is the correlation between Yt and Yt-k after removing the effect of 
intermediate Y’s. 
 
If we find out, as a result of visual inspection of correlogram and/or formal unit 
root tests, that our data is nonstationary; we need to make it stationary by 
differencing until nonstationary fades away. Then based on the stationary data 
after differencing and its correlogram, we identify the appropriate values of our 
model; that is, p, d and q. 
 
In the second step; that is, estimation, the model based on the results from the 
first step is constructed and estimated, which is followed by diagnostic checking 
in the third step. To check whether the model is a reasonable fit to the data or 
not, we collect residuals from the estimation done in previous step and check 
whether any of the autocorrelations and partial correlations of the residuals is 
individually statistically significant or not. If they are not statistically significant, 
then it means that the residuals are purely random and there is no need to look 
for another ARIMA model. In the final step, forecasting is carried out based on 
the constructed and checked ARIMA model. 
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A-3.3 Overview of Data 
 
This section describes the data used in the study. The data used in the 
estimation process is quarterly time series data on real electricity prices, real 
income (or real GDP per capita) and electricity demand (or net electricity 
consumption per capita) for the period 1984-2004, a total of 84 observations. 
The data was obtained from the “International Energy Agency” (IEA), the 
“Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development” (OECD), the 
“International Monetary Fund” (IMF) and some other national institutions of 
Turkey; namely, the “State Institute of Statistics” (DIE), the “Turkish Electricity 
Transmission Company” (TEIAS), Undersecretariat of Treasury and State 
Planning Organization (DPT). The time plots of the data are provided in 
Appendix 4-D. 
 
Since the data on net electricity consumption, population and GDP was not 
available quarterly, the annual series on these data were converted into 
quarterly data assuming that the change during the year is linear. It is also 
important to note that each data point in series shows the change in the last one 
year period, not only the last three months. For example, the electricity 
consumption by industry in the second quarter of 2004 is 53,935 GWh. This 
data represents the consumption between the period 01 July 2003 - 31 June 
2004, not the one during 01 April 2004 – 31 June 2004. Specification of data 
and their sources are summarized below. 
 
A-3.3.1 Real Electricity Prices 
 
A single time series data on real electricity prices in Turkey is not directly 
obtainable. Therefore, it was calculated using available data. First of all a 
weighted average price is computed using the existing data on electricity prices 
for industry/households and electricity consumption by industry/households. 
Then, an inflation index is also computed using the data on annual percentage 
change in inflation assuming 2004 as the base year; that is 2004=1. Finally, real 
electricity prices are obtained by dividing weighted average price for each 
period by inflation index for the related year. 
 
The quarterly data on electricity prices for industry and households was 
collected from IEA (2005a). All prices are electricity end-use prices in New 
Turkish Lira (YTL) per kilowatt hour (kWh). The annual data on electricity 
consumption by industry and households was taken from IEA (2002) for 1984-
2000 and IEA (2004a) for 2001-2002. Moreover, the data for the period from the 
first quarter of 2003 to the last quarter of 2004 was collected from DIE (2005a). 
The data from DIE is in GWh; however, the original data from IEA is measured 
in ktoe. To get a single unit, the data from IEA was converted into GWh using 
the simple equality 1 ktoe = 11.63 GWh. Finally, the data on annual percentage 
change in inflation was taken from IMF (2005). 
 
To get real electricity prices, first of all, a weighted average price was computed 
by using the available data on electricity prices and consumption. Then, an 
inflation index was also computed (assuming the year 2004 as the base year; 
that is, 2004=1) and it was used to obtain the data on real electricity prices in 
YTL/kWh at 2004 prices. All related data is given in Appendix 4-A. 
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A-3.3.2 Real Income 
 
A single time series data on real income (or real GDP per capita) is also not 
directly available. Therefore, it was calculated by using available data on 
population, GDP per capita at current prices and annual percentage change in 
inflation. The annual time series data on Turkish population was collected from 
DIE (2005b). It is measured in thousand people. In Turkey, censuses are 
carried out once in every five years. The figures for years without a census are 
official estimates by DIE. The annual time series data on Turkish gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita at current prices in YTL was obtained from 
the Undersecretariat of Treasury (2005) for 1984-2003 and from DPT (2005) for 
2004. 
 
To get real income, GDP per capita at current prices was calculated and the 
figures were converted into real prices by using the inflation index computed in 
the previous step. At the end, real GDP per capita at 2004 prices was obtained 
in YTL. 
 
A-3.3.3 Electricity Demand 
 
Electricity demand (or net electricity consumption per capita) is not directly 
accessible, so once more the data was worked out. The annual data on net 
electricity consumption71 was collected from TEIAS (2005a) for 1984-2003 and 
from DIE (2005c) for 2004. All figures are measured in GWh. These figures 
were converted into kWh and then divided by population figures to get net 
electricity consumption per capita in kWh. The table showing real income and 
electricity demand figures is given in Appendix 4-B. 
 
In forecasting section, besides annual net electricity consumption data from 
TEIAS (2005a), additional data from TEIAS (2005b) will also be used. 
Furthermore, the data to be used in this section is annual data for 1923-2004 
period, rather than quarterly data from 1984 to 2004. The data to be used in 
forecasting process is given in Appendix 4-C. 
 
Having discussed the data and their sources let me focus on the general view of 
the data to be directly used in the estimation. The graphs of the data are 
provided in Appendix 4-D. Since one of the main aims of this study is to get 
elasticities of electricity demand, the series were transformed into natural 
logarithms so that direct estimates of elasticities can be obtained. Graphs below 
show time series plots of natural logarithms of real electricity prices (LP), real 
GDP per capita (LY) and real net electricity consumption per capita (LE). 
 
                                                 
71 Net electricity consumption is calculated by subtracting network loses from total supply. 
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Figure 22. Time Series Plots of Natural Logarithms of LP, LY and LE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A close look at the graphs reveals that there are trends in the variables with the 
exception of LP, which fluctuates within an interval. Visual inspection of the 
plotted data also indicates that LY and LE have non-constant means and non-
constant variances; that is, they seem to be non-stationary. 
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A-3.4 Estimation and Presentation of Results 
 
A-3.4.1 Partial Adjustment Model 
 
Using quarterly data discussed in the previous section, the reduced form model 
is estimated72. 
 
Equation (1) is estimated as follows: 
 
 t t tlnE 5.12 1.17lnP 1.18lnY= − − +  (14) 
 
The last column of the estimation output73 gives the probability of drawing a t-
statistic as extreme as the one actually observed. It is also known as the “p-
value”. For the parameters in our model, p-values of α , 1β  and 2β  are all within 
acceptable range and the null hypothesis that one of these coefficients is zero 
can be rejected at the 2% significance level.  
 
As for summary statistics, “R-squared” measures the success of the regression 
in predicting the values of the dependent variable within the sample. It equals 
one if the regression fits perfectly. In our model, it is almost 0.38 and therefore it 
can be concluded that our model may predict dependent variable with 38% 
accuracy with given sample, which is not high enough for an appropriate model. 
Since “R-squared” never decreases as more regressors are added; “Adjusted 
R-squared”, which penalizes for addition of irrelevant regressors, is a better 
measure of “goodness-of-fit”. In our model, it is almost 0.36 and, therefore, it is 
also below the expected level, which is at least around 0.80. 
 
Durbin-Watson statistic measures the serial correlation (or, autocorrelation), 
AR(1), in the residuals. As a rule, if it is less than 2, there is evidence of positive 
serial correlation. Durbin-Watson statistic in our estimation output is very close 
to 0.14, indicating the existence of serial correlation in the residuals. F-statistics 
and its p-value, Prob(F-statistic), comes from a joint test of the null hypothesis 
that all slope coefficients in the regression are zero. Since in our model p-value 
of the F-statistics is zero, we can reject the null hypothesis. 
 
Although the coefficients of price and income have correct signs74, econometric 
indicators imply that this equation may be misspecified. Therefore, the lagged 
dependent variable, lnEt-1, is added in the right-hand-side of the equation (1) so 
as to obtain partial adjustment model in equation (4), estimation of which gives 
the following result75. 
 
 t t t t 1lnE 0.04 0.01lnP 0.01lnY 0.99lnE −= − − + +  (15) 
 
 
                                                 
72 Unless otherwise stated, all estimation throughout the study is carried out by EViews 5.1, the 
Windows-based forecasting and econometric analysis package. 
73 The estimation output is given in Appendix 5-A. 
74 The economic theory states that there is an inverse relationship between demand and price; 
and a positive relation exists between demand and income. 
75 The estimation output is given in Appendix 5-B. 
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This new model is clearly better than the first one. First of all, the coefficients of 
price and income have still correct signs. Second, p-values of all coefficients, 
with the exception of intercept term, are within acceptable range and they are 
significant at 2% significance level76. Third, “R-squared” and “Adjusted R-
squared” measures in this model are about 1, meaning that the regression fits 
almost perfectly. Finally, p-value of the F-statistics is still zero. 
 
Based on this model, the estimated short-run and long-run elasticities of 
demand are as follows77: 
 
 
Table 14. Elasticities of Demand for Electricity in Turkey, 
based on Conventional Partial Adjustment Model 
 
 Short-run Long-run 
Price Elasticity -0.0123aa -0.9079aa 
Income Elasticity  0.0148aa 1.0947aa 
 
There seems to be a substantial difference between short-run and long-run 
elasticities of demand because, in this model, the speed of adjustment to the 
long-run equilibrium demand level is so close to 0 (δ = 0.0135 ). The other, and 
probably more striking, outcome from this model is the fact that although short-
run elasticities are extremely low, less than 0.02; the long-run response to both 
price and income changes is exceptionally high. For instance, if real income 
doubles (or, increases by 100%) in Turkey, the demand for electricity will 
increase by 109% in the long run. Similarly, if real price of electricity declines by 
100%, the demand will increase by 91% in the long run. 
 
There is, however, a possibility that the OLS results may be misleading due to 
inappropriate standard errors because of the presence of heteroskedasticity. In 
order to test whether error terms are heteroskedastic or not, White 
heteroskedasticity test (without cross terms) was carried out and its result is 
given in Appendix 5-C. The top part of the output displays the joint significance 
of the regressors (excluding the constant term) for each test regression. Under 
the null of no heteroskedasticity (or, no misspecification78), the non-constant 
regressors should not be jointly significant. The probability value of 0.146 
indicates that they are not jointly significant even at 10% significance level; 
meaning that error terms are not heteroskedastic in our model. 
 
We need also to test for serial correlation. The Durbin-Watson statistic is not 
appropriate as a test for serial correlation in this case since there is a lagged 
dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation. Therefore, another 
                                                 
76 However, the p-value of the intercept term (0.44) is so high that we cannot reject the zero null 
hypothesis even at the 40% significance level! 
77 Relying on the notation in equation (4), estimated parameters are as follows: 
     0.041010δα = −    1 0.012257δβ = −    2 0.014779δβ =    (1 ) 0.986500− δ =  
   From above, it is obvious that 0.0135δ =  and, therefore, β =1 -0.9079  and β =2 1.0947 .     
78 Since the White test is an extremely general test, it may also identify some specification 
errors (such as an incorrect functional form), as well as revealing heteroskedasticity. 
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test, namely Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test, was applied, which 
produced the output table in Appendix 5-D. 
 
The top part of the output presents the test statistics and associated probability 
values. The statistic labeled “Obs*R-squared” is the LM test statistic for the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation. The (effectively) zero probability value 
strongly indicates the presence of serial correlation in the residuals. In the 
presence of serial correlation, the OLS estimators are still linear unbiased as 
well as consistent and asymptotically normally distributed, but they are no 
longer efficient, meaning that standard errors are estimated in the wrong way 
and, therefore, usual confidence intervals and hypotheses tests are unreliable. 
Moreover, usually, the finding of autocorrelation is also an indication that the 
model is misspecified. Newey and West (1987) proposed a general covariance 
estimator that is consistent in the presence of both heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. Thanks to Newey-West procedure79, we can still use OLS but 
correct the standard errors for autocorrelation. The estimation output of OLS 
with Newey-West procedure is given in Appendix 5-E. As can be seen in 
Appendix 5-E; when we correct the standard errors for autocorrelation, p-values 
of all coefficients become insignificant even at 10% significance level, 
supporting the previous indication that the model is misspecified.  
 
Since it is obvious that conventional partial adjustment model is not the 
appropriate one in our case; after experimenting with various functional forms, 
the model below is specified and estimated. 
 
 t 0 1 t 2 t 3 t 2 4 5 t 2 tlnE lnP lnY lnP t lnE− −= φ + φ + φ + φ + φ + φ + ε  (16) 
 
where lnEt-2 and lnPt-2 are the second lag of natural logarithms of demand and 
real price respectively; and t is a simple trend that increases by one for each 
observation80. The OLS estimation output of this new model is provided in 
Appendix 5-F. 
 
This last model is obviously the best one among all others. The coefficients of 
price and income have correct signs. P-values of all coefficients, without 
exception, are significant at 5% significance level. “R-squared” and “Adjusted R-
squared” measures indicate that the regression fits almost perfectly. P-value of 
the F-statistics is zero. White heteroskedasticity test (without cross terms) and 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test were carried out once more for the 
new model and the results indicate that we have no heteroskedasticity in our 
model but there exists serial correlation in the residuals. In order to correct the 
standard errors for autocorrelation, the model was re-estimated by OLS with 
Newey-West procedure and, as can be seen in the test output table, all 
coefficients are still significant at 5% significance level. The test output tables 
are given in Appendix 5-G, 5-H and 5-I. 
                                                 
79 It is important to point out that the Newey-West procedure is strictly speaking valid in large 
samples and may not be appropriate in small ones. Since we have 84 observations, our sample 
may be regarded as reasonably large. 
80 The base period for the trend is the 29th observation, the 1st quarter of 1991; which has the 
lowest figure for real electricity price for the period 1984-1998. The trend in our model starts 
from -180 for the 1th quarter of 1984, then increases by one in each period; and at the end, 4th 
quarter of 2004, becomes -97. 
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Although all econometric indicators support the appropriateness of this model, a 
formal test for functional form is also carried out to make sure that our 
specification is correct. Ramsey (1969) has suggested the popular RESET test 
(regression specification error test) to check the functional form of a model. 
Ramsey's RESET test estimates a regression which uses powers of the 
predicted values of the dependent variable (which are, of course, linear 
combinations of powers and cross-product terms of the explanatory variables) 
as regressors as well as original independent variables; and tests for the 
hypothesis that the coefficients on the powers of fitted values are all zero. The 
output table of this test is given in Appendix 5-J. As can be seen in the test 
output table, this test does not indicate a specification problem in our model at 
the 5% level of significance. That is, the model appears to be free from 
misspecification. 
 
Based on these results, it seems that we need to respecify reduced form model 
for Turkish case. First of all, we need to readjust the desired or equilibrium 
electricity demand level (E't) in partial adjustment model as follows:  
 
 t 1 t 2 t 3 t 2 4 tlnE lnP lnY lnP t u−′ = α + β + β + β + β +  (17) 
 
Second, based on the model represented by equation (16), it is clear that partial 
adjustment process in Turkey operates as follows: 
 
 t t 2 t t 2lnE lnE (lnE lnE )− −′− = δ −  (18) 
 
Substituting equation (17) into equation (18) and rearranging gives: 
 
 t 1 t 2 t 3 t 2 4 t 2 tlnE lnP lnY lnP t (1 )lnE u− −= δα + δβ + δβ + δβ + δβ + − δ + δ  (19) 
 
In order to simplify notation, equation (19) can be rewritten as: 
  
 t 0 1 t 2 t 3 t 2 4 5 t 2 tlnE lnP lnY lnP t lnE− −= φ + φ + φ + φ + φ + φ + ε  (20) 
 
where 0φ = δα , 1 1φ = δβ , 2 2φ = δβ , 3 3φ = δβ , 4 4φ = δβ , 5 (1 )φ = − δ  and t tuε = δ . In 
equation (20)81, 1φ  and 2φ  are the short-run price and income elasticities 
respectively. The long-run price and income elasticities are given by 1β  and 2β  
correspondingly. Therefore, based on our estimation results given below, the 
short-run and long-run elasticities of demand for electricity in Turkey are as 
follows82: 
 
         t t t t 2 t 2lnE 0.653-0.041lnP 0.057lnY 0.017lnP 0.002t 0.862lnE− −= + + + + (21) 
 
 
                                                 
81 Please note that equations (20) and (16) are identical. 
82 Relying on the notation in equation (20), elasticities are obtained as follows: 
                     1 1 -0.041φ = δ =β    2 2 0.057φ = δ =β    (1 ) 0.862− δ =  
   From above, it is obvious that δ = 0.138  and, therefore, β =1 -0.297  and β =2 0.414 . 
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Table 15. Elasticities of Demand for Electricity in Turkey, 
based on Readjusted Partial Adjustment Model 
 
 Short-run Long-run 
Price Elasticity -0.041aa -0.297aa 
Income Elasticity 0.057aa 0.414aa 
 
Now, there seems to be less difference between short-run and long-run 
elasticities of demand because, in this new model, the speed of adjustment to 
the long-run equilibrium demand level ( 0.138δ = ) is much higher, meaning that 
now it takes demand less time to reach long run equilibrium. Furthermore, it is 
clear that the long run demand is relatively elastic compared to short run 
demand. Moreover, the level of income has more effect on demand than that of 
prices. As also suggested by economic theory, the demand is most responsive 
to income changes in the long run. In Turkey, if real income increases by 100%, 
electricity demand increases by 41% in the long-run. 
 
A-3.4.2 Cointegration Analysis 
 
As indicated before, since it is critical to find out whether the results obtained 
from our model are meaningful (i.e., not spurious) or not, let me apply formal 
unit root tests in each series to test the reliability of our estimates. 
 
A-3.4.2.1 The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test 
 
The established standard procedure for cointegration analysis is to start with 
unit root tests on the time series data being analyzed. The augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test is used to test for the presence of unit roots and establish the 
order of integration of the variables in the model. Tables in Appendix 5-K, 5-L 
and 5-M show the results of the unit root tests83 from estimation of  equation 
(12). The null hypothesis of the test is that there is a unit root against the 
alternative one that there is no unit root in the variables. 
 
 
Table 16. Summary of ADF Tests for Unit Roots in the 
Variables (in level form with a trend and intercept) 
 
Variable ADF Test Statistic Results 
LNE -1.008983 Fail to reject the null 
LNP -2.627504 Fail to reject the null 
LNY -2.614160 Fail to reject the null 
Note: The ADF statistic at 5% significance is -3.466248. 
 
The ADF statistics for the natural logarithms of electricity demand (LNE), real 
                                                 
83 Since equation (20) implies that the electricity demand in time t is affected by the second lag 
of the variables; two lags have been used in ADF unit root tests. 
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electricity prices (LNP) and real income (LNY) are all insignificant at 5 percent 
level of significance, which leads to non-rejection of the null hypothesis that 
there is a unit root problem in the variables. Based on ADF test, it is obvious 
that the variables are non-stationary.  
 
As mentioned previously, differencing has the effect of making the variables 
stationary. Tables in Appendix 5-N, 5-O and 5-P present the results of unit root 
tests for the differenced variables, which are summarized in the table below. 
 
 
Table 17. Summary of ADF Tests for Unit Roots in the Variables 
(in 1st difference form with a trend and intercept) 
 
Variable ADF Test Statistic Results 
∆ LNE -4.569026 Reject the null 
∆ LNP -13.98314 Reject the null 
∆ LNY -38.88917 Reject the null 
Note: The ADF statistic at 5% significance is -3.466966. 
 
The ADF statistics for the first difference variables are all significant at 5 percent 
level of significance, which leads to rejection of the null hypothesis that there is 
a unit root problem in the variables. Based on ADF test, it is apparent that the 
first difference variables are stationary, which implies that the variables are 
integrated of order one, (1)Ι . 
 
A-3.4.2.2 Cointegration Tests 
 
A-3.4.2.2.1 Augmented Engle-Granger (AEG) Test 
 
The residuals from the estimation of equation (20) were used to test for the 
existence of cointegrating relationship between the variables. The null 
hypothesis is that the residuals have a unit root problem against the alternative 
that the variables cointegrate. The result of AEG test84 is presented in Appendix 
5-R. 
 
 
Table 18. Summary of AEG Test Output for Equation (20) 
 
Variable ADF Test Statistic Result 
Residuals -5.3643 Reject the null 
Note: 95% critical value for the Dickey-Fuller statistic is -4.9387. 
 
It is clear that absolute value of ADF test statistic is more than the critical value, 
meaning that the null hypothesis is rejected. To reject the null hypothesis 
implies that the residuals have not a unit root problem; i.e., they are stationary. 
                                                 
84 The test is carried out by Microfit 4.1. 
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It can therefore be concluded that, based on the AEG method, the variables are 
cointegrated.  
 
A-3.4.2.2.2 Cointegrating Regression Durbin-Watson Test 
 
Since cointegration is very crucial to the reliability of estimated parameters, a 
second test, namely CRDW test, was carried out to make sure that the 
variables in this study are definitely cointegrated. The Durbin-Watson statistic 
for the regression represented by equation (20) is 0.559, which is above the 1% 
critical value (0.511). Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
cointegration at the 1% level, which reinforces the finding on the basis of the 
AEG test.  
 
To sum up, our conclusion, based on both the AEG and CRDW tests, is that the 
variables LNE, LNP and LNY are cointegrated. Although they individually exhibit 
random walks, there seems to be a stable long-run relationship between them; 
they will not wander away from each other in the long-run.  
 
Based on these results, we may conclude that the appropriate model for Turkish 
electricity demand is the one represented in equation (20) and that our 
estimates are reliable; that is, not spurious. 
 
A-3.5 Electricity Demand Forecast for Turkey: 2005-2015 
 
Before starting the forecast, it is important to make some points clear. First of 
all, data used here is annual data covering the period 192385-2004, a total of 82 
observations. Also, unlike previous section, the data here is not converted into 
natural logarithms and, therefore, the unit is GWh. Furthermore, the time plot of 
data is provided in Appendix 6-A to facilitate the understanding of current trend 
in electricity demand. As can easily be seen from the time plot, there exists a 
sharp sustained upward trend in electricity demand starting from the early 
1960s and even this trend has become steeper in the last 20 years. 
 
In literature, there are five main approaches to economic forecasting based on 
time series data; namely, (1) exponential smoothing methods, (2) single-
equation regression models, (3) simultaneous-equation regression models, (4) 
autoregressive integrated moving average models (ARIMA), and (5) vector 
autoregression. Although still used in some areas, the first group of models is 
now supplanted by the other four methods; therefore, we will not use them in 
this study. Taking into account rather low estimates of elasticities obtained in 
previous section86, it seems better not to include price and income variables in 
the forecasting process and “let the demand data speak for itself”, which is the 
main philosophy behind ARIMA modelling. Since the second, third and the fifth 
group of models require the inclusion of price, income and some other variables 
in the forecasting process; they will also not be used here. In short, this section 
                                                 
85 The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923. 
86 Since the absolute value of the elasticities measure the relative change in the dependent 
variable (in our case, electricity consumption) due to a relative change in the independent 
variables (in our case, price and income); low elasticities imply that responsiveness of demand 
to price and income changes is rather limited, meaning that a forecast linking price and income 
to consumption will not produce healthy results. 
  123 
will develop an electricity demand forecast for Turkey based on ARIMA 
modelling. 
 
As mentioned before, ARIMA modelling consists of four steps. In the first step, 
namely identification step, we need to identify the appropriate parameters in 
our model, that is, ARIMA(p,d,q). The figure in Appendix 6-B provides us with 
the correlogram up to 40 lags, or the plots of ACF and PACF against the lag 
length of 40. The column labeled AC and PAC are the sample autocorrelation 
function and the sample partial autocorrelation function respectively. Also the 
diagrams of AC and PAC are provided on the left. The solid and dashed vertical 
lines in the diagram represent the zero axis and 95% confidence interval 
respectively. From this figure, two facts stand out: First, the autocorrelation 
coefficient starts at a very high value at lag 1 (0.937) and declines very slowly; 
and ACF up to 16 lags are individually statistically significant different from zero 
as they are all outside the 95% confidence bounds. Second, after the first lag, 
the PACF drops dramatically, and all PACFs after lag 1 are statistically 
insignificant. These two facts strongly support the idea that the electricity 
consumption time series is nonstationary. It may be nonstationary in mean or 
variance, or both. 
 
Since the data is nonstationary we have to make it stationary. The figures in 
Appendix 6-C and 6-D show the correlograms of the first and second 
differenced data up to 40 lags. We still observe a trend in the first-differenced 
consumption time series but this trend disappears in the second-differenced 
one, perhaps suggesting that the second-differenced data is stationary. A 
formal application of the ADF unit root test shows that that is indeed the case. 
The output table of this test is given in Appendix 6-E. 
 
In Appendix 6-D, we have a much different pattern of ACF and PACF. The 
ACFs at lags 1, 3 and 4; and PACFs at 1, 2, 4, 6 and 13 seem statistically 
different from zero. But at all other lags, they are not statistically different from 
zero. If the partial correlation coefficient were significant only at lag 1, we could 
have identified this as an AR(1) model. Let us therefore assume that the 
process that generated the second-differenced consumption is at the most an 
AR(13) process. Since from the partial correlogram we know that only the AR 
terms at lag 1, 2, 4, 6 and 13 are significant, we only need to include these AR 
terms. Therefore at the end of first step we may conclude that the original time 
series is ARIMA(13,2,0); that is, the second differenced stationary data can be 
modeled as an ARMA(13,0) process. 
 
The second step in ARIMA modelling is estimation. Let *tE  denote the second-
differenced data. Then, in line with the conclusion in the first step, our model is: 
 
 − − − − −= δ + α + α + α + α + α +
* * * * * *
t 1 t 1 2 t 2 4 t 4 6 t 6 13 t 13 tE E E E E E u  (22) 
 
Using EViews, we obtained the following estimates87: 
 
 * * * * * *t t 1 t 2 t 4 t 6 t 13E 275.93 0.56E 0.44E 0.62E 0.56E 0.54E− − − − −= − − − − +  (23) 
                                                 
87 Estimation output table is given in Appendix 6-F. 
  124 
 
In the third step; that is, diagnostic checking, we have obtained residuals from 
(23) and get the ACF and PACF of these residuals up to lag 40 in order to 
check that the model represented by equation (23) is a reasonable fit to the 
data. The estimated ACF and PACF are shown in Appendix 6-G. As can be 
seen in Appendix 6-G, none of the autocorrelations and partial correlations is 
individually statistically significant. In other words, the correlograms of both 
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation give the impression that the residuals 
estimated from regression (23) are purely random. Hence, there is not any need 
to look for another ARIMA model.  
 
The final step is forecasting. However, we need to integrate the second-
differenced series to obtain the forecast of consumption rather than its changes. 
We know that88: 
 
 − −= − +
*
t t t 1 t 2E E 2E E  (24) 
 
If we transform all variables in equation (22) based on this formula and 
rearrange it, our model becomes: 
 
Et    = − − −δ + + α + α − α − + α − α1 t 1 2 1 t 2 1 2 t 3(2 )E ( 2 1)E ( 2 )E   
 
− − − −+ α + α − α + α + α − α2 4 t 4 4 t 5 4 6 t 6 6 t 7( )E 2 E ( )E 2 E  (25) 
 
− − − −+α + α − α + α +6 t 8 13 t 13 13 t 14 13 t 15 tE E 2 E E u   
 
The values of δ , α1, α2 , α4 , α6  and α13  are already known from the estimated 
regression (23) and ut is assumed to be zero, which enables us to convert 
equation (25) into equation (26). Using equation (26), we can easily obtain the 
forecast values for the period 2005-2015, which are given in the table below. 
 
Et    = − − − −+ − + −t 1 t 2 t 3 t 4275.93 1.44E 0.32E 0.32E 1.06E   
 
− − − −+ − + −t 5 t 6 t 7 t 81.23E 1.17E 1.11E 0.56E  (26) 
 
− − −+ − +t 13 t 14 t 150.54E 1.08E 0.54E   
 
                                                 
88 This formula to integrate data from second-differenced form into level form is produced by the 
author himself. 
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Table 19. Demand (Net Electricity Consumption) Forecast for Turkey, 2005-2015 
 
Year 
Forecasted 
Annual 
% Change 
Index 
(2004=100) 
Net Electricity 
Consumption 
(GWh) 
2005 130,204.9 11.7 111.7 
2006 134,876.5 3.6 115.7 
2007 142,091.6 5.3 121.9 
2008 152,696.9 7.5 131.0 
2009 153,897.4 0.8 132.0 
2010 167,413.7 8.8 143.6 
2011 170,957.3 2.1 146.7 
2012 176,576.5 3.3 151.5 
2013 192,011.2 8.7 164.7 
2014 187,387.9 -2.4 160.8 
2015 205,108.1 9.5 176.0 
Note: Average annual % change is 5.4 
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Appendix 4: The Data 
 
 
 
Appendix 4-A: Real Electricity Prices at 2004 Prices (YTL/kWh) 
 
  Electricity Electricity Electricity Electricity Weighted Inflation  Real Electricity  
Period Prices for  Prices for  Consumption Consumption Average (Annual Inflation Prices 
  Industry Households by Industry by Households Price Change)  Index (at 2004 Prices) 
  (YTL/kWh) (YTL/kWh) (GWh) (GWh) (YTL/kWh) % (2004=1) (YTL/kWh) 
1Q1984 0.000016 0.000013 15277 4096 0.000015 
48.4 0.00007 
0.235480 
2Q1984 0.000017 0.000014 15860 4166 0.000016 0.250961 
3Q1984 0.000020 0.000016 16443 4236 0.000019 0.293943 
4Q1984 0.000022 0.000018 17026 4306 0.000021 0.324776 
1Q1985 0.000024 0.000019 17360 4474 0.000023 
45.0 0.00010 
0.237263 
2Q1985 0.000024 0.000019 17695 4643 0.000023 0.237112 
3Q1985 0.000024 0.000019 18029 4811 0.000023 0.236968 
4Q1985 0.000030 0.000022 18363 4980 0.000028 0.292180 
1Q1986 0.000046 0.000030 18646 5151 0.000043 
34.6 0.00014 
0.302944 
2Q1986 0.000046 0.000030 18928 5321 0.000042 0.302605 
3Q1986 0.000046 0.000030 19211 5492 0.000042 0.302276 
4Q1986 0.000048 0.000030 19494 5663 0.000044 0.312996 
1Q1987 0.000053 0.000031 20192 5874 0.000048 
38.8 0.00019 
0.254201 
2Q1987 0.000053 0.000031 20890 6085 0.000048 0.254174 
3Q1987 0.000064 0.000038 21588 6296 0.000058 0.307574 
4Q1987 0.000072 0.000040 22286 6507 0.000065 0.342701 
1Q1988 0.000088 0.000046 22602 6784 0.000078 
73.7 0.00026 
0.298503 
2Q1988 0.000088 0.000046 22918 7060 0.000078 0.297758 
3Q1988 0.000095 0.000052 23233 7337 0.000085 0.322808 
4Q1988 0.000102 0.000056 23549 7613 0.000091 0.345994 
1Q1989 0.000120 0.000066 24098 7777 0.000107 
63.3 0.00046 
0.234443 
2Q1989 0.000134 0.000075 24647 7940 0.000120 0.262533 
3Q1989 0.000155 0.000088 25197 8103 0.000139 0.304390 
4Q1989 0.000173 0.000102 25746 8267 0.000156 0.341801 
1Q1990 0.000186 0.000114 26146 8465 0.000168 
60.3 0.00074 
0.226306 
2Q1990 0.000204 0.000127 26547 8664 0.000185 0.248700 
3Q1990 0.000222 0.000137 26947 8863 0.000201 0.270080 
4Q1990 0.000245 0.000151 27348 9062 0.000222 0.297822 
1Q1991 0.000268 0.000169 27078 9505 0.000242 
66.0 0.00119 
0.203123 
2Q1991 0.000312 0.000235 26808 9948 0.000291 0.244105 
3Q1991 0.000383 0.000328 26538 10392 0.000368 0.308127 
4Q1991 0.000430 0.000375 26268 10835 0.000414 0.347041 
1Q1992 0.000540 0.000500 27023 10997 0.000528 
70.1 0.00198 
0.266885 
2Q1992 0.000591 0.000574 27779 11160 0.000586 0.296025 
3Q1992 0.000665 0.000679 28535 11322 0.000669 0.337869 
4Q1992 0.000742 0.000770 29290 11484 0.000750 0.378732 
1Q1993 0.000836 0.000871 29908 11753 0.000846 
66.1 0.00337 
0.251153 
2Q1993 0.000947 0.000985 30527 12023 0.000958 0.284367 
3Q1993 0.001091 0.001133 31145 12292 0.001103 0.327463 
4Q1993 0.001286 0.001336 31763 12561 0.001300 0.386040 
1Q1994 0.001520 0.001503 31759 12784 0.001515 
106.2 0.00559 
0.270838 
2Q1994 0.002356 0.002329 31755 13007 0.002348 0.419749 
3Q1994 0.002565 0.002537 31751 13230 0.002557 0.457039 
4Q1994 0.002706 0.002676 31748 13452 0.002697 0.482120 
1Q1995 0.002932 0.002904 32749 13713 0.002924 93.6 0.01154 0.253462 
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2Q1995 0.003254 0.003238 33751 13974 0.003249 0.281686 
3Q1995 0.003748 0.003729 34752 14234 0.003742 0.324439 
4Q1995 0.004010 0.004004 35753 14495 0.004008 0.347481 
1Q1996 0.005265 0.005328 36414 14979 0.005283 
82.3 0.02233 
0.236581 
2Q1996 0.006514 0.006637 37075 15464 0.006550 0.293308 
3Q1996 0.007550 0.007720 37735 15948 0.007601 0.340338 
4Q1996 0.008752 0.008986 38396 16433 0.008822 0.395041 
1Q1997 0.009923 0.010201 39121 16954 0.010007 
85.7 0.04071 
0.245804 
2Q1997 0.010841 0.011149 39846 17475 0.010935 0.268594 
3Q1997 0.011957 0.012347 40571 17996 0.012077 0.296644 
4Q1997 0.014124 0.014711 41296 18517 0.014306 0.351392 
1Q1998 0.015947 0.016614 42023 18897 0.016154 
84.6 0.07560 
0.213672 
2Q1998 0.018344 0.019227 42751 19277 0.018618 0.246271 
3Q1998 0.021088 0.022101 43478 19658 0.021403 0.283109 
4Q1998 0.023201 0.024309 44206 20038 0.023547 0.311457 
1Q1999 0.026351 0.027791 44277 20675 0.026809 
64.9 0.13956 
0.192099 
2Q1999 0.030501 0.031974 44349 21313 0.030979 0.221977 
3Q1999 0.035287 0.037179 44420 21950 0.035913 0.257328 
4Q1999 0.040881 0.043072 44491 22588 0.041619 0.298214 
1Q2000 0.045191 0.047657 44893 22914 0.046024 
54.9 0.23013 
0.199989 
2Q2000 0.048402 0.051069 45294 23240 0.049306 0.214250 
3Q2000 0.051589 0.054410 45696 23566 0.052549 0.228339 
4Q2000 0.054770 0.057985 46097 23892 0.055867 0.242760 
1Q2001 0.065051 0.068638 45825 23821 0.066278 
54.4 0.35648 
0.185924 
2Q2001 0.092663 0.097735 45553 23751 0.094401 0.264816 
3Q2001 0.108814 0.114671 45280 23680 0.110825 0.310889 
4Q2001 0.123146 0.129758 45008 23609 0.125421 0.351833 
1Q2002 0.135150 0.142237 45968 23609 0.137555 
45.0 0.55040 
0.249916 
2Q2002 0.137850 0.145167 46927 23609 0.140299 0.254902 
3Q2002 0.145180 0.152890 47887 23609 0.147726 0.268396 
4Q2002 0.151385 0.159487 48846 23609 0.154025 0.279840 
1Q2003 0.152610 0.160761 50253 23850 0.155233 
25.3 0.79808 
0.194507 
2Q2003 0.123673 0.129624 51661 24090 0.125566 0.157334 
3Q2003 0.123673 0.129624 53068 24331 0.125544 0.157306 
4Q2003 0.119461 0.128515 54475 24572 0.122275 0.153211 
1Q2004 0.142800 0.158300 54205 25111 0.147707 
11.4 1.00000 
0.147707 
2Q2004 0.142800 0.158300 53935 25650 0.147796 0.147796 
3Q2004 0.142800 0.158300 53664 26189 0.147883 0.147883 
4Q2004 0.142800 0.158300 53394 26728 0.147971 0.147971 
 
  128 
Appendix 4-B: Real GDP per capita at 2004 Prices (YTL) and Net Electricity 
Consumption per capita (kWh) 
 
      GDP  Inflation   Real GDP Net Net Electricity 
  Population GDP at  per capita at (Annual Inflation per capita Electricity Consumption 
Period (thousand current prices current prices Change) Index (at 2004 Prices) Consumption per capita 
  people) (YTL) (YTL) % (2004=1) (YTL) (GWh) (kWh) 
1Q1984 48166 15,928,750 0.331 
48.4 0.00007 
5068.1 25258 524.4 
2Q1984 48467 17,951,500 0.370 5676.2 26050 537.5 
3Q1984 48769 19,974,250 0.410 6276.6 26843 550.4 
4Q1984 49070 21,997,000 0.448 6869.9 27635 563.2 
1Q1985 49379 25,271,500 0.512 
45.0 0.00010 
5285.1 28154 570.2 
2Q1985 49688 28,546,000 0.575 5932.8 28672 577.0 
3Q1985 49997 31,820,500 0.636 6572.5 29190 583.8 
4Q1985 50306 35,095,000 0.698 7204.3 29709 590.6 
1Q1986 50588 39,091,000 0.773 
34.6 0.00014 
5503.4 30334 599.6 
2Q1986 50870 43,087,000 0.847 6032.3 30959 608.6 
3Q1986 51151 47,083,000 0.920 6555.5 31584 617.5 
4Q1986 51433 51,079,000 0.993 7072.9 32210 626.3 
1Q1987 51715 56,989,750 1.102 
38.8 0.00019 
5830.9 33332 644.5 
2Q1987 51997 62,900,500 1.210 6400.7 34454 662.6 
3Q1987 52279 68,811,250 1.316 6964.4 35575 680.5 
4Q1987 52561 74,722,000 1.422 7522.1 36697 698.2 
1Q1988 52850 88,347,250 1.672 
73.7 0.00026 
6372.5 37453 708.7 
2Q1988 53138 101,972,500 1.919 7315.5 38209 719.1 
3Q1988 53427 115,597,750 2.164 8248.1 38965 729.3 
4Q1988 53715 129,223,000 2.406 9170.8 39722 739.5 
1Q1989 54010 153,748,500 2.847 
63.3 0.00046 
6247.4 40571 751.2 
2Q1989 54304 178,274,000 3.283 7204.8 41421 762.8 
3Q1989 54599 202,799,500 3.714 8151.7 42270 774.2 
4Q1989 54893 227,325,000 4.141 9088.6 43120 785.5 
1Q1990 55223 268,758,750 4.867 
60.3 0.00074 
6540.6 44045 797.6 
2Q1990 55553 310,192,500 5.584 7504.2 44970 809.5 
3Q1990 55882 351,626,250 6.292 8456.4 45895 821.3 
4Q1990 56212 393,060,000 6.992 9397.4 46820 832.9 
1Q1991 56482 452,324,250 8.008 
66.0 0.00119 
6714.0 47436 839.8 
2Q1991 56752 511,588,500 9.014 7557.6 48051 846.7 
3Q1991 57021 570,852,750 10.011 8393.3 48667 853.5 
4Q1991 57291 630,117,000 10.999 9221.0 49283 860.2 
1Q1992 57563 745,929,750 12.958 
70.1 0.00198 
6544.7 50458 876.6 
2Q1992 57835 861,742,500 14.900 7525.3 51634 892.8 
3Q1992 58107 977,555,250 16.823 8496.7 52809 908.8 
4Q1992 58379 1,093,368,000 18.729 9459.0 53985 924.7 
1Q1993 58654 1,315,492,750 22.428 
66.1 0.00337 
6659.2 55298 942.8 
2Q1993 58929 1,537,617,500 26.093 7747.3 56611 960.7 
3Q1993 59203 1,759,742,250 29.724 8825.5 57924 978.4 
4Q1993 59478 1,981,867,000 33.321 9893.5 59237 995.9 
1Q1994 59755 2,453,507,500 41.059 
106.2 0.00559 
7339.7 59778 1000.4 
2Q1994 60033 2,925,148,000 48.726 8710.0 60319 1004.8 
3Q1994 60310 3,396,788,500 56.322 10068.0 60860 1009.1 
4Q1994 60587 3,868,429,000 63.849 11413.5 61401 1013.4 
1Q1995 60867 4,841,935,750 79.549 
93.6 0.01154 
6896.2 62899 1033.4 
2Q1995 61147 5,815,442,500 95.106 8244.8 64397 1053.2 
3Q1995 61426 6,788,949,250 110.522 9581.3 65896 1072.8 
4Q1995 61706 7,762,456,000 125.797 10905.5 67394 1092.2 
1Q1996 61990 9,514,869,500 153.490 82.3 0.02233 6873.1 69085 1114.5 
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2Q1996 62274 11,267,283,000 180.931 8101.8 70775 1136.5 
3Q1996 62557 13,019,696,500 208.125 9319.5 72466 1158.4 
4Q1996 62841 14,772,110,000 235.071 10526.1 74157 1180.1 
1Q1997 63128 18,288,053,250 289.698 
85.7 0.04071 
7115.9 76089 1205.3 
2Q1997 63415 21,803,996,500 343.830 8445.5 78021 1230.3 
3Q1997 63702 25,319,939,750 397.475 9763.2 79953 1255.1 
4Q1997 63989 28,835,883,000 450.638 11069.0 81885 1279.7 
1Q1998 64278 34,683,148,500 539.580 
84.6 0.07560 
7137.2 83340 1296.6 
2Q1998 64567 40,530,414,000 627.726 8303.1 84795 1313.3 
3Q1998 64856 46,377,679,500 715.087 9458.6 86250 1329.9 
4Q1998 65145 52,224,945,000 801.672 10603.9 87705 1346.3 
1Q1999 65435 58,522,526,750 894.361 
64.9 0.13956 
6408.4 88579 1353.7 
2Q1999 65725 64,820,108,500 986.232 7066.7 89453 1361.0 
3Q1999 66014 71,117,690,250 1077.312 7719.3 90328 1368.3 
4Q1999 66304 77,415,272,000 1167.581 8366.1 91202 1375.5 
1Q2000 66595 89,207,318,500 1339.550 
54.9 0.23013 
5820.7 92975 1396.1 
2Q2000 66887 100,999,365,000 1510.000 6561.4 94749 1416.6 
3Q2000 67178 112,791,411,500 1678.993 7295.7 96522 1436.8 
4Q2000 67469 124,583,458,000 1846.529 8023.7 98296 1456.9 
1Q2001 67756 138,040,703,250 2037.321 
54.4 0.35648 
5715.1 97989 1446.2 
2Q2001 68044 151,497,948,500 2226.470 6245.7 97683 1435.6 
3Q2001 68331 164,955,193,750 2414.061 6772.0 97376 1425.1 
4Q2001 68618 178,412,439,000 2600.082 7293.8 97070 1414.6 
1Q2002 68903 203,202,843,500 2949.115 
45.0 0.55040 
5358.1 98540 1430.1 
2Q2002 69188 227,993,248,000 3295.272 5987.0 100009 1445.5 
3Q2002 69472 252,783,652,500 3638.641 6610.9 101479 1460.7 
4Q2002 69757 277,574,057,000 3979.157 7229.5 102948 1475.8 
1Q2003 70039 298,121,274,250 4256.504 
25.3 0.79808 
5333.4 105153 1501.3 
2Q2003 70321 318,668,491,500 4531.626 5678.1 107357 1526.7 
3Q2003 70603 339,215,708,750 4804.551 6020.1 109562 1551.8 
4Q2003 70885 359,762,926,000 5075.304 6359.4 111766 1576.7 
1Q2004 71165 377,450,063,750 5303.872 
11.4 1.00000 
5303.9 112965 1587.4 
2Q2004 71444 395,137,201,500 5530.726 5530.7 114164 1598.0 
3Q2004 71724 412,824,339,250 5755.735 5755.7 115362 1608.4 
4Q2004 72003 430,511,477,000 5979.077 5979.1 116561 1618.8 
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Appendix 4-C: Net Electricity Consumption in Turkey (1923-2004) 
 
                    
   Net Electricity   Net Electricity   Net Electricity   
   Consumption   Consumption   Consumption   
  Year (GWh)  Year (GWh)  Year (GWh)   
  1923 41.3  1951 764.0  1979 19,663.1   
  1924 41.3  1952 878.5  1980 20,398.2   
  1925 41.9  1953 1,012.5  1981 22,030.0   
  1926 60.6  1954 1,191.5  1982 23,586.8   
  1927 63.4  1955 1,347.3  1983 24,465.1   
  1928 81.4  1956 1,544.8  1984 27,635.2   
  1929 88.9  1957 1,757.0  1985 29,708.6   
  1930 96.7  1958 1,961.5  1986 32,209.7   
  1931 106.0  1959 2,170.5  1987 36,697.3   
  1932 117.5  1960 2,395.7  1988 39,721.5   
  1933 136.2  1961 2,585.4  1989 43,120.0   
  1934 157.7  1962 3,059.3  1990 46,820.0   
  1935 199.6  1963 3,406.3  1991 49,282.9   
  1936 206.8  1964 3,780.7  1992 53,984.7   
  1937 257.7  1965 4,236.8  1993 59,237.0   
  1938 279.9  1966 4,728.9  1994 61,400.9   
  1939 316.8  1967 5,269.2  1995 67,393.9   
  1940 359.3  1968 5,870.1  1996 74,156.6   
  1941 377.6  1969 6,679.0  1997 81,885.0   
  1942 372.5  1970 7,307.8  1998 87,704.6   
  1943 395.7  1971 8,289.3  1999 91,201.9   
  1944 429.9  1972 9,527.3  2000 98,295.7   
  1945 459.0  1973 10,530.1  2001 97,070.0   
  1946 487.0  1974 11,358.7  2002 102,948.0   
  1947 541.2  1975 13,491.7  2003 111,766.0   
  1948 585.7  1976 16,078.9  2004 116,561.0   
  1949 633.9  1977 17,968.8      
  1950 678.8  1978 18,933.8      
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Appendix 4-D: Time Series Plots of Real Electricity Prices, Real GDP per 
capita and Net Electricity Consumption per capita 
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Appendix 5: Estimation Outputs 
 
 
 
Appendix 5-A: OLS Estimation Output for Equation (14) 
 
Dependent Variable: LNE   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1984Q1 2004Q4   
Included observations: 84   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -5.124650 2.058049 -2.490052 0.0148 
LNP -1.167446 0.166995 -6.990908 0.0000 
LNY 1.178790 0.212901 5.536795 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.378947     Mean dependent var 6.901568 
Adjusted R-squared 0.363612     S.D. dependent var 0.338070 
S.E. of regression 0.269692     Akaike info criterion 0.251986 
Sum squared resid 5.891420     Schwarz criterion 0.338801 
Log likelihood -7.583411     F-statistic 24.71183 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.138525     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
      
 
 
Appendix 5-B: OLS Estimation Output for Equation (15) 
 
Dependent Variable: LNE   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1984Q2 2004Q4  
Included observations: 83 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.041010 0.052322 -0.783804 0.4355 
LNP -0.012257 0.005074 -2.415843 0.0180 
LNY 0.014779 0.006049 2.443350 0.0168 
LNE(-1) 0.986500 0.002672 369.2103 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.999633     Mean dependent var 6.909270 
Adjusted R-squared 0.999619     S.D. dependent var 0.332627 
S.E. of regression 0.006495     Akaike info criterion -7.188486 
Sum squared resid 0.003333     Schwarz criterion -7.071916 
Log likelihood 302.3222     F-statistic 71655.72 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.654315     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Appendix 5-C: White Heteroskedasticity Test Output for Equation (15) 
 
White Heteroskedasticity Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 1.645829     Prob. F(6,76) 0.146190 
Obs*R-squared 9.544376     Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.145197 
     
          
Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1984Q2 2004Q4   
Included observations: 83   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.000400 0.011245 -0.035613 0.9717 
LNP 8.79E-05 0.000189 0.465490 0.6429 
LNP^2 -1.73E-07 6.63E-05 -0.002605 0.9979 
LNY -9.98E-05 0.002609 -0.038238 0.9696 
LNY^2 -2.02E-06 0.000146 -0.013868 0.9890 
LNE(-1) 0.000427 0.001037 0.411713 0.6817 
LNE(-1)^2 -2.81E-05 7.57E-05 -0.370882 0.7118 
     
     R-squared 0.114992     Mean dependent var 4.02E-05 
Adjusted R-squared 0.045123     S.D. dependent var 4.68E-05 
S.E. of regression 4.57E-05     Akaike info criterion -17.06688 
Sum squared resid 1.59E-07     Schwarz criterion -16.86288 
Log likelihood 715.2754     F-statistic 1.645829 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.023832     Prob(F-statistic) 0.146190 
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Appendix 5-D: Breusch-Godfrey Test Output for Equation (15) 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 69.04066     Prob. F(1,78) 0.000000 
Obs*R-squared 38.97136     Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.000000 
     
          
Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1984Q2 2004Q4   
Included observations: 83   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.070172 0.039270 1.786913 0.0778 
LNP 0.006694 0.003805 1.759165 0.0825 
LNY -0.008219 0.004542 -1.809257 0.0743 
LNE(-1) 0.001704 0.001969 0.865534 0.3894 
RESID(-1) 0.706301 0.085004 8.309071 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.469534     Mean dependent var 1.43E-15 
Adjusted R-squared 0.442331     S.D. dependent var 0.006375 
S.E. of regression 0.004761     Akaike info criterion -7.798390 
Sum squared resid 0.001768     Schwarz criterion -7.652677 
Log likelihood 328.6332     F-statistic 17.26016 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.878140     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Appendix 5-E: Estimation Output of OLS with Newey-West 
Procedure for Equation (15) 
 
Dependent Variable: LNE   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1984Q2 2004Q4  
Included observations: 83 after adjustments  
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.041010 0.074577 -0.549903 0.5839 
LNP -0.012257 0.008346 -1.468604 0.1459 
LNY 0.014779 0.009852 1.500027 0.1376 
LNE(-1) 0.986500 0.005095 193.6392 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.999633     Mean dependent var 6.909270 
Adjusted R-squared 0.999619     S.D. dependent var 0.332627 
S.E. of regression 0.006495     Akaike info criterion -7.188486 
Sum squared resid 0.003333     Schwarz criterion -7.071916 
Log likelihood 302.3222     F-statistic 71655.72 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.654315     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
      
 
 
 
Appendix 5-F: OLS Estimation Output for Equation (16) 
 
Dependent Variable: LNE   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1984Q3 2004Q4  
Included observations: 82 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.653163 0.325404 2.007234 0.0483 
LNP -0.041065 0.008860 -4.634800 0.0000 
LNY 0.057235 0.011819 4.842577 0.0000 
LNE(-2) 0.861767 0.041823 20.60486 0.0000 
LNP(-2) 0.017296 0.005998 2.883757 0.0051 
@TREND(29) 0.001562 0.000587 2.660853 0.0095 
     
     R-squared 0.998977     Mean dependent var 6.916860 
Adjusted R-squared 0.998909     S.D. dependent var 0.327363 
S.E. of regression 0.010811     Akaike info criterion -6.146136 
Sum squared resid 0.008883     Schwarz criterion -5.970035 
Log likelihood 257.9916     F-statistic 14838.59 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.558808     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Appendix 5-G: White Heteroskedasticity Test Output for Equation (16) 
 
White Heteroskedasticity Test:  
     
     F-statistic 1.619995     Prob. F(10,71) 0.118502 
Obs*R-squared 15.23391     Prob. Chi-Square(10) 0.123764 
     
          
Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1984Q3 2004Q4   
Included observations: 82   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.017964 0.048179 -0.372861 0.7104 
LNP 0.001680 0.000653 2.572813 0.0122 
LNP^2 0.000539 0.000241 2.234292 0.0286 
LNY 0.011808 0.007782 1.517289 0.1336 
LNY^2 -0.000667 0.000435 -1.533302 0.1296 
LNE(-2) -0.010417 0.011962 -0.870873 0.3868 
LNE(-2)^2 0.000770 0.000823 0.935601 0.3526 
LNP(-2) -6.05E-05 0.000557 -0.108620 0.9138 
LNP(-2)^2 -2.99E-05 0.000215 -0.139264 0.8896 
@TREND(29) -2.94E-05 4.79E-05 -0.613819 0.5413 
(@TREND(29))^2 -9.74E-08 2.08E-07 -0.467174 0.6418 
     
     R-squared 0.185779     Mean dependent var 0.000108 
Adjusted R-squared 0.071100     S.D. dependent var 0.000133 
S.E. of regression 0.000129     Akaike info criterion -14.95567 
Sum squared resid 1.17E-06     Schwarz criterion -14.63282 
Log likelihood 624.1826     F-statistic 1.619995 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.196172     Prob(F-statistic) 0.118502 
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Appendix 5-H: Breusch-Godfrey Test Output for Equation (16) 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 80.72216     Prob. F(1,75) 0.000000 
Obs*R-squared 42.50659     Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.000000 
     
          
Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1984Q3 2004Q4   
Included observations: 82   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.097829 0.227590 0.429849 0.6685 
LNP 0.006639 0.006234 1.065008 0.2903 
LNY -0.010279 0.008336 -1.233149 0.2214 
LNE(-2) 1.24E-05 0.029218 0.000423 0.9997 
LNP(-2) -0.002559 0.004200 -0.609402 0.5441 
@TREND(29) 8.00E-06 0.000410 0.019510 0.9845 
RESID(-1) 0.737827 0.082122 8.984551 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.518373     Mean dependent var 1.35E-16 
Adjusted R-squared 0.479843     S.D. dependent var 0.010472 
S.E. of regression 0.007553     Akaike info criterion -6.852331 
Sum squared resid 0.004278     Schwarz criterion -6.646880 
Log likelihood 287.9456     F-statistic 13.45369 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.553819     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Appendix 5-I: Estimation Output of OLS with Newey-West 
Procedure for Equation (16) 
 
Dependent Variable: LNE   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1984Q3 2004Q4  
Included observations: 82 after adjustments  
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.653163 0.322592 2.024731 0.0464 
LNP -0.041065 0.015544 -2.641829 0.0100 
LNY 0.057235 0.018367 3.116284 0.0026 
LNE(-2) 0.861767 0.043749 19.69790 0.0000 
LNP(-2) 0.017296 0.006857 2.522487 0.0137 
@TREND(29) 0.001562 0.000584 2.674101 0.0092 
     
     R-squared 0.998977     Mean dependent var 6.916860 
Adjusted R-squared 0.998909     S.D. dependent var 0.327363 
S.E. of regression 0.010811     Akaike info criterion -6.146136 
Sum squared resid 0.008883     Schwarz criterion -5.970035 
Log likelihood 257.9916     F-statistic 14838.59 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.558808     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Appendix 5-J: Ramsey’s RESET Test Output for Equation (16) 
 
Ramsey RESET Test:   
     
     F-statistic 0.021673     Prob. F(1,75) 0.883357 
Log likelihood ratio 0.023692     Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.877671 
     
          
Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: LNE   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1984Q3 2004Q4   
Included observations: 82   
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.550829 1.045948 0.526631 0.6000 
LNP -0.042883 0.023660 -1.812437 0.0739 
LNY 0.059191 0.026327 2.248333 0.0275 
LNE(-2) 0.900155 0.352927 2.550546 0.0128 
LNP(-2) 0.017619 0.007356 2.395046 0.0191 
@TREND(29) 0.001673 0.001046 1.599527 0.1139 
FITTED^2 -0.003467 0.030929 -0.112082 0.9111 
     
     R-squared 0.998977     Mean dependent var 6.916860 
Adjusted R-squared 0.998895     S.D. dependent var 0.327363 
S.E. of regression 0.010881     Akaike info criterion -6.122035 
Sum squared resid 0.008880     Schwarz criterion -5.916583 
Log likelihood 258.0034     F-statistic 12206.32 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.547331     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Appendix 5-K: ADF Test Output for Variable LNE 
 
Null Hypothesis: LNE has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 2 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.008983  0.9365 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.075340  
 5% level  -3.466248  
 10% level  -3.159780  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LNE)   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1984Q4 2004Q4  
Included observations: 81 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LNE(-1) -0.014234 0.014107 -1.008983 0.3162 
D(LNE(-1)) 0.817644 0.112186 7.288264 0.0000 
D(LNE(-2)) -0.152445 0.113974 -1.337541 0.1850 
C 0.096042 0.088819 1.081326 0.2830 
@TREND(1984Q1) 0.000155 0.000198 0.785676 0.4345 
     
     R-squared 0.590348     Mean dependent var 0.013318 
Adjusted R-squared 0.568787     S.D. dependent var 0.007270 
S.E. of regression 0.004774     Akaike info criterion -7.791620 
Sum squared resid 0.001732     Schwarz criterion -7.643815 
Log likelihood 320.5606     F-statistic 27.38080 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.058138     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Appendix 5-L: ADF Test Output for Variable LNP 
 
Null Hypothesis: LNP has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 2 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.627504  0.2696 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.075340  
 5% level  -3.466248  
 10% level  -3.159780  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LNP)   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1984Q4 2004Q4  
Included observations: 81 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LNP(-1) -0.328946 0.125193 -2.627504 0.0104 
D(LNP(-1)) -0.128201 0.127760 -1.003448 0.3188 
D(LNP(-2)) -0.231465 0.114701 -2.017989 0.0471 
C -0.346218 0.149123 -2.321697 0.0229 
@TREND(1984Q1) -0.002212 0.001047 -2.111976 0.0380 
     
     R-squared 0.258894     Mean dependent var -0.008474 
Adjusted R-squared 0.219888     S.D. dependent var 0.219296 
S.E. of regression 0.193691     Akaike info criterion -0.385362 
Sum squared resid 2.851238     Schwarz criterion -0.237557 
Log likelihood 20.60717     F-statistic 6.637358 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.260532     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000123 
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Appendix 5-M: ADF Test Output for Variable LNY 
 
Null Hypothesis: LNY has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 2 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.614160  0.2754 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.075340  
 5% level  -3.466248  
 10% level  -3.159780  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LNY)   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1984Q4 2004Q4  
Included observations: 81 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LNY(-1) -0.314597 0.120344 -2.614160 0.0108 
D(LNY(-1)) -0.284724 0.121798 -2.337673 0.0220 
D(LNY(-2)) -0.357557 0.106247 -3.365347 0.0012 
C 2.838351 1.072483 2.646524 0.0099 
@TREND(1984Q1) -0.000854 0.000785 -1.087170 0.2804 
     
     R-squared 0.365476     Mean dependent var -0.000599 
Adjusted R-squared 0.332080     S.D. dependent var 0.200999 
S.E. of regression 0.164269     Akaike info criterion -0.714880 
Sum squared resid 2.050810     Schwarz criterion -0.567075 
Log likelihood 33.95265     F-statistic 10.94370 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.658289     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Appendix 5-N: ADF Test Output for Variable ∆LNE 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LNE) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 2 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.569026  0.0022 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.076860  
 5% level  -3.466966  
 10% level  -3.160198  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LNE,2)   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1985Q1 2004Q4  
Included observations: 80 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(LNE(-1)) -0.431331 0.094403 -4.569026 0.0000 
D(LNE(-1),2) 0.213854 0.112273 1.904765 0.0606 
D(LNE(-2),2) 0.212534 0.112233 1.893676 0.0621 
C 0.007902 0.002124 3.720568 0.0004 
@TREND(1984Q1) -5.13E-05 2.57E-05 -1.994177 0.0498 
     
     R-squared 0.217850     Mean dependent var -0.000207 
Adjusted R-squared 0.176135     S.D. dependent var 0.005203 
S.E. of regression 0.004723     Akaike info criterion -7.812458 
Sum squared resid 0.001673     Schwarz criterion -7.663581 
Log likelihood 317.4983     F-statistic 5.222387 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.055362     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000914 
     
      
 
  144 
Appendix 5-O: ADF Test Output for Variable ∆LNP 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LNP) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 2 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -13.98314  0.0001 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.076860  
 5% level  -3.466966  
 10% level  -3.160198  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LNP,2)   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1985Q1 2004Q4  
Included observations: 80 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(LNP(-1)) -2.788586 0.199425 -13.98314 0.0000 
D(LNP(-1),2) 1.214362 0.143948 8.436115 0.0000 
D(LNP(-2),2) 0.630397 0.088659 7.110329 0.0000 
C 0.043001 0.037602 1.143573 0.2564 
@TREND(1984Q1) -0.001501 0.000769 -1.951425 0.0547 
     
     R-squared 0.807216     Mean dependent var -0.001239 
Adjusted R-squared 0.796934     S.D. dependent var 0.347902 
S.E. of regression 0.156775     Akaike info criterion -0.807553 
Sum squared resid 1.843372     Schwarz criterion -0.658677 
Log likelihood 37.30213     F-statistic 78.50915 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.180600     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Appendix 5-P: ADF Test Output for Variable ∆LNY 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LNY) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 2 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -38.88917  0.0001 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.076860  
 5% level  -3.466966  
 10% level  -3.160198  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LNY,2)   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1985Q1 2004Q4  
Included observations: 80 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(LNY(-1)) -3.793587 0.097549 -38.88917 0.0000 
D(LNY(-1),2) 1.862172 0.069221 26.90186 0.0000 
D(LNY(-2),2) 0.932547 0.040171 23.21437 0.0000 
C 0.072953 0.014474 5.040253 0.0000 
@TREND(1984Q1) -0.001735 0.000295 -5.881906 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.968479     Mean dependent var -0.000653 
Adjusted R-squared 0.966798     S.D. dependent var 0.329185 
S.E. of regression 0.059982     Akaike info criterion -2.729082 
Sum squared resid 0.269838     Schwarz criterion -2.580205 
Log likelihood 114.1633     F-statistic 576.0951 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.728550     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Appendix 5-R: AEG Test Output for Equation (20) 
 
Unit root tests for residuals 
Based on  OLS regression of LNE on:                                        
C         LNP         LNY         LNP(-2)         TREND_29         LNE(-2) 
                                                                           
 82 observations used for estimation from 1984Q3 to 2004Q4                 
        Test Statistic      LL           AIC           SBC           HQC    
 DF         -3.4922      276.6860      275.6860      274.5013      275.2114 
 ADF(1)     -3.8941      278.0639      276.0639      273.6944      275.1146 
 ADF(2)     -5.3643      284.6611      281.6611      278.1070      280.2372 
95% critical value for the Dickey-Fuller statistic =  -4.9387               
 LL  = Maximized log-likelihood      AIC = Akaike Information Criterion     
 SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion    HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion           
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Appendix 6: Electricity Demand Forecasting for Turkey (2005-2015) 
 
 
 
Appendix 6-A: Time series plot of Net Electricity 
Consumption in Turkey (1923-2004)  
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Appendix 6-B: The Correlogram of Turkish Electricity 
Consumption Data up to 40 lags 
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Appendix 6-C: The Correlogram of the First-Differenced Data up to 40 lags 
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Appendix 6-D: The Correlogram of the Second-Differenced Data up to 40 lags 
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Appendix 6-E: The Output Table of ADF unit root test for 
the Second-Differenced Data 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(E,2) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 2 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.459685  0.0001 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.081666  
 5% level  -3.469235  
 10% level  -3.161518  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(E,3)   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1928 2004   
Included observations: 77 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(E(-1),2) -2.182197 0.399693 -5.459685 0.0000 
D(E(-1),3) 0.429314 0.317061 1.354042 0.1800 
D(E(-2),3) -0.048718 0.170577 -0.285604 0.7760 
C -168.7739 324.1367 -0.520687 0.6042 
@TREND(1923) 8.239787 6.739378 1.222633 0.2255 
     
     R-squared 0.804403     Mean dependent var -52.04026 
Adjusted R-squared 0.793536     S.D. dependent var 2867.817 
S.E. of regression 1303.086     Akaike info criterion 17.24559 
Sum squared resid 1.22E+08     Schwarz criterion 17.39778 
Log likelihood -658.9552     F-statistic 74.02595 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.960384     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Appendix 6-F: Estimation Output of OLS for Equation (23) 
 
Dependent Variable: D2E   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1938 2004   
Included observations: 67 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 275.9257 149.0168 1.851642 0.0689 
D2E(-1) -0.557877 0.103994 -5.364531 0.0000 
D2E(-2) -0.439390 0.109108 -4.027120 0.0002 
D2E(-4) -0.616152 0.157881 -3.902645 0.0002 
D2E(-6) -0.555630 0.213647 -2.600690 0.0117 
D2E(-13) 0.537760 0.329528 1.631908 0.1079 
     
     R-squared 0.612053     Mean dependent var 70.80746 
Adjusted R-squared 0.580254     S.D. dependent var 1812.079 
S.E. of regression 1174.006     Akaike info criterion 17.05952 
Sum squared resid 84075675     Schwarz criterion 17.25695 
Log likelihood -565.4938     F-statistic 19.24760 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.868246     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Appendix 6-G: The Correlogram of the Residuals from Equation (23) 
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Appendix 6-H: The Process of Conversion of Official Electricity Gross Demand 
Projections into Net Electricity Consumption Figures 
 
The relationship between various technical terms used to express electricity 
demand is shown below. Please note that network losses include both 
transmission and distribution losses; and internal consumption refers to 
electricity consumed by power plants for the purposes heating, pumping, 
traction, lighting and so on. 
 
  Internal  Import-  
  Consumption  Export  
 Import-    Internal 
 Export    Consumption 
      
   Gross   
Net Gross Net Demand Gross Net 
Consumption Consumption Supply = Generation Generation 
   Gross   
   Supply   
      
      
Network      
Losses      
 
 
The table below shows the data on gross demand, internal consumption and 
network losses for the latest available 10-year period (i.e., 1994-2003); and, as 
can be seen in the table, during this period, internal consumption and network 
losses accounted for 22.3% of gross demand on average. 
 
 
  Gross Internal Internal Cons. Network Network Losses  The Total 
  Demand Consumption as a % of Losses as a % of Total as a % of 
  (GWh) (GWh) Gross Demand (GWh) Gross Demand (GWh) Gross Demand 
  (a) (b)  (c)  (d=b+c)  
1994 77,783.0 4,539.1 5.8 11,843.0 15.2 16,382.1 21.1 
1995 85,551.5 4,388.8 5.1 13,768.8 16.1 18,157.6 21.2 
1996 94,788.6 4,777.3 5.0 15,854.8 16.7 20,632.1 21.8 
1997 105,517.1 5,050.2 4.8 18,581.9 17.6 23,632.1 22.4 
1998 114,022.7 5,523.2 4.8 20,794.9 18.2 26,318.1 23.1 
1999 118,484.9 5,738.0 4.8 21,545.0 18.2 27,283.0 23.0 
2000 128,275.6 6,224.0 4.9 23,755.9 18.5 29,979.9 23.4 
2001 126,871.3 6,472.6 5.1 23,328.7 18.4 29,801.3 23.5 
2002 132,552.6 5,672.7 4.3 23,931.9 18.1 29,604.6 22.3 
2003 141,150.9 5,332.2 3.8 24,052.7 17.0 29,384.9 20.8 
    Annual Average: 4.8   17.4   22.3 
Source: TEIAS (2005a,d)      
 
 
Assuming that internal consumption and network losses will continue to account 
for 22.3% of gross demand on average during the period 2005-2012. The 
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following table is prepared. In addition to calculated official net electricity 
consumption projections, the table also compares these projections with the 
forecasts based on ARIMA modelling. 
 
 
  Official   Forecasted Net   
  Projection Average Total Official Electricity Cons.  Difference as a 
  of Gross Int. Cons. and Net. Projection based on ARIMA  % of forecasts 
  Demand Losses as a % of of Net Cons. Modelling Difference based on ARIMA 
  (GWh) Gross Demand (GWh) (GWh) (GWh) Modelling 
      (e) (f) (g=e-f)   
2005 168,262 22.3 130,739.6 130,204.9 534.7 0.4 
2006 185,600 22.3 144,211.2 134,876.5 9,334.7 6.9 
2007 204,150 22.3 158,624.6 142,091.6 16,533.0 11.6 
2008 224,300 22.3 174,281.1 152,696.9 21,584.2 14.1 
2009 246,150 22.3 191,258.6 153,897.4 37,361.2 24.3 
2010 269,842 22.3 209,667.2 167,413.7 42,253.5 25.2 
2011 295,800 22.3 229,836.6 170,957.3 58,879.3 34.4 
2012 323,200 22.3 251,126.4 176,576.5 74,549.9 42.2 
 
